Half a century after the Soviet Union first let its citizens choose among candidates, the quiet work of watching elections has become a small but meaningful thread in the fabric of democratic life. A former American diplomat recalls how observation grew from a curiosity into a practice that informs reform, through reports rather than authority, and how the country that once championed it now hesitates. The question he leaves hanging is whether those who watch the ballot will be welcomed to do so again.
Why International Election Observation Still Matters: A Veteran Observer's Case for Transparency
Observers have no power to change results, only to make findings available
Half a century after the Soviet Union first let its citizens choose among candidates, the quiet work of watching elections has become a small but meaningful thread in the fabric of democratic life. A former American diplomat recalls how observation grew from a curiosity into a practice that informs reform, through reports rather than authority, and how the country that once championed it now hesitates. The question he leaves hanging is whether those who watch the ballot will be welcomed to do so again.
In 1988, Doug Wake traveled to Leningrad as a Foreign Service officer expecting to discuss a rival state with no interest in elections. Then Mikhail Gorbachev announced competitive votes for a new Soviet congress and regional parliaments, and the mood shifted. Reform candidates organized, Baltic movements prepared to press for independence, and Wake followed the campaigns without knowing whether the counts would be honest. The elections were far from fully democratic, yet in Leningrad a grassroots campaign encouraged voters to strike out the name of an entrenched party boss, and more than half did. Wake, without accreditation, was never refused when he asked to visit polling stations, and only later understood that his conversations and visits were a form of observation.
Over the following decades, the United States became a leading backer of election observation, funding civil society monitors and international bodies while embassy staff often watched votes themselves. Wake went on to observe more than two dozen elections in nearly twenty countries, many through the OSCE's Warsaw-based office, from Ukraine after Crimea to Hungary and Poland. His conclusion is that observation is practical and inexpensive, yet its power is soft: observers cannot change procedures, only report, and responsible missions avoid simple verdicts.
Since 2025, Wake argues, American support for democratic institutions has sharply faded. The United States was not invited to observe its 2026 midterms, and whether funding and political backing will return remains an open question.
Doug Wake went to Leningrad in 1988 as a Foreign Service officer to consult experts on America's chief rival. Nobody he spoke to mentioned elections, because none had been scheduled in the USSR and none had mattered there since 1917. Then General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced competitive elections: to a new Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, and to regional parliaments in 1990. Activists began preparing to campaign.
In Leningrad, an informal coalition planned to field candidates who supported reform. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, popular movements meant to use the Soviet vote to send delegates to Moscow in 1989 and to restore independence in 1990. Wake and his colleagues followed the campaigns closely, without knowing whether ballots would be counted fairly or real results announced. By his account, in Leningrad and the Baltics they largely were. Still, the elections were far from fully democratic: only one party was legal, independent candidates met obstacles, and the most powerful communist official in Leningrad used his authority to become the only candidate in one working-class district.
On a Saturday outing shortly before the vote, Wake came across a banner and a grassroots campaign telling voters that Soviet law let them cross out the official's name. More than half did, humiliating the party boss and prompting his early retirement. During those years Wake also asked officials for permission to enter polling stations. He had no accreditation, yet was never refused. Only later did he see that talking to organizers, watching street campaigns, and visiting polling places amounted to election observation.
Wake, now writing in the Foreign Service Journal, traces how democracy promotion became Western policy after World War II, but only became an explicit American diplomatic and development goal at the end of the Cold War, when support for free elections was tied to longer-term security, stability, and prosperity. Through USAID and other channels, Washington funded better electoral processes abroad, and embassy staff often watched elections themselves. For decades the United States was the leading political and financial backer of domestic civil society observers and of regional and global international observation bodies.
He says that has changed since 2025. U.S. support for democratic institutions and elections has been deemphasized, in his words "to put it mildly." Elections and political participation have vanished from the State Department's Annual Country Reports on Human Rights, nongovernmental partners have lost American support, and administration officials have publicly endorsed particular right-wing candidates in Europe.
Wake himself observed more than two dozen elections in nearly 20 countries, as a U.S. diplomat and as an international civil servant, mostly with the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. His missions included Ukraine after the 2014 Crimea annexation, Russia's Far East and Moldova in 2016, Hungary in 2018 when Viktor Orbán kept power, and Poland in 2023 when a pro-European coalition replaced the ruling party. His conclusion is that good observation is a cost-effective, practical tool for transparency and democratic development, deserving support from the United States among others.
He is plain about its limits. Observers cannot intervene or change procedures or results; their power is soft, resting on reports and public statements that media, the European Union (which uses them to gauge membership progress), parliaments, civil society, and voters can use. Their mere presence can deter fraud, though governments do not always behave better when watched. And responsible missions avoid binary verdicts of "free and fair" or "legitimate," since none are perfect.
A typical mission, on the ODIHR model also largely adopted by the EU and the Carter Center, puts a core team of experts and long-term observers on the ground for six to eight weeks, with short-term observers visiting polling stations on election day. Analysts examine the legal framework, election administration, media, campaign finance, gender equality, and human rights. Missions may deploy up to a thousand or more observers. Reputable groups follow a common Declaration of Principles and code of conduct stressing impartiality, and judge elections against international standards the state itself has accepted.
The OSCE observed U.S. elections from 2002 to 2024. For the 2026 midterms, it was not invited. Whether funding and political backing for observation return is the question Wake leaves open.
Citas Notables
Good international observation is a cost-effective and practical tool to foster transparency and promote democratic development.— Doug Wake, former U.S. diplomat and election observer
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