As Xi Jinping arrives in India for the BRICS summit — his first visit since 2019 — the encounter with Prime Minister Modi becomes a quiet referendum on whether two civilizations, long entangled by geography and rivalry, can rebuild trust after blood was shed on a Himalayan border six years ago. The thaw has been real but fragile: flights resumed, investment restrictions eased, diplomats exchanged careful words of satisfaction. Yet encroachments continue, trade deficits deepen, and the larger world presses in — forcing both nations to ask not merely whether they can coexist, but on whose terms
Xi-Modi summit tests India-China reset amid trade tensions at BRICS
Trust remains conditional and fragile.
So Xi is coming to India for the first time since 2019. That's significant, right? What changed?
The 2020 border clash nearly broke the relationship entirely. But over the past year, both sides have made moves—resumed flights, eased investment rules, high-level diplomatic meetings. It's a genuine thaw, not just talk.
But in August, China reportedly denied Indian troops access to border patrol points and encroached on territory in Arunachal Pradesh. That's the same month they were saying things were improving. How much weight should we give to the positive signals?
That's the tension. The improvements are real—people-to-people exchanges have resumed, border trade is happening again. But the underlying disputes haven't been resolved. It's more like a ceasefire than a peace.
What does India actually want from this meeting?
Primarily, they want to address the trade deficit. China is India's largest business partner, but India owes China $112 billion more than China owes India. That's a record gap. India also depends on Chinese batteries for its green energy goals, which gives China leverage.
Is there any indication China will actually move on market access? Or is this more about managing the relationship without solving the underlying problems?
The reporting suggests both sides will discuss it, but there's no indication of major concessions coming. China is wary of India's emergence as an alternative manufacturing hub—India is already the world's second-largest phone maker and is diversifying Apple's supply chain away from China.
So they're both trying to reduce dependence on each other while maintaining the relationship?
Exactly. India is also hedging by building relationships with Australia, Indonesia, the UK, and the EU. Modi is signaling that India won't be locked into any single partnership.
The reporting mentions Xi is bringing 400 officials, double his 2019 delegation. Does that mean this is a breakthrough moment, or just that the agenda is complicated?
It could be either. A larger delegation could signal serious intent to negotiate. Or it could just reflect how many issues need to be addressed—border security, trade, investment, technology. The size alone doesn't tell us the outcome.
What should we watch for when they meet?
Whether they announce anything concrete on market access or border management. Statements about "improved relations" are easy. Actual policy changes are harder to come by.
Der Puls
- The 2020 border clash, which killed at least 20 Indian soldiers, left a wound that diplomatic gestures have softened but not healed — and Beijing's reported denial of Indian patrol access as recently as August suggests the wound is still tender.
- India's record $112 billion trade deficit with China has become a structural vulnerability, with New Delhi dependent on Chinese batteries for its green energy ambitions even as Beijing restricts technology transfers to protect its manufacturing dominance.
- Strained relations with the Trump administration over tariffs have pushed India toward strategic hedging — signing declarations with BRICS partners, striking resource deals across three continents, and pursuing trade agreements with the UK and EU to avoid dependence on any single power.
- Xi's delegation of roughly 400 officials — more than double his 2019 contingent — signals that both sides regard this summit as substantive, though whether that weight reflects genuine opportunity or the sheer complexity of unresolved grievances remains an open question.
- The next few days will test whether the incremental improvements of the past year represent a durable reset or a diplomatic veneer stretched thin over competing territorial, economic, and technological ambitions.
As Xi Jinping arrives in India for the BRICS summit — his first visit since 2019 — the encounter with Prime Minister Modi becomes a quiet referendum on whether two civilizations, long entangled by geography and rivalry, can rebuild trust after blood was shed on a Himalayan border six years ago. The thaw has been real but fragile: flights resumed, investment restrictions eased, diplomats exchanged careful words of satisfaction. Yet encroachments continue, trade deficits deepen, and the larger world presses in — forcing both nations to ask not merely whether they can coexist, but on whose terms and at what cost.
Xi Jinping's arrival in India for the BRICS summit is his first since 2019 and his most consequential encounter with Prime Minister Modi since their relationship broke open over a deadly border clash in 2020, when soldiers fought along the disputed Himalayan frontier and at least 20 Indian troops were killed. The visit asks a harder question than any summit agenda can answer: whether two of Asia's largest powers can genuinely rebuild trust, or whether the improvements of the past year are surface gestures over unresolved fractures.
The thaw has been real in its particulars. Modi visited China last year. Direct flights have resumed. New Delhi loosened restrictions on Chinese investment. Indian and Chinese diplomats reported satisfaction with renewed border trade and people-to-people exchanges. But in August, Beijing reportedly denied Indian Army access to key patrolling points and encroached on territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Trust, it seems, remains conditional.
