At the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, where geography becomes destiny, Yemen's Houthi movement has announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia — a declaration that, if carried out, would simultaneously seal both of the Middle East's major oil export arteries for the first time in modern history. The Strait of Hormuz, already partially closed by Iran since February, and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, through which 7.4 million barrels of oil now pass each day, together form the twin valves of the global energy system. Whether driven by their own strategic ambitions or by Tehran's broader r
Houthi Red Sea blockade threatens to compound global energy crisis alongside Iran's Hormuz closure
Both major oil export routes would be blocked at once.
So the Houthis just announced they're closing the Red Sea. How serious is this threat?
They announced a blockade on Monday, but the reporting doesn't actually say how they'd carry it out or whether it would include attacks on ships like before. That's a real gap.
Right—and we should be careful about the word "blockade." That's a military term with specific meaning. What they've actually done is make a threat. Whether they have the means or will to enforce it is a separate question.
But they did attack shipping before, in 2023 and 2024. Why would this be different?
They did, and it was devastating—shipping companies rerouted around Africa, Suez Canal traffic dropped 52 percent. But those attacks ended with the Gaza ceasefire in October. Now tensions have escalated again between Yemen's government and the Houthis, and the group is using the blockade threat as leverage.
The timing matters. This announcement came after the Houthis said Saudi Arabia struck Sanaa airport to stop an Iranian plane. So it's framed as retaliation for that specific incident, not necessarily a new phase of the broader conflict.
And Iran—are the Houthis doing this on Iran's orders, or is this their own move?
That's the central question the reporting can't answer. The U.S. says Iran funds and trains them. The Houthis deny being a proxy. They're ideologically aligned with Iran but don't recognize Iran's supreme leader the way Hezbollah does.
The reporting is honest about that uncertainty. It says "it is not clear how far the group's stance on Bab el-Mandeb stems from its own strategic priorities or is being made on Iran's behalf." That's the right place to leave it.
What would actually happen if they did close the strait?
Both major oil export routes from the Middle East would be blocked at once. Saudi Arabia has already diverted 70 percent of its crude to Red Sea ports because the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted. If Bab el-Mandeb closes too, there's no backup route.
And the numbers are significant—7.4 million barrels per day moving through Bab el-Mandeb in June, about 7 percent of global oil output. That's not theoretical.
So why haven't they acted on previous threats?
Last month they said they'd ban Israeli-linked ships from the Red Sea after Israel attacked Iran. That threat was never acted on. Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are actually resuming some Red Sea routes they'd abandoned.
Which suggests either the Houthis lack the capability to enforce what they're threatening, or they're using threats as a negotiating tool rather than a military strategy. The reporting doesn't tell us which.
El Pulso
- Both of the Middle East's critical oil chokepoints now face simultaneous closure — a scenario with no modern precedent and no easy contingency.
- Saudi Arabia, already rerouting 70% of its crude exports through Red Sea ports after Iran's Hormuz disruption, would lose its only remaining major export corridor if the Houthis follow through.
- The Red Sea route has quietly become the world's energy lifeline, with Bab el-Mandeb volumes nearly doubling in a year — making it an extraordinarily high-value target.
- The Houthis' true chain of command remains opaque: whether this blockade is their own gambit or an Iranian directive shapes everything about how the world should respond.
- The group has enforced Red Sea disruptions before — their 2023–2024 shipping attacks collapsed Suez Canal traffic by 52% — giving weight to a threat that might otherwise seem like posturing.
- Global energy markets, already strained by the Hormuz crisis, are now pricing in a worst-case scenario that weeks ago seemed like a distant contingency.
At the southern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, where geography becomes destiny, Yemen's Houthi movement has announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia — a declaration that, if carried out, would simultaneously seal both of the Middle East's major oil export arteries for the first time in modern history. The Strait of Hormuz, already partially closed by Iran since February, and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, through which 7.4 million barrels of oil now pass each day, together form the twin valves of the global energy system. Whether driven by their own strategic ambitions or by Tehran's broader regional calculus, the Houthis have placed themselves at the center of a crisis whose consequences would reach far beyond Yemen's civil war.
Yemen's Houthi movement announced on Monday that it would impose a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia — a declaration that threatens to close the last major oil export route still functioning after Iran's partial shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz in February. The Bab el-Mandeb strait, which the Houthis control from Yemen's coastline, is the southern gateway to the Red Sea and one of only two chokepoints through which Middle Eastern oil reaches world markets. If both close simultaneously, the global energy system faces a disruption without recent parallel.
The stakes are sharpened by how dramatically the Red Sea route has grown in importance. After the Hormuz disruption, Saudi Arabia redirected more than 70 percent of its crude exports to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, with shipments surging from roughly 973,000 barrels per day to 4 million barrels per day. Total petroleum volumes through Bab el-Mandeb reached 7.4 million barrels per day in June — about 7 percent of global oil output — nearly double the prior year's figure. This corridor has been quietly holding global oil prices in check. Saudi Arabia is now weighing an expansion of its Red Sea pipeline infrastructure, a sign of how permanent this rerouting has become.
