On a Tuesday in late October, Libya's parliament, in its eastern seat, gave unanimous assent to a maritime pact with Turkey that sketches a direct economic corridor across the sea between two shores. The accord is an old document, first signed in 2019, that lacked the blessing of the east until now, and its arrival has stirred the familiar old quarrel over who owns the water above rich and unseen seabeds. Athens and Brussels answer it with the language of law, while Ankara answers with the language of geography and the claim that a sea shaped by small islands cannot be divided by their shadows
Turkey-Libya Maritime Deal Deepens Rift with Greece and Draws EU Rebuke
Whose claims are legitimate in the eastern Mediterranean is the central contention.
Libya's eastern parliament has now backed a deal the west signed in 2019. Why does that matter so much?
Because the deal had a weak side. The eastern government opposed it, so it lacked full Libyan backing. A unanimous vote removes that objection.
And Greece's objection is about islands?
Crete, Karpathos and Rhodes sit in the path of the corridor. Greece says islands generate full EEZs, and the corridor ignores that.
Greece also cites Article 121 of UNCLOS. But Turkey never signed that convention, so how binding is it on Ankara?
That's the crux. Turkey doesn't accept a UN arbitration tribunal, so there's no obvious forum to settle it.
And the EU calling it null and void is a political statement, not a ruling. Nothing in the reporting says a court has decided.
Why did the east flip?
The reporting points to Turkey's outreach to Hifter: reconstruction contracts, weapons, training. It says this appears to have led to rapprochement.
"Appears" is carrying weight there. The motives of the eastern parliament aren't spelled out, and the gas estimates, several hundred billion dollars, are estimates only.
What's the practical risk?
The EastMed pipeline route is crossed by the corridor, and the sharper disputes are expected once drilling starts.
Expected, not certain. The two-bloc scenario is a long-term possibility the analysis raises, not something that has happened.
Le Pouls
- Libya's eastern parliament reversed course and unanimously endorsed a maritime corridor with Turkey, giving a decade-old deal new force.
- Athens and Brussels reacted within hours, calling the memorandum null and void and invoking the sovereign rights of Greek islands.
- Greece leans on UNCLOS and an International Court of Justice precedent, while Turkey, which never signed the convention, rejects arbitration.
- Hundreds of billions of dollars in possible gas beneath the seabed raise the stakes, and the corridor cuts across the planned EastMed pipeline route.
- Analysts warn the eastern Mediterranean may harden into two rival blocs as extraction edges closer.
On a Tuesday in late October, Libya's parliament, in its eastern seat, gave unanimous assent to a maritime pact with Turkey that sketches a direct economic corridor across the sea between two shores. The accord is an old document, first signed in 2019, that lacked the blessing of the east until now, and its arrival has stirred the familiar old quarrel over who owns the water above rich and unseen seabeds. Athens and Brussels answer it with the language of law, while Ankara answers with the language of geography and the claim that a sea shaped by small islands cannot be divided by their shadows alone. What unfolds here is less a single decision than another chapter in the long human contest over the sea and what lies beneath it.
On Tuesday, Libya's parliament voted unanimously to approve a maritime agreement with Turkey, opening a direct economic corridor between the southern coast of Turkey and the northern coast of Libya. In Ankara the vote was welcomed at once. In Athens and Brussels it was rejected just as swiftly.
The agreement is not new. Turkey signed it in 2019 with the UN-recognized government in western Libya, but the rival government in the east had opposed it, and without the east the deal rested on shaky ground. Now the east has changed its position, and the corridor finds a political footing it lacked before.
What drives the dispute is what lies beneath the sea. Recent finds suggest natural gas worth several hundred billion dollars may sit under the seabed. The corridor, Greece argues, ignores the rights of its islands, including Crete, Karpathos and Rhodes, which Athens says carry full exclusive economic zones under UNCLOS. Greece has the European Union's support, and Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief, has told Turkey the vote infringes the sovereign rights of third states. Turkey counters that a sea crowded with small islands should not give each one a full zone, and it has never signed the convention, so it refuses to let a UN tribunal hear the case. Even experts disagree on what a fair division would be.
