BRI Projects Gain Pace in Central Asia as China Expands Trade, Rail, Energy and Digital Links

In 2013, in Astana, Xi Jinping stood before an audience and spoke of camel bells echoing through mountains and thin smoke rising over the desert. It was the first time he floated the idea of a 21st-century Silk Road Economic Belt, and the choice of Kazakhstan's capital was deliberate: it marked Central Asia as the transit hub between East and West. Xi laid out five connectivities as the framework: policy coordination, a unified infrastructure network, trade facilitation, monetary and financial flows, and people-to-people diplomacy.

The history he invoked is old. From the 2nd century BC, the Great Silk Road and its caravans passed through thousands of cities and settlements, tying Asia and Europe together through trade, culture and science. Central Asia has long leaned toward China, which historically treated the region as a belt surrounding its imperial core. Today, as the source puts it, the caravans of silk, porcelain and tea have given way to trucks and trains carrying steel, electric vehicles, machinery and technology.

The numbers show how far that has gone. In 2025, trade between China and the five Central Asian countries reached $106.3 billion, up 12 per cent on the year before. Kazakhstan accounted for $49 billion, Uzbekistan for $18 billion, and Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan together for $40.3 billion. Chinese exports to the region came to $71.2 billion, up 11 per cent, led by machinery, electrical equipment and high-tech goods. Chinese imports from Central Asia totaled $35.1 billion, up 14 per cent. China is the largest trading partner of every country in the region.

Investment tells a similar story. Chinese capital, whether state-owned, private or mixed, makes up over 65 per cent of all foreign investment in the region. Kazakhstan receives roughly 35 per cent of it, followed by Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

The physical projects anchor this. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, on the southern route, is under construction. Khorgos, described as the Eastern Gate, is a major logistics centre on the Chinese–Kazakh border where cargo is transshipped. The Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline is built as four lines, A, B, C and a planned line D, carrying natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China. Alongside these sit cross-border cables, satellite stations, data centres and exchanges of digital expertise.

About 84 Digital Silk Road projects are being carried out or planned across Central Asia. Kazakhstan has 30 and Uzbekistan 26. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have ten each, mostly smart-city schemes and telecom upgrades. Turkmenistan has eight, chiefly fibre-optic cables laid along the Caspian Sea bed.

Each country plays a distinct role. Turkmenistan is among China's most important energy suppliers. Kazakhstan serves as a key financial hub for the Belt and Road outside China. Uzbekistan has picked China as its main strategic partner in military-technical matters. Georgia, meanwhile, is the only Caucasus state with a free trade agreement with China, joined in Europe only by Switzerland and Serbia.

Security runs through all of it. The article says China has a basic interest in stability in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which border Xinjiang, and in preventing any attempt to destabilise the region. It describes Beijing's approach, pursued through the BRI, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and military-technical cooperation, as aiming to make Central Asia a prosperous, stable zone within China's sphere of influence. The railway, line D of the pipeline and the digital projects are the things to watch next.