The Houthis' announcement followed a rapid escalation in Yemen's long-running civil war. After the internationally recognized government struck Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing, the Houthis retaliated with missile strikes on a Saudi airport, and a senior Houthi official warned that continued escalation would bring the closure of Bab el-Mandeb. The group has a demonstrated capacity to act on such threats: their 2023–2024 campaign against Red Sea shipping, launched in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, forced major carriers to reroute around Africa and caused Suez Canal traffic to fall 52 percent by 2025 — its lowest level in at least half a century.
What remains genuinely uncertain is whether this blockade reflects the Houthis' own strategic judgment or Iranian direction. The United States maintains that Iran arms, funds, and trains the group, but the Houthis reject the label of proxy and claim independent weapons development. Unlike Hezbollah or Iraqi Shi'ite militias, they do not recognize Iran's supreme leader as a religious authority. During the current Iran-U.S. conflict, they had been notably restrained — until now. Whether they possess the capability to enforce a full blockade, and whether this announcement marks the beginning of action or the continuation of pressure, remains the question on which the next chapter of the global energy crisis may turn.
On Monday, Yemen's Houthi movement announced it would impose a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia, a declaration that threatens to compress an already fractured global energy market. The announcement came after escalating tensions between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed government in Yemen—tensions that have now pulled the group into the broader conflict between Iran and the United States.
The stakes are enormous because of where Yemen sits geographically. The country controls the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea, one of two critical chokepoints through which Middle Eastern oil reaches world markets. The other is the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has already partially closed following Israeli and American attacks on February 28. That earlier disruption forced a global energy shock, raising prices and cutting off most oil exports from the Persian Gulf. If the Houthis follow through on their blockade threat, both of the Middle East's major oil export routes would be simultaneously compromised—a scenario that has no recent precedent.
Saudi Arabia has already adapted to the Hormuz crisis by redirecting more than 70 percent of its normal daily crude exports to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Shipments from Yanbu have surged to an average of 4 million barrels per day in recent weeks, up from roughly 973,000 barrels per day a year earlier. Overall, petroleum volumes moving through Bab el-Mandeb reached 7.4 million barrels per day in June—about 7 percent of global oil output—compared to 4.2 million barrels per day the previous year. This Red Sea route has become a lifeline for the energy market, helping to keep global oil prices from spiking further. Saudi Arabia is now considering an expansion of its crude oil pipeline to the Red Sea coast to reduce dependence on any single port.
The Houthis are an Iran-aligned movement that emerged in north Yemen during the 1990s as a military and political force. They have been locked in civil war with the Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government for more than a decade, and they have repeatedly attacked Gulf neighbors with missiles and drones. A 2022 truce between Yemen's warring factions largely held until last week, when the internationally recognized government claimed it struck Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing. The Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia and responded by firing missiles at Abha airport in the kingdom's southwest. A senior Houthi official then warned that if escalation continued, Bab el-Mandeb would be closed.
What remains unclear is whether the blockade announcement reflects the Houthis' own strategic calculations or whether it is being orchestrated by Iran as part of its regional strategy. The United States says Iran has armed, funded, and trained the Houthis, but the group denies being an Iranian proxy and claims to develop its own weapons. The Houthis do not recognize Iran's supreme leader as their ultimate religious authority in the way that Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi'ite militias do. Their stated motivations are primarily domestic, though they are ideologically aligned with Iran and champion the Iranian-led "Axis of Resistance."
The group has a history of disrupting Red Sea shipping. After the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and Israel's subsequent campaign in Gaza, the Houthis began firing at shipping in the Red Sea, claiming they were acting in solidarity with Palestinians. Those attacks severely disrupted global commerce, forcing major shipping companies like Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd to reroute around Africa—a far longer and more expensive journey. Suez Canal traffic fell 52 percent in 2025 compared to 2023 levels and reached its lowest point in at least 50 years. A U.S.-led military mission conducted repeated strikes on Houthi targets and shot down hundreds of drones and missiles, but some attacks continued until the Gaza ceasefire in October.
During the current Iran-U.S. conflict, the Houthis had been relatively restrained compared to Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, which joined the fighting early. The group's leader said in March that their "fingers are on the trigger at any moment should developments warrant it." They launched a few missile and drone attacks on Israel in late March and early April. An Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander suggested in June that the Houthis could choke off the Red Sea. Now, with their blockade announcement, that possibility appears to be moving from threat to action—though it remains uncertain whether they have the capability to enforce such a blockade or whether they will resume the shipping attacks that caused such disruption before.
Citas Notables
Our fingers are on the trigger at any moment should developments warrant it— Abdul Malik al-Houthi, group leader, March 5
The Houthis deny being an Iranian proxy and say they develop their own weapons— Houthi movement statement (paraphrased)