Ethiopia's Constitutional Reform Could Consolidate PM Abiy's Already Formidable Power

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has governed Ethiopia since 2018 through wars, peace negotiations, and the reshaping of the nation's role on the continent. Now, after weeks of political consultations involving roughly 4,000 delegates gathered in Addis Ababa, there are signs that Ethiopia's constitutional structure could shift in ways that would hand him even more formal authority than he already wields.

The proposed change is straightforward in concept: merge the largely ceremonial office of president with the prime minister's role, creating a single, powerful executive position. Local reporting suggests the national dialogue produced a positive recommendation for this restructuring. If enacted, it would represent not so much a transfer of new power to one person as a legal formalization of dominance that Abiy has already accumulated. Since taking office, he has built the Prosperity Party from a coalition of partners, reshaped the political system to constrain opposition movements, and consolidated control over the military and security apparatus. A stronger presidency would give him the formal title and constitutional backing to match the influence he already exercises.

Abiy's path to implementing such a reform appears clear. In June's parliamentary elections, his party won by a commanding margin—the kind of majority that could push constitutional amendments through the legislature. Supporters of the presidential system argue it would serve Ethiopia's fractured society by creating a single national figure elected across ethnic and religious lines, strengthening both democratic process and national cohesion. Befeqadu Hailu, a civil rights activist and political commentator, told Deutsche Welle that a directly elected president would carry a stronger mandate to govern and would need to appeal to multiple ethnic and religious groups to win office. Yet Hailu also issued a warning: presidential systems are inherently vulnerable to authoritarian drift.

The deeper problem, however, is not the design of the office but the legitimacy of the process that would create it. The national dialogue that recommended the presidential system excluded opposition parties entirely—they boycotted the proceedings. Armed groups with significant political stakes in Ethiopia's conflicts were also absent. This means that major political forces most directly affected by the current system had no seat at the table. Martin Plaut, a British journalist and Ethiopia expert, described the dialogue as a "rubber-stamping exercise" and concluded that without opposition parties and armed factions, "the process lacks the backing of groups that feel alienated by the current system." Hailu made a sharper distinction: parliament may possess the formal, procedural authority to amend the constitution, but that legal power does not necessarily reflect the popular will of the country. He noted bluntly that "no one believes that Ethiopia has ever had democratic elections," pointing to the recent parliamentary vote, which took place under difficult conditions—voting was impossible in several conflict-ridden regions, and opposition parties reported restrictions and repression.

The question that hangs over the reform is whether legal procedure can substitute for genuine democratic consent. Hailu argues that Ethiopia's political institutions have procedural legitimacy to enact constitutional changes but lack the broad popular legitimacy that would make such changes truly representative. The reforms, he suggests, are ultimately aimed at implementing changes "based on the vision of the Prosperity Party itself."

Beyond the question of how power is formalized lies a more fundamental problem: a new constitutional structure is unlikely to address the conflicts that have defined Ethiopia's recent history and continue to define its present. Armed violence persists in Oromia and Amhara. The 2020-2022 war in Tigray left deep political and social fractures, with many territorial and political disputes still unresolved despite peace initiatives. Nearly half the population lives below the poverty line. Plaut argues that the proposed reforms amount to "sticking a band-aid on what is a gaping wound." The central issue—the relationship between a concentrated government in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia's more than 80 ethnic groups—remains unresolved. Previous attempts to ease tensions between center and periphery have failed. Until the government addresses these underlying divisions, a change in the title or formal powers of the executive will leave the country's deepest problems untouched.