Putin Digs In Despite Russia's Deteriorating Position in Ukraine War

In late June, Vladimir Putin sat for an interview and declared once more that Russia would prevail in Ukraine. The army was advancing along an 800-mile frontline, he said, occupying more territory each day. Kyiv was struggling. Yes, Ukrainian drone strikes were hitting Russian oil refineries and infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, creating what he called "problems." But Russians would adapt. "These terrorist attacks have no impact whatsoever on the situation," he said.

Twenty months earlier, such confidence would have been grounded in reality. Donald Trump had just taken office, praising Moscow and criticizing Kyiv. Russian troops were making slow but steady gains. The Kremlin had sketched three paths forward: Plan A was to work with the White House to force Ukraine into a Moscow-written deal. Plan B was simpler—wait for Trump to abandon Ukraine entirely, then roll to victory. Plan C was to simply outlast Ukraine on the battlefield. But by the summer of 2026, all three had collapsed.

Plan A died when Trump's envoys—his friend Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner, neither experienced diplomats—proved unable to negotiate anything. Putin kept demanding that Ukraine surrender territory and sovereignty, conditions Trump either could not accept or could not deliver. Moscow's attitude toward both men soured. Plan B unraveled more slowly. In March 2025, Trump stopped providing free weapons to Ukraine. By July, he zeroed out financial aid. But Ukrainian officials and their European allies persuaded him to keep sharing intelligence and to allow weapons sales paid for by Europe. The Europeans filled the gap Trump created, providing money and safe territory for Ukraine to build its own drones and missiles. Meanwhile, Trump grew frustrated with Putin's refusal to make concessions. He kept sanctions in place and blacklisted Russia's two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, squeezing the Kremlin's war chest.

With diplomatic and economic leverage exhausted, Putin turned to Plan C: winning through military superiority. This too has begun to fail. In 2025, Russia captured roughly 1,600 square miles of Ukrainian territory at enormous cost in lives. In the first half of 2026, it advanced perhaps 250 square miles. Ukraine had built new defensive lines with fortifications and minefields. More critically, Kyiv had expanded what military analysts call the "kill zone"—the area along the frontlines where Russian soldiers are detected almost immediately by Ukrainian drones and then struck. The result has been catastrophic casualties. According to the Carnegie Endowment's Michael Kofman, Russian monthly deaths have risen dramatically over the past eighteen months. The total of killed and grievously wounded now reaches roughly 30,000 per month. Meanwhile, recruitment has fallen to 27,000 monthly—dwindling sign-up bonuses in some regions and growing awareness of the death toll have made volunteering less attractive. Russia's ability to break through Ukrainian lines is increasingly in doubt.

Ukraine's drone campaign has compounded Russia's troubles. Kyiv has systematically destroyed Russian logistics and supply lines, slowing the military advance. Long-range strikes have hit military production facilities and critical infrastructure deep inside Russia. About one-third of Russian oil-refining capacity is now offline, causing fuel shortages and rationing that lasted from June through late July. Ukrainian drones have attacked warehouses belonging to Wildberries, Russia's largest online retailer, making the war visceral for ordinary consumers and affecting thousands of small businesses that sell through the platform. Kyiv has also intensified efforts to isolate Crimea and disrupt Russia's maritime exports by targeting fuel routes and attacking oil tankers in the Black Sea.

The economic damage is real. Russia's official forecast for 2026 GDP growth is just 0.4 percent. Inflation is rising. The central bank is holding interest rates at 14 percent to prevent prices from spiraling, but this makes credit prohibitively expensive for businesses. Most alarming for the Kremlin, the budget deficit has swelled to $73 billion in the first six months of 2026—far exceeding the $48.5 billion anticipated for the entire year. Trump's war against Iran has boosted Russian oil revenues, but not enough to create a cushion. The monetary reserves Russia accumulated over decades of commodity exports are depleted. The Kremlin is cutting nonmilitary spending and borrowing domestically, even as Russian bond buyers demand higher risk premiums. Putin's approval rating has fallen from around 80 percent at the start of the year to 66 percent by mid-July. Polling shows growing uncertainty and anxiety among the public. Fewer Russians believe their soldiers can win or that Putin has a realistic plan.

Yet Putin shows no sign of changing course. Some voices in the Russian establishment—including a prominent military analyst published in the flagship foreign affairs journal in May, and the CEO of Russia's largest bank in late June—have called for genuine negotiations. The analyst argued that Russia could not achieve more on the battlefield in the short to medium term and that prolonged war costs were outstripping strategic benefits. The banker said he believed everyone in the country wanted the conflict to end swiftly. But Putin is not listening. He still believes he can crush Ukraine's will, particularly through a winter bombing campaign using ballistic missiles—weapons Russia has doubled production of from prewar levels. Ukraine, meanwhile, is running low on high-quality interceptors, a shortage worsened by Washington's decision to stop selling Patriots. Putin also plans to intensify hybrid attacks on Europe, hoping to damage defense production and disrupt civilian life, fracturing Western support for Kyiv. If bombing alone fails, the Kremlin is preparing a new round of conscription using electronic draft notices sent year-round to thousands of potential conscripts. Unlike the 2022 mobilization, which was announced on national television and triggered an exodus of military-age men, this one will be quieter and more dispersed, targeting poorer regions while largely sparing major cities. Draft dodgers will face a newly introduced two-year prison sentence, enforced through digital surveillance and facial recognition. The Kremlin can sustain the war by forcing businesses, regional governments, and households to absorb its costs. Russia is currently spending eight percent of its GDP on defense—high, but far less than the Soviet Union or United States spent during World War II, or the nearly 40 percent Ukraine is spending now. These policies will make Russians angrier and poorer, but the regime has tools to contain dissent: blanket censorship laws, AI-powered surveillance, and expanded law enforcement. As Ukrainian attacks intensify and reach more people, a rally-around-the-flag effect may offset economic frustration. Polling shows support for the Russian armed forces above 65 percent nationwide, with less than 25 percent opposed. In border regions that have faced Ukrainian strikes longer, support is even higher. Putin is not ready to crawl out of the hole he has dug. Ukraine and its allies should prepare for a long winter and a Kremlin determined to keep fighting.