Taiwan's 2028 Election Could Trigger Beijing's Most Aggressive Move Yet

The Taiwan Strait has grown quiet in recent months, a deceptive calm that masks the approach of a critical juncture. Chinese fighter jets still cross the centerline between Taiwan and mainland China with regularity. Warships maneuver in the waters to the island's east. Coast guard vessels continue their harassment operations. Yet for nearly a year, Beijing has refrained from the large-scale military exercises that became routine after Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan—a notable shift that reflects something more calculated than restraint.

This pause stems from renewed optimism in Beijing about Taiwan's political future. Xi Jinping has directed his military to prepare for a cross-strait confrontation, but not yet. For years, analysts in Washington and across the Asia-Pacific assumed 2027 would be the pivotal moment—the year Xi had set as a deadline for military readiness. As that date approaches, however, it appears increasingly unlikely that Xi intends to use force soon. He has conducted systematic purges of his military leadership, a move that suggests confidence in his ability to manage both Washington and Taipei without immediate crisis. His real focus lies elsewhere: on Taiwan's 2028 presidential election, and on the parallel U.S. election that same year.

Xi's calculation rests on a specific hope. The opposition Kuomintang party, which Beijing views as more amenable to dialogue, might return to power after a dozen years under the Democratic Progressive Party—a party the mainland regards as separatist and dangerous. Beijing has maintained no visible diplomatic channels with Taiwan's government since the DPP took office in 2016, a stark departure from Xi's approach to his predecessor's administration. In 2015, Xi became the first Chinese leader since Mao Zedong to shake hands with a Taiwanese president, a moment he clearly valued. Yet under the DPP, Taiwan has drifted further from the mainland, frustrating Xi's ambitions to begin the political process of annexing the island—his true objective, far preferable to the costs and risks of military invasion.

Xi's hopes brightened in November 2025 when Cheng Li-wun unexpectedly became chair of the Kuomintang. Cheng has advocated a softer approach toward China, emphasizing shared cultural identity across the strait and the need for dialogue. In April 2026, she traveled to Beijing to meet with Xi, a meeting that allowed him to present his Taiwan policy as conciliatory and reasonable despite a decade of coercive pressure on the ruling party. Yet Cheng's position is fragile. Her pro-Beijing views are not widely shared even within her own party. She won the KMT chairmanship with just over 50 percent of the vote, and only 27 percent of Taiwan's population supports her party. Her prospects for becoming the KMT's presidential candidate in 2028, let alone winning the general election, remain precarious.

This uncertainty sets the stage for Xi's dilemma. In 2028, he will likely face either a second term for the current president, Lai Ching-te, or a more cautious KMT leader wary of Xi's overtures. If Lai wins reelection with a renewed legislative majority, it would shatter Xi's hopes for a viable alternative to DPP rule. After Lai's 2024 victory—achieved with only a plurality of votes and amid KMT gains in the legislature—Beijing rationalized the result as evidence that most Taiwanese opposed his approach to the mainland. A second Lai victory would be far harder to explain away, leaving Xi as steward of a stagnant Taiwan policy that has produced no political progress in over a decade.

As Xi enters what may be his fourth term in 2027, he will be increasingly impatient. By the end of that term, he will be nearly 80 years old. If Taiwan's 2028 election disappoints him, he may reach for more aggressive tools. He learned from the 2022 Pelosi visit that he could escalate dramatically—firing missiles over Taiwan for the first time since the 1990s, imposing maritime exclusion zones—without triggering a full crisis with the United States or serious consequences for China. After the Communist Party's 21st Congress next year, when he reshuffles his military leadership, he may feel even more confident in his high command.

The next phase of coercion could involve sustained military pressure short of actual warfare: stopping foreign ships at sea, declaring zones near Taiwan off-limits to international traffic, disrupting high-profile U.S. arms deliveries. Such moves would signal that Taiwan's connection to the outside world exists only with Beijing's permission. Yet the endgame remains unclear. Escalation might push Taiwan's voters toward acceptance of mainland rule—or it might backfire entirely, creating a rally-around-the-flag effect that strengthens anti-Beijing sentiment, as happened after the third Taiwan Strait crisis in the 1990s.

Meanwhile, the window for Washington to strengthen Taiwan is closing. Taiwan has transformed itself into a model partner, reorienting its economy away from China and toward the United States while dramatically increasing defense spending. In May, it passed a supplemental defense bill appropriating $25 billion for the military. Taiwan's outbound investment in China has plummeted from over 80 percent in 2010 to less than 10 percent today. Its semiconductor industry, fueled by the AI boom, has made it the fourth-largest trading partner of the United States, with leading companies promising hundreds of billions in U.S. investment. Yet Trump's recent statements—describing arms sales as a bargaining chip and expressing reluctance to defend Taiwan militarily—have unsettled Taipei and undermined decades of precedent. A $14 billion arms package sits on his desk, unapproved. The long lead times for weapons delivery make haste essential now, while Xi waits to see what 2028 will bring. If Washington delays, the next administration may lack the opportunity or the willing partner to enhance Taiwan's defenses before an aging, potentially more aggressive Xi decides that further patience no longer serves his interests.