North Korea drifts too far from the Chinese orbit
Seven years after his last visit, Xi Jinping returned to Pyongyang this week — not in triumph, but in quiet urgency. China's only formal treaty ally has been drifting toward Moscow, drawn by shared combat in Ukraine and a mutual defense pact that speaks a language Beijing has not recently offered. Xi's journey is a reminder that alliances, like all relationships, require tending — and that the cost of neglect in geopolitics can be measured in the realignment of entire regions.
- North Korea has deployed over 10,000 soldiers to fight in Russia's Ukraine war, forging a military bond with Moscow that now eclipses its formal treaty ties with Beijing.
- China's only treaty ally is drifting — and Xi's first visit to Pyongyang in seven years is a direct attempt to arrest that drift before it becomes irreversible.
- The long-standing Beijing-Washington consensus on Korean denuclearization has quietly collapsed: China omitted the issue from its last joint statement with Kim, while North Korea unveiled a new nuclear facility and called for exponential arsenal growth.
- Xi's deeper anxiety may be Japan — he has grown unusually vocal about Tokyo's military expansion in meetings with Trump and Starmer alike, and North Korea remains a potential, if rhetorical, partner in that concern.
- The visit itself carries symbolic weight: Xi, who now rarely travels and prefers to receive leaders in Beijing, made the journey — signaling just how much China fears losing its gravitational pull over Pyongyang.
Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang for a two-day visit — his first in nearly seven years — with a relationship to repair and a drift to reverse. North Korea is China's only formal treaty ally, a bond sealed in the Korean War when their soldiers fought side by side. But that history has been quietly eroding. Pandemic-era trade collapsed, and Pyongyang has since turned toward Moscow with striking speed: a mutual defense pact in 2024, and more than 10,000 North Korean soldiers now fighting in Russia's war in Ukraine. Within North Korean propaganda, Russia is celebrated with warmth; China receives nostalgia.
The geopolitical moment is unusually tangled. Xi, Putin, and Kim stood together at a Beijing military parade last September — a display of autocratic solidarity. But behind the choreography, interests diverge. China still maintains consequential economic ties with the United States, and just weeks before this Pyongyang trip, Xi met Trump in Beijing. Trump later suggested the two had discussed North Korea, and has expressed interest in meeting Kim again — raising the possibility that Xi arrived in Pyongyang partly as an intermediary.
The nuclear question has taken a strange turn. For decades, Beijing and Washington shared a common line on denuclearization. That consensus has fractured: China's last joint statement with Kim omitted the issue entirely, Beijing declined to confirm a White House claim that Xi and Trump had reaffirmed denuclearization goals, and Kim's sister flatly dismissed the assertion. North Korea, meanwhile, unveiled a new nuclear production facility and Kim called for exponential expansion of the arsenal.
Analysts suggest Xi's deeper concern is not nuclear talks but Japan — whose military expansion he has raised with unusual intensity in recent meetings with world leaders. Any Beijing-Pyongyang alignment on that front is likely to remain rhetorical. Still, Xi's willingness to make the journey at all — at a moment when he rarely travels abroad — signals how seriously China takes the risk of losing its anchor role on the Korean Peninsula, especially as North Korea's missile capabilities, now including AI-guided weapons, continue to advance.
Xi Jinping arrived in Pyongyang on Monday for a two-day visit—his first return to North Korea in nearly seven years. The timing was deliberate. China's president came to shore up a relationship that has quietly fractured, worn thin by a pandemic-era collapse in trade and, more pressingly, by Pyongyang's accelerating courtship with Moscow.
North Korea remains China's only formal treaty ally, a bond forged in blood during the Korean War in the early 1950s when Chinese and North Korean troops fought side by side against the South. But that historical closeness has been tested. Over the past few years, North Korea has pivoted toward Russia with a speed and intimacy that has left Beijing watching carefully. The two countries signed a mutual defence pact in 2024. More concretely, North Korea has deployed more than 10,000 soldiers to fight in Russia's war in Ukraine—a commitment that speaks to a military partnership far more active and urgent than anything currently binding Pyongyang to Beijing.
