Midterms May Not Change Trump's Iran Policy, Analysts Warn, as Washington Consensus Runs Deeper Than It Appears

Voters go to the polls this Tuesday in a midterm election that Deutsche Welle describes as one of the most consequential in modern US history. Washington's relationship with Israel and the war on Iran sit at the center of the standoff. Whether the result will change how the war is run is another matter, and analysts who spoke to DW doubt it will, at least not by much.

The Democratic side is loud in its criticism. Abdul El-Sayed, the party's Senate nominee in Michigan and one of its rising stars, has called the conflict "illegal" and "stupid." President Donald Trump, for his part, spent the campaign playing the war down. Last week he said only "one or two targets" remained in Iran and that they could be dealt with in 10 minutes. In the same breath, he added that messages were still passing between the two sides, that Tehran remained keen on a deal, and that the US had plenty of time.

There are also reports that the US and Israel are preparing a new round of strikes on Iran right after the election. Pro-war Republicans are pushing the White House in that direction. Senator Ted Cruz, after a day with Trump, wrote online that he had urged arming Iranian protesters to overthrow the regime, and he has pressed the administration to deal with what he calls the threat from Iran.

Behind the partisan noise, analysts see less division than the campaign suggests. Former National Security Advisor John Bolton told DW that Democrats are likely to win the House and possibly the Senate, which would hand them influence over war funding. Congress can set defense budgets or restrict how money is spent. But Bolton noted that the president can veto legislation, and overriding a veto takes a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Even with both houses, he said, Democrats would be limited to Congress's legislative and political tools.

Alan Eyre, a US diplomat and Iran expert who is a fellow at the Middle East Institute, spoke of a bipartisan consensus. In his words, both major parties share significant common ground in opposing the political structure of the Islamic Republic and in backing pressure on Tehran to change its behavior.

Tehran, meanwhile, warns of a "crushing response" to any new strikes on underground sites, yet has confirmed continuing indirect contact through Doha and Muscat, keeping the diplomatic door open. Shahin Modarres, who leads the Iran team at ITSS Verona, argues that Tehran is miscalculating. In his view, the leadership assumes a Democratic Congress can easily restrain the White House. Its strategy of dragging out talks, pressuring the Strait of Hormuz and letting fuel prices weigh on American voters is meant to deny Trump a win before November. Modarres warns it could backfire afterward, when the administration has no electoral reason to hold back. He also says it overlooks that both US parties largely agree Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons.

Bolton, once a Trump ally and now a critic, says he cannot predict what the president will do and that even Trump does not yet know his final decision. He expects the choice to come once political pressure eases. As one scenario, he points to a possible strike on "Kuh-e Kolang," a new nuclear site he claims Iran is building near Natanz. Trump, he said, could damage it, declare victory and pull back.

Trump has consistently said the US goal is to deny Iran the capability to build nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly claimed success. Bolton disagrees about what would last: he believes Iran will pursue the capability as long as the Islamic Republic remains in power, and sees regime change as the only sustainable guarantee.

Eyre is skeptical that outside pressure can deliver that. A Washington consensus alone, he says, cannot overcome the structural obstacles to political change inside Iran, and any real transformation must come from Iranian society. He faults American diplomacy for failing to convey a clear, coherent and authentic message to Iranians, noting that official US messaging is only partly reflected in the media most Iranians use. Successive administrations, he said, have not prioritized targeted engagement with Iranian society, and Iranians see Washington take positions in rhetoric but act differently in practice. That gap, he said, is structural and outlasts any one administration or election cycle.

What to watch after Tuesday is whether the reported strikes materialize, and whether Tehran's wait-it-out approach survives a president no longer facing voters.