Houthis Rise as Iran's Most Valuable Proxy Force, Eclipsing Weakened Hezbollah

In the streets of Iraqi cities this week, men held signs bearing a familiar refrain: death to America, insults directed at Saudi Arabia and Israel. The slogans echoed those of the Houthi rebel group in Yemen, and the men chanting them were members of Iraq's Shiite paramilitary factions. Both groups belong to what regional analysts call the "axis of resistance"—a constellation of armed organizations supported and often directed by Iran, stretching from Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen.

For years, Hezbollah in Lebanon held the premier position in this network. The group had decades of operational experience, a sophisticated military apparatus, and a leader in Hassan Nasrallah whose strategic acumen shaped Iran's regional posture. But the past eighteen months have redrawn that hierarchy. Israeli airstrikes have degraded Hezbollah's fighting capacity. The loss of its Syrian bases has constrained its operational reach. And in Yemen, the Houthis have begun doing things that Hezbollah never managed: this week alone, they brought down a Saudi F-15 fighter jet using a missile they claim to have modified themselves. Hezbollah has shot down Israeli drones and targeted fighter jets, but never achieved a confirmed hit on a manned aircraft.

The Houthis' recent military campaign has extended their control over the Yemeni coast and several Red Sea islands, positioning them to potentially dominate a critical waterway for global oil exports and trade. The Institute for the Study of War assessed last week that these territorial gains "set up conditions to establish an axis of resistance-controlled body of water." In Tehran, hardline newspapers have responded with unrestrained praise. Kayhan, one of Iran's most conservative publications, wrote that the Houthis' advances "greatly increased the weight of Sanaa as a branch of resistance in the ongoing regional war." At nightly gatherings held across Iranian cities since the US-Iran conflict began, crowds this week reached their 200th such event, chanting "you are my soul, O Yemen!"

Farea al-Muslimi, a Yemen researcher at London's Chatham House, believes the shift is decisive. "The Houthis have become more valuable than Hezbollah could ever be," he told Deutsche Welle. "Hezbollah had decades of experience and built the Houthis' capacity over years. But the Houthis have now exceeded them." Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at King's College London's School of Security Studies, frames the strategic calculus differently but reaches the same conclusion: "Hezbollah gave Tehran deterrence against Israel from Lebanon. The Houthis give Iran leverage over Saudi Arabia, Israel and global shipping. Their strategic importance to Tehran has risen sharply as Hezbollah has come under much greater pressure."

The Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi has long admired Nasrallah, even imitating his rhetorical style in public speeches. But al-Muslimi suggests that al-Houthi is now moving into a role Nasrallah once occupied—that of "the fixer" for the axis of resistance, a figure who coordinates actions across the network's various factions. Evidence emerged recently when Iraqi axis members carried out an attack on Saudi pipelines, suggesting a level of coordination that points toward centralized direction from Yemen.

Yet the relationship between the Houthis and Iran remains more ambiguous than the one Tehran maintained with Hezbollah. While Iranian state media celebrated recent Houthi gains as victories for the axis of resistance, Houthi-run channels framed the same events primarily as their own struggle against the Saudi blockade of their territories. Krieg identifies autonomy as the crucial difference: "The Houthis have their own leadership, ideology, domestic constituency and territorial project. Tehran can enable them, arm them and benefit from their actions, but it cannot necessarily switch them on and off at will." The Houthis have previously pursued military operations despite Iranian objections, and Tehran has publicly denied involvement in their latest campaign. Yet al-Muslimi notes that over the past two years, the relationship has tightened considerably. Iran has sent sophisticated weaponry regularly, and in July, sources told Reuters that Iranian leadership had discussed with the Houthis the possibility of closing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

What unites observers is agreement that the Houthis will prove extremely difficult to contain. Past military campaigns by Saudi Arabia, the United States, and allied forces have failed. Sanctions and economic pressure have little effect because the Houthis operate outside the international financial system. The group collects taxes but directs all revenue toward military operations rather than salaries or public services. This reflects an ideological commitment rooted in the group's founding principles—a belief that contemporary Muslim societies have grown too comfortable, and that poverty and hardship serve as divine tests. Hezbollah, by contrast, maintains a political branch in Lebanon and provides social welfare services, requiring it to balance relationships with other demographic groups. The Houthis face no such constraints. "They don't care if the Israelis bomb the airport or the US bombs a hospital," al-Muslimi observed. "It actually serves them very well because their ideology is all about martyrdom and sacrifice." That ideological commitment, he suggests, makes them potentially more dangerous than Hezbollah—not primarily as an international threat, though they are that, but as an existential threat to the very concept of a functioning state and civil society in Yemen.