On the same day Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Washington to press for long-range missiles, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin spoke by phone, and the two capitals offered differing readouts of a conversation that, read closely, promised less than its reception suggested. Talk of a second summit was raised but not agreed, and what emerged looks less like a turning point than a sequencing decision: lower-level diplomacy first, leaders later, a pattern already familiar from Alaska. Beneath the procedural motion lies a deeper stalemate, since the terms each side considers non-negotiable have not yet
Trump-Putin Call Yields Process Concession, Not Breakthrough; Tomahawk Stance Softens
The call was discussed, not agreed: a summit still only possible
So what actually came out of this call?
Less than the headlines implied. Trump spoke as if a second summit were close, but Ushakov's account says it was discussed, not agreed.
And that's Ushakov's account, which is Moscow's framing. We don't have a neutral transcript of the call.
What's the concession the piece points to?
Sequence. Lower-level talks first, then a summit. The author calls it a shape-of-the-table concession, similar to Trump dropping ceasefire-first at Alaska.
Why would that help both leaders?
Domestically. Putin faces hardliners and sharper questions from the press pool. Trump gets time against Graham and Blumenthal on sanctions.
That's the author's reading of motives. Nothing in the readouts states it, so treat it as interpretation.
And the Tomahawks?
The author says they're hard to use without it being obvious who's operating them, there are too few, and they're nuclear capable. He thinks Putin made headway in the call, though the excerpt doesn't show what was said.
Right, that claim rests on a passage we can't see. Also, the Sleboda 2027 projection and the European political predictions are one commentator's views, not established fact.
What would show real movement?
Return of the seized Russian diplomatic property and restored direct flights, plus how Trump decides on the Tomahawks.
Le Pouls
- Zelensky's Washington visit collided with a Trump-Putin call, and the two readouts immediately diverged in tone and detail.
- Moscow has refused to confirm a second summit, while Kremlin aides insist that preparations will move slowly, in stages.
- Pressure from Senate hawks over Russian oil buyers has been deflected by pointing to the EU, leaving Washington's sanctions threat hanging.
- The looming Tomahawk decision has become the sharpest escalation point, with Moscow signaling alarm while avoiding the look of panic.
- Core positions on neutrality and NATO remain far apart, so the new track is landing as a process rather than a path to peace.
On the same day Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Washington to press for long-range missiles, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin spoke by phone, and the two capitals offered differing readouts of a conversation that, read closely, promised less than its reception suggested. Talk of a second summit was raised but not agreed, and what emerged looks less like a turning point than a sequencing decision: lower-level diplomacy first, leaders later, a pattern already familiar from Alaska. Beneath the procedural motion lies a deeper stalemate, since the terms each side considers non-negotiable have not yet found common ground, and each leader may be buying room at home more than advancing a settlement abroad.
On the day Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky flew to Washington for his third visit since January, to press Trump for Tomahawk missiles able to strike deep inside Russia, Trump also spoke by phone with Vladimir Putin. The White House and the Kremlin published separate accounts, and the commentary that followed ran far ahead of what either account actually says.
Trump seemed to oversell the prospect of a second summit. Putin's aide Yury Ushakov said only that such a meeting had been discussed and not agreed, though he also said preparations would start at once, with Budapest a possible venue. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov then lowered expectations, saying preparation would come in stages: first a call between Lavrov and Rubio, then a meeting, with negotiating teams still to be named.
The author reads this as a concession on process, not substance: lower-level talks first, a summit later, much as Alaska went when Putin persuaded Trump to drop his ceasefire demand. Trump had been under pressure from senators to impose secondary sanctions on buyers of Russian oil, and the Alaska process gave him cover. When India's case backfired, his team tied sanctions to the EU, and the EU's refusal let him set the hawks aside.
The Tomahawk request is the sharpest demand of the moment, and experts doubt it is workable. Ground launchers would be large and vulnerable, there are too few missiles to matter, and their nuclear capability makes Russia unwilling to accept the precedent. Zelensky said Moscow rushed to resume dialogue as soon as it heard about the request.