Behind the legal fight lies a political story. In 2019, Turkey had intervened militarily in Libya's civil war to help the Tripoli government repel an offensive by the eastern commander Khalifa Hifter. Since then Ankara has built ties with Hifter's camp too, winning reconstruction contracts and joining with Libya's oil corporation on seismic surveys, while supplying arms and training to his forces. In doing so, Turkey has also pushed back against Egyptian and Russian influence in the east.
For the east, the deal offers a claim on resources and a larger place on the world stage. But it also crosses the planned route of the EastMed pipeline, meant to carry gas from Israel and Cyprus through Greece to Europe. Analysts expect the disputes to deepen once drilling begins, and fear the region may divide into a Turkey-Libya axis on one side and a grouping of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel on the other.
On Tuesday, Libya's parliament voted unanimously to approve a maritime agreement with Turkey, creating a direct economic corridor between the southern coast of Turkey and the northern coast of Libya. The vote was quickly welcomed by Turkey's Foreign Ministry. It was rejected just as quickly in Athens and Brussels.
The agreement itself is not new. Turkey signed it in 2019 with the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in western Libya. But the rival government in the east opposed it, and without the east, the deal stood on uncertain ground. Now the eastern parliament has reversed its position, which gives the corridor a political footing it did not have before.
The stakes are largely about what lies underneath. Large oil and gas deposits have recently been found in the area, and estimates suggest natural gas worth several hundred billion US dollars may sit beneath the seabed. Turkey and Libya want to secure their economic rights to those resources and develop them jointly. The corridor, however, disregards Greek islands including Crete, Karpathos and Rhodes. Greece maintains that it holds a full exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, around them.
Greece's Foreign Ministry said on X that it firmly rejects the agreement and that it has the European Union's backing. The ministry quoted the EU as calling the memorandum null and void, saying it violates the sovereign rights of third states and is inconsistent with the Law of the Sea. Kaja Kallas, the EU's high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, posted similar language on X. She said she had raised the Libyan vote with Turkey and stressed that it infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states.
The legal argument turns on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. Greece points to Article 121, under which inhabited islands that support an economic life of their own carry the same EEZ rights as mainland territory. Athens says that covers Crete, Rhodes and Lesbos. It also cites a 2022 International Court of Justice ruling that found Colombia had violated Nicaragua's sovereign rights by authorizing fishing in Nicaragua's EEZ. In that case, the court held that overlapping interests call for a fair demarcation weighing coastlines, geography and the effects of any boundary.
Turkey's government counters that Mediterranean geography deserves special weight. If every small Greek island near the Turkish and Cypriot coasts received a full EEZ, it argues, Turkey would be largely cut off from the open sea. Turkey has never signed UNCLOS, so it does not accept having the dispute heard by a UN arbitration tribunal. Even international law-of-the-sea experts disagree about what a fair division would look like here.
The politics behind Libya's turn are as notable as the law. In 2019, a brutal civil war was still underway, and Turkey intervened militarily in the west to back the Tripoli government, helping repel an offensive by eastern general Khalifa Hifter. Since then, a Turkish charm offensive appears to have produced a rapprochement with Hifter and his camp. Turkey now has mutually advantageous relations with both halves of Libya. Turkish construction firms have won contracts worth billions for reconstruction, and Turkey's state oil company TPAO and Libya's National Oil Corporation are already working on joint plans for seismic surveys off Libya's coast. Turkey has also become a military partner for Hifter's forces, supplying weapons and training, and in doing so it is pushing back against Egyptian and Russian influence in the east.
For the east, approval means a claim on the resources, and potentially greater international standing for Hifter. The corridor also cuts across the planned route of the EastMed pipeline, meant to carry gas from Israel and Cyprus through Greece and strengthen EU energy security. Turkey has argued that cable or pipeline projects on its claimed continental shelf need its consent. The article's analysis is that disputes will likely sharpen once extraction begins, and that the region could split into two blocs: a Turkey-Libya axis, and an EU-supported grouping of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel.
Citations marquantes
I raised yesterday's Libyan vote on a maritime MoU with Türkiye and stressed that it infringes upon the sovereign rights of third states.— Kaja Kallas, EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, on X
The EU has described the Turkish-Libyan memorandum as null and void, violating third states' sovereign rights and inconsistent with the Law of the Sea.— Greek Foreign Ministry, on X (paraphrased)