The Master case is only the tip of the iceberg
André Esteves, presidente do conselho do BTG Pactual, apresentou um diagnóstico ao mesmo tempo otimista e cautelar sobre a economia brasileira: bastaria um punhado de medidas fiscais para reduzir os juros e preparar o país para o próximo governo. Mas por trás da confiança, havia uma defesa institucional — sobre o papel do BTG na crise do Banco Master — e um aviso velado de que as vulnerabilidades do sistema financeiro ainda não foram plenamente reveladas.
- Esteves afirma que três ou quatro medidas de contenção de gastos seriam suficientes para derrubar a taxa de juros para entre 7% e 8%, sugerindo que o problema fiscal brasileiro é simples demais para justificar a inércia política.
- O BTG está no centro de investigações por ter distribuído CDBs do Banco Master, instituição que entrou em colapso, e Esteves enfrenta pressão pública e judicial para explicar o papel da plataforma na venda desses papéis.
- Sem admitir qualquer falha institucional, Esteves deslocou a responsabilidade para Ilan Goldfajn e a gestão anterior do Banco Central, acusando-os de omissão ao permitir a expansão de Vorcaro sem o devido reconhecimento regulatório.
- Ele propôs equiparar as carreiras e salários dos reguladores — Banco Central e CVM — aos do BNDES, mas deixou implícito que a vontade política para tal reforma provavelmente não existe.
- O alerta mais grave veio ao final: o caso Master seria apenas a ponta do iceberg, e os fundos de investimento poderiam ser o próximo epicentro de uma crise sistêmica ainda por vir.
André Esteves conduziu uma entrevista recente com a serenidade de quem acredita ter o diagnóstico certo. Para ele, a crise fiscal brasileira não exige soluções complexas: três ou quatro medidas de contenção de gastos seriam suficientes para sinalizar disciplina ao mercado e derrubar os juros para a faixa de 7% a 8%. O próximo presidente, sugeriu, poderia herdar um país já em recuperação.
Mas Esteves também precisou defender o BTG Pactual. O banco foi um dos principais distribuidores dos CDBs do Banco Master, a instituição de Daniel Vorcaro que entrou em colapso e gerou uma série de processos judiciais contra as plataformas envolvidas. Questionado sobre possíveis falhas nos controles internos, foi categórico: não houve erro algum da parte do BTG.
A culpa, em sua narrativa, recaiu sobre Ilan Goldfajn e a gestão anterior do Banco Central. Goldfajn teria permitido, por omissão, que a Master crescesse sem o devido reconhecimento regulatório — sem autorização formal para a aquisição de licença bancária, sem o reconhecimento de Vorcaro como agente relevante no sistema. O ministro Mercadante acompanhou a crítica, falando em negligência e cumplicidade.
Esteves foi além e apontou um problema estrutural: os órgãos reguladores são mal remunerados e subvalorizados. Sua proposta era direta — replicar no Banco Central e na CVM o modelo de carreira e salários do BNDES. Mas ele mesmo pareceu cético quanto à viabilidade política da ideia.
O tom mais sombrio veio no final. O caso Master, disse, não é um episódio isolado, mas um sinal de alerta. Os fundos de investimento seriam o próximo problema a emergir. Para além do otimismo fiscal, Esteves deixou no ar uma advertência: os testes mais duros do sistema financeiro ainda estão por vir.
André Esteves, who leads BTG Pactual's board, sat down recently to discuss Brazil's economic prospects with a confidence that bordered on the serene. The country's problems, he suggested, were not intractable. A handful of straightforward spending controls—three or four measures, he said, nothing elaborate—could signal to markets that the government was serious about fiscal discipline. If that happened, interest rates could fall to somewhere between 7 and 8 percent. The implication was clear: the next president would inherit a nation already on the mend, the hard work already done.
But Esteves also found himself in the position of defending his own institution. BTG Pactual, along with other major financial platforms like XP and Nubank, had been a primary distributor of certificates of deposit issued by Banco Master, the troubled institution run by Daniel Vorcaro. When Master's finances deteriorated, the role these brokerages had played in moving Vorcaro's paper came under intense scrutiny. Lawsuits followed. Esteves was asked directly whether BTG had failed in its control systems or in vetting the instruments it was selling. His answer was unambiguous: there was no error at BTG, none whatsoever.
The blame, in his telling, lay elsewhere. Ilan Goldfajn, who had led the Central Bank before the current administration, bore responsibility for what Esteves characterized as omission and tacit acceptance. Goldfajn's team had never formally authorized Master's acquisition of a banking license, nor had they formally recognized Vorcaro as a significant player in the financial system. Yet it happened anyway. The current finance minister, Mercadante, echoed this criticism, pointing to what he called negligence and complicity in the previous Central Bank's watch.
Esteves then pivoted to what he saw as the deeper structural problem: the institutions meant to police the financial system were understaffed and undervalued. He proposed something he framed as elementary. Take the career structure and compensation that the BNDES offered its employees—the state development bank that could afford to attract talent—and replicate it at the Central Bank and the Securities Commission. Empower those regulators, he said. Give them real authority. But he seemed skeptical it would happen. The political will, he implied, was not there.
What concerned him most, though, was what lay ahead. The Master case, he suggested, was not an isolated failure but a warning sign. Investment funds would be the next problem to surface. The deterioration at Master was, in his phrase, only the tip of the iceberg. The implication was that the financial system still harbored vulnerabilities that had not yet been exposed, that the cleanup was far from complete. For all his talk of simple solutions and an orderly handoff to the next administration, Esteves seemed to be signaling that the real stress tests were still to come.
Notable Quotes
There is no error at BTG, none whatsoever— André Esteves, BTG Pactual board chair
The previous Central Bank administration showed omission and tacit acceptance of Master's expansion— Finance Minister Mercadante, paraphrased
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
When Esteves says three or four measures could bring rates down to 7 or 8 percent, is he describing something that's actually within reach, or is this more of a theoretical exercise?
He's describing what he believes is achievable if the political class acts. But the gap between what's theoretically simple and what actually gets done in Brazil is vast. He seems to know this, which is why he sounds both confident and slightly exasperated.
On the Master bank question—is his denial of error at BTG credible, or is he just protecting the institution's reputation?
He's protecting it, certainly. But the legal and regulatory scrutiny suggests the question itself is legitimate. BTG was a major distributor of Master's paper. Whether that constitutes an error in judgment or a failure of due diligence is what the courts will decide, not what Esteves says in an interview.
He blames the previous Central Bank leadership for omission. Does that actually resolve anything, or is it just finger-pointing?
It's both. There may be real negligence in how the previous administration handled Master's licensing. But pointing backward doesn't fix what's broken now. It's a way of saying the problem was inherited, not created.
What does he mean when he says investment funds will be the next crisis?
He's suggesting that Master is a symptom, not the disease. If a major bank could deteriorate this badly without adequate oversight, what else is hidden in the financial system? Investment funds are less regulated than banks. If there are similar problems there, they could surface next.
So his optimism about the incoming president inheriting a 'tidy' nation—how genuine is that?
It's conditional. He believes the fiscal measures can work. But he's also warning that the financial system itself is still fragile. He's being optimistic about one thing while sounding an alarm about another.