I'm surprised Argentina allows Chinese Armed Forces to operate in secret there.
In the shifting tectonic plates of global influence, Argentina has chosen its footing. President Javier Milei has turned his country toward Washington with unusual deliberateness, reversing BRICS membership, redirecting arms purchases, and opening Argentine infrastructure to American partnership — all as the United States seeks to slow China's deepening roots across Latin America. The alignment is not merely rhetorical: within months of Milei taking office, three of America's most senior officials made the journey to Buenos Aires, signaling that Argentina has become a meaningful piece in a much larger contest over who shapes the future of the Western Hemisphere.
- Washington is racing to consolidate influence in Latin America before Chinese military and economic infrastructure becomes too entrenched to dislodge — and Argentina is now its most willing partner.
- A Chinese military-operated space station in Neuquén province, active since 2014, has alarmed U.S. commanders who warn it provides Beijing with global surveillance and targeting capabilities that could compromise American military operations.
- Milei's sharp anti-China rhetoric — calling its government murderous and its people unfree — sits uneasily alongside the fact that China remains Argentina's second-largest trading partner, and the two countries' leaders have exchanged letters.
- Argentina's port authority quietly signed an agreement allowing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to work on the Paraná-Paraguay Waterway, a 3,400-kilometer corridor that moves Argentine grain to the world and cocaine northward through the continent.
- The F-16 purchase from Denmark instead of China, the BRICS reversal, and the parade of American officials through Buenos Aires all point in the same direction: Argentina is repositioning itself as a strategic asset for the United States in a region long courted by Beijing.
President Javier Milei has left little ambiguity about where Argentina stands. "My priority is to be an ally of the United States," he told CNN, and the actions of his young administration have matched the declaration. For Washington, the timing is welcome: General Laura Richardson, head of U.S. Southern Command, traveled to Buenos Aires in early April to discuss what she openly calls a "geopolitical competition" with China for Latin America's future.
The pace of high-level American visits has been remarkable. Within his first four months in office, Milei received Secretary of State Antony Blinken, CIA Director William Burns, and General Richardson — three of Washington's most senior figures, arriving in rapid succession. The most tangible early result was Argentina's decision to purchase F-16 fighter jets from Denmark rather than from China, reversing a deal the previous Fernández government had been pursuing.
Milei's hostility toward Beijing is ideological and vocal — he once compared the Chinese government to a murderer — yet commercial ties with China have not been severed, and he and Xi Jinping have exchanged correspondence. The contradiction is real, but apparently navigable for both sides.
Two strategic flashpoints define the deeper tensions. The first is the Paraná-Paraguay Waterway, a river corridor of more than 3,400 kilometers that carries Argentine agricultural exports to global markets and, according to international narcotics authorities, serves as a conduit for cocaine moving northward. In early March, Argentina's port authority signed a memorandum allowing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to operate on the waterway — a move the U.S. ambassador was careful to frame as civilian infrastructure work.
The second, and more charged, issue is a Chinese military-operated space station in Neuquén province, built in 2014 and run by a division of China's armed forces. Richardson has warned Congress that the facility gives Beijing global tracking and surveillance capabilities with potential military consequences for U.S. operations. The U.S. ambassador expressed open bewilderment that Argentina permits Chinese army personnel to operate there in secrecy. Argentine officials maintain the base's purpose has always been scientific, and China's embassy describes it as a site of technological cooperation.
Milei's reversal of Argentina's BRICS membership — one of his first presidential acts — crystallizes the broader shift. His predecessor had secured Argentina's inclusion in the bloc just months earlier; Milei walked it back, declaring the moment "not opportune." In its place, he has staked Argentina's future on Washington, telling CNN that his alignment with the United States holds regardless of which party governs there. The facts, as they stand, appear to bear him out.
President Javier Milei of Argentina has made his allegiance unmistakable. "My priority is to be an ally of the United States," he told CNN recently, and he has been backing those words with concrete action since before he even took office. For Washington, this alignment arrives at a crucial moment—the U.S. is locked in what General Laura Richardson, head of U.S. Southern Command, calls a "geopolitical competition" with China for influence across Latin America. Richardson traveled to Buenos Aires on a Tuesday in early April to meet with Argentine officials, and the message was clear: the U.S. wants Argentina's help in slowing China's regional expansion.
Milei seems tailor-made for this role. During his campaign, he declared he would do no business with China "or any communist," despite the fact that China has been Argentina's second-largest trading partner for years, ahead of the United States. He compared the Chinese government to a "murderer" and insisted the Chinese people "are not free." Yet even with this rhetoric, he has not severed commercial ties with Beijing, and he and Xi Jinping have exchanged letters. The contradiction is notable but apparently manageable for both sides.