The contrast is stark. Within North Korean state propaganda, Russia is celebrated with what analysts describe as effusive praise for the bonds forged through shared combat. China, by contrast, gets nostalgic references—important, yes, but tinged with the past tense. Xi's visit is an attempt to rebalance that equation before North Korea drifts too far from the Chinese orbit, a possibility that keeps Beijing's strategists awake at night.
The geopolitical backdrop makes the visit even more delicate. In September, Xi, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un stood together at a massive military parade in Beijing, a carefully choreographed display of autocratic solidarity. But behind closed doors, each man is protecting his own interests, and those interests do not always align. China, unlike Russia, maintains economic and strategic ties with the United States—ties that matter enormously. Just weeks before Xi's trip to Pyongyang, he met with Donald Trump in Beijing. Trump later mentioned that he and Xi had discussed North Korea, and there is speculation he may have asked Xi to relay a message to Kim. Trump has said repeatedly that he would like to meet the North Korean leader again.
The question of nuclear weapons hangs over everything, though in a strange new way. For decades, Beijing and Washington presented a united front opposing North Korea's atomic arsenal. That consensus has fractured. When Xi and Kim met in Beijing last year, their official statements omitted any mention of denuclearization for the first time. After the Trump-Xi summit in May, the White House said the two leaders had reaffirmed their shared goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula—but Beijing did not confirm this. On Sunday, Kim Yo-jong, the North Korean leader's sister and a powerful figure in the regime, dismissed claims that Xi and Trump had discussed denuclearization as false. Last week, North Korea unveiled a new nuclear material production facility and Kim called for an exponential expansion of the country's atomic arsenal.
For Xi, though, nuclear talks may not be the primary concern. Analysts suggest his real focus is defending China's security interests in northeast Asia—specifically, what Beijing views as Japan's alarming military expansion. Xi has reportedly become unusually animated when discussing Japanese militarism, raising the issue with both Trump and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer during recent meetings. Japan rejects the characterization, arguing that its more proactive defence posture is a reasonable response to regional threats, not a return to militarism. Any cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang on the Japan question is likely to remain rhetorical rather than concrete.
Xi's willingness to travel to North Korea is itself significant. In recent months, he has hosted a steady stream of world leaders in Beijing and travels internationally less frequently than he did before the pandemic. That he would make the journey—a short flight or even a train ride from the capital—underscores how much China values this relationship and how much it fears losing influence over it. North Korea's recent missile tests, including successful trials of AI-guided weapons, have added urgency. Xi likely sees the need to show up in person, to demonstrate that China remains Pyongyang's anchor, before tensions on the peninsula escalate beyond Beijing's ability to manage them.
Notable Quotes
Within North Korean propaganda, there are really over the top paeans to the closeness with Russia forged in fighting a war together. Whereas with China it's kind of nostalgic.— John Delury, senior fellow for the Asia Society
Xi likely sees the need to show up in Pyongyang in person to prevent tension on the Korean Peninsula from escalating.— William Yang, senior analyst at the Crisis Group
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Xi need to visit now, after so long away? What changed?
Russia and North Korea have become military partners in a way that didn't exist before. Ten thousand North Korean soldiers are fighting in Ukraine. That's not a symbolic gesture—that's a real alliance being forged in blood. Xi can't let that relationship overshadow China's claim on North Korea.
But North Korea and China have a treaty from the 1950s. Doesn't that still matter?
It matters, but it's starting to feel historical rather than living. The propaganda celebrates Russia as a current ally, a brother-in-arms. China gets respect, but it's tinged with nostalgia. Xi is trying to make the relationship feel present and vital again.
What about the nuclear weapons? Isn't that what China and the US used to care about together?
That consensus has broken down. China and the US no longer speak with one voice on denuclearization. Beijing has stopped mentioning it in official statements with Kim. Meanwhile, North Korea just unveiled a new nuclear factory and is calling for exponential expansion of its arsenal. The old framework doesn't hold anymore.
So what is Xi actually trying to accomplish on this trip?
Prevent North Korea from spinning too far into the Russian orbit. And probably signal to the US—indirectly—that China still has influence over Pyongyang, even as that influence is being tested. He also wants to use North Korea as a partner in pushing back against what he sees as Japanese militarism.
Is there a risk this visit fails?
The risk isn't that the visit itself fails. The risk is that it's too late—that the momentum with Russia is already too strong. Xi showing up in person matters, but it may only slow the drift, not reverse it.