On substance, nothing is near. Russian and Ukrainian, American and European positions do not overlap, and Kyiv and most European states will not accept neutrality or a pledge never to join NATO. The call may matter most inside Russia, where hardliners want a tougher line and even Putin's own journalists have questioned him. Two signs will show whether the new track goes anywhere: the return of seized Russian diplomatic property and direct flights, and Trump's decision on Tomahawks.
On the day Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky flew into Washington for his third visit since January, the White House and the Kremlin each put out their own account of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Zelensky had come to press Trump to supply Tomahawk missiles capable of striking deep inside Russia. The call landed on top of that visit, and the commentary that followed ran well ahead of what the two readouts actually say.
The analysis at Naked Capitalism argues that the readouts contain much less than the excited reaction suggested. Trump appeared to oversell the prospect of a second summit with Putin. But the summary from Putin's aide Yury Ushakov says the idea of another personal meeting was discussed, not agreed to by the Russian side. Ushakov said representatives of both countries would begin preparations immediately, with Budapest named as a possible venue. The author notes the oddity of preparing at once for something that is only a possibility. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov then talked down expectations, telling a TASS reporter that preparation would come in stages. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of State Marco Rubio would first speak by phone and then meet, and negotiating teams still had to be determined.
The author reads this as a process concession by Trump: lower-level talks first, then a summit. That echoes what Alaska produced, where Putin persuaded Trump to drop his demand for a ceasefire before negotiations. The author stresses that this is a question of process, not of what a peace would contain. Skeptics saw the ceasefire demand as a way for Ukraine to regroup and rearm.
The piece also credits the Alaska summit with giving Trump cover. He was under heavy pressure from Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal to impose secondary sanctions on countries buying Russian oil, a step that would hit trade with China and others. Graham had claimed 80 votes for his sanctions bill. Trump was already finding with India that the approach backfired. His team then said it would impose such sanctions only if the EU did as well, and the EU's refusal let him wave off the hawks. The author adds that Trump claimed in a call with Modi that India had agreed to stop importing Russian oil, which India denied in carefully worded terms.
The Tomahawk question is the escalatory demand of the moment. The author says experts have picked apart whether it is feasible. A ground-launched system, needed to sustain the pretense that Ukraine operates the missiles, would be large and likely destroyed by Russia, and there are too few missiles to matter. Tomahawks are also nuclear capable, so Russia cannot accept the precedent even if the missiles fired at it were conventional. Putin and others have tried to signal alarm without appearing panicked. The author thinks Putin made progress on that front in this call. Zelensky, for his part, said Moscow was rushing to resume dialogue as soon as it heard about Tomahawks.
On substance, the author sees no settlement ahead. Russian positions and those of Ukraine, the US and the EU do not overlap. Ukraine and most European states will not accept a neutral Ukraine or a pledge never to join NATO. The author says Washington cannot cut a deal over Kyiv's head, and that cutting intelligence to force compliance would not be tolerated by Congress.
The call may matter most at home. Russian hardliners, and reportedly a broader public, have charged that Putin is too soft and that talks with the West are pointless. Even Putin's favored journalist Pavel Zarubin has questioned him sharply. The call undercuts claims, including from the Russian Foreign Ministry, that the Alaska process was dead. The author also sees Russia content to keep grinding Ukraine down, citing Mark Sleboda's projection of operations into 2027, and points to strain in Europe: Andrej Babis forming a government in the Czech Republic, and Macron weakened in France with his term ending in May 2027.
Two indicators are worth watching. Russia has asked for the return of seized diplomatic property and the reopening of direct flights, and the author says progress on either would show the new track is going somewhere. So would the Tomahawk decision Trump is weighing in his meeting with Zelensky.
Citations marquantes
Preparations for a Putin-Trump meeting will be in several stages, with Lavrov and Rubio working out the issues first.— Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman, via TASS
Moscow is rushing to resume dialogue as soon as it hears about Tomahawks.— Volodymyr Zelensky, per the BBC