India's broader strategic posture shapes the summit's context. Relations with Washington have frayed over trade and tariffs, nudging New Delhi toward what analysts call strategic hedging — cultivating BRICS partnerships, signing resource deals with Australia, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan, and pursuing trade agreements with the UK and EU. At a recent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, Modi and Xi signed a declaration condemning military strikes against Iran without naming the United States. India is not choosing sides; it is building redundancy.
Trade will dominate the bilateral conversation. China is India's largest business partner, with total trade reaching a record $151 billion in the year ending March 2026 — but India's deficit has also hit a record $112 billion, leaving New Delhi acutely exposed. India's green energy ambitions depend on Chinese batteries. China has already weaponized rare earth controls against the United States, and Indian analysts fear similar leverage could be turned their way. Meanwhile, India's rise as an alternative manufacturing hub for smartphones unnerves Beijing, which has restricted technology transfers in response.
The border dispute, rooted in a 1962 war and reopened by the 2020 clashes, will almost certainly be raised, though the BRICS forum was built to reform global financial structures, not resolve territorial grievances. Xi travels with a delegation twice the size of his 2019 visit — a signal that both governments regard this moment as consequential. Whether that consequence yields progress or simply maps the full weight of what divides them will become clearer before the week is out.
Xi Jinping will arrive in India this week for the BRICS summit, marking his first visit to the country since 2019 and his most significant encounter with Prime Minister Narendra Modi since their relationship fractured over a deadly border clash in 2020. The meeting carries weight that extends far beyond ceremonial handshakes. It will test whether the two largest economies in Asia can genuinely rebuild trust, or whether the improvements of the past year remain surface-level gestures masking deeper structural tensions.
The relationship between India and China has thawed noticeably since 2020, when soldiers clashed along their disputed border, killing at least 20 Indian troops and an unknown number of Chinese forces. Modi visited China last year for a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. In August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met and reported satisfaction with the resumption of people-to-people exchanges, border trade, and pilgrimages through Himalayan passes. Direct flights have resumed. New Delhi has loosened restrictions on Chinese investment. These are concrete moves, not rhetoric. Yet they exist alongside something more troubling: in that same August, Beijing reportedly denied Indian Army access to key patrolling points and encroached on territory in Arunachal Pradesh, India's northeastern border state. Trust, it seems, remains conditional and fragile.
For India, the timing of this summit reflects a broader strategic calculation. Relations with the Trump administration have grown strained over trade and tariffs, pushing New Delhi to cultivate alternatives. The BRICS bloc—which includes Russia, Iran, and Brazil—offers India a platform to signal its commitment to what analysts call "strategic hedging." Modi and Xi already met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Kyrgyzstan last week, where they signed a declaration condemning military attacks against Iran without naming the United States. India has simultaneously struck resource deals with Australia, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan, and trade agreements with the United Kingdom and European Union. The message is clear: India is not choosing sides, but rather building multiple relationships to reduce dependence on any single power.
Trade imbalance will dominate the bilateral agenda. China is India's largest business partner, with total trade reaching a record $151.1 billion in the year ending March 2026. But India's deficit with China has also hit a record: $112.16 billion, up from $99.21 billion the previous year. New Delhi is acutely vulnerable because it relies on Chinese goods to fuel its own development. India's push for green energy infrastructure depends heavily on Chinese batteries. China has weaponized rare earth export controls against the United States; Indian analysts worry it could do the same to India. Meanwhile, India is emerging as an alternative manufacturing hub for Apple smartphones, already the world's second-largest mobile phone maker. China views this competition warily and has restricted technology transfers, concerned that Indian advancement could undermine Beijing's grip on global supply chains. Any investment liberalization between the two countries will proceed cautiously, tied closely to geopolitical developments, according to economists tracking the relationship.
The border dispute itself remains unresolved and will almost certainly be discussed. The conflict between India and China dates back decades, culminating in a 1962 war. The 2020 clashes reopened wounds that had scabbed over. Experts note that while the relationship has improved markedly, expectations should be managed carefully. The BRICS summit was created to reform global financial and governance structures, not to solve geopolitical disputes. Observers caution against conflating the bloc's mission with the bilateral tensions that persist between its members. Xi is traveling with a delegation of about 400 officials, more than double the size of his 2019 delegation, suggesting the Indian government views this visit as consequential. Whether that delegation size reflects optimism or the complexity of the agenda remains to be seen. What is certain is that the next few days will reveal whether the tentative reset between Asia's two giants can hold under the weight of trade imbalances, border disputes, and competing strategic interests.
Bemerkenswerte Zitate
This is a really crucial moment. It's a great opportunity to use the BRICS summit as an excuse to have a really substantive bilateral meeting.— Vrinda Sahai, research analyst, Carnegie India
Recent Indian government actions confirm India's continuing commitment to strategic hedging.— Chietigj Bajpaee, senior research fellow for South Asia, Chatham House