The pace of high-level American visits to Buenos Aires has been striking. Within forty days of Milei taking office—before he had even completed four months in power—three major figures from the U.S. government made the journey: Secretary of State Antony Blinken in late February, CIA Director William Burns just days before Richardson, and now Richardson herself. While these visits were technically part of broader regional tours, the concentration is significant. Richardson herself has been cultivating relationships across Latin America since 2021, visiting presidents and military leaders in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay. She had been to Buenos Aires before, in 2022 and 2023, under the previous peronist president, Alberto Fernández. But the tenor has shifted. Under Milei, the U.S. has secured a major defense win: Argentina agreed to purchase F-16 fighter jets and other military equipment from Denmark rather than from China, as the previous government had planned.
One of the most sensitive areas of U.S. involvement is the Paraná-Paraguay Waterway, a river corridor stretching more than 3,400 kilometers through Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It is the main export route for Argentine agricultural products—grains, flour, oils—and a crucial passage for global commodity traders like the American firms ADM, Bunge, and Cargill, as well as the Chinese company Cofco. The waterway is also a known trafficking route for cocaine moving north from Peru and Bolivia. In 2021, the International Narcotics Control Board warned that the waterway had become a gateway for Bolivian and Peruvian cocaine destined for international markets via Brazilian and Paraguayan ports. In 2022, Brazilian federal police seized 568 kilograms of cocaine at the port of Santos in a container carrying peanuts, with another 866 kilograms discovered in Rotterdam—all shipped from Rosario, the Argentine city now gripped by narco violence. In early March, under Milei's government, Argentina's port authority signed a memorandum allowing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to work on the waterway. U.S. Ambassador Marc Stanley emphasized that these are civil engineers, not soldiers—the same kind who work on the Mississippi River.
But the most strategically sensitive issue may be the space observation base in Neuquén province, operated since 2014 by China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General, a division of China's military, in partnership with Argentina's National Space Activities Commission. It was the first such facility China built outside its borders. Richardson told Congress that despite China's public opposition to militarizing space, the Chinese military continues to invest in and upgrade its space capabilities, including this deep-space station in Argentina, which gives it global tracking and surveillance abilities. These capabilities, she warned, could translate into military advantages that would affect U.S. forces and compromise conventional and nuclear targeting, air-sea operations, and missile defense. Ambassador Stanley expressed bewilderment in a recent interview: "I'm surprised that Argentina allows the Chinese Armed Forces to operate in Neuquén, in secret, doing who knows what. I understand these are Chinese Army soldiers operating this space telescope. I don't know what they do. I think the Argentines don't know either, and they should understand why the Chinese are deployed there."
Argentina's Interior Minister Guillermo Francos responded that these matters are "discussed and clear," noting that the base was installed in 2014 under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and that successive Argentine governments of different political stripes have consistently denied it serves military purposes. China's embassy in Buenos Aires issued a statement calling it a facility for technological and scientific cooperation, where scientists from both countries conduct research. The U.S., for its part, maintains its own presence in Neuquén—a civilian emergency operations center near the airport, built at the provincial government's request, equipped to respond to floods, disease, wildfires, and earthquakes. Argentina also hosts a European space antenna in Mendoza, which has drawn no such suspicion.
Milei's pivot away from BRICS membership—one of his first acts as president—underscores the shift. His predecessor had secured Argentina's inclusion in the bloc in August; Milei reversed that decision, saying it was not "opportune" at this time. The five BRICS nations represent over 42 percent of the world's population, 30 percent of its land, 23 percent of global GDP, and 18 percent of world trade. Yet Milei has chosen a different alignment. "The most important thing is my alignment with the United States, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans are in government," he told CNN, adding that while he feels more affinity with Republican ideas, he also maintains "excellent relations" with the Biden administration. The facts appear to bear him out.
Notable Quotes
My priority is to be an ally of the United States, regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans are in government.— President Javier Milei, in an interview with CNN
I'm surprised that Argentina allows the Chinese Armed Forces to operate in Neuquén, in secret, doing who knows what. I think the Argentines don't know either, and they should understand why the Chinese are deployed there.— U.S. Ambassador Marc Stanley, in an interview with La Nación
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does the U.S. care so much about Argentina specifically? There are other countries in the region.
Argentina sits at a crossroads. It controls access to the Paraná-Paraguay Waterway, which moves most of South America's grain exports. It also hosts a Chinese military space station that the U.S. views as a surveillance threat. For Washington, Argentina is both a strategic chokepoint and a test case.
But Milei was openly hostile to China during his campaign. Isn't that just rhetoric?
It started as rhetoric, yes. But he's backing it up now—rejecting BRICS, buying American fighter jets instead of Chinese ones, allowing U.S. engineers onto the waterway. The question is whether this is genuine conviction or pragmatism born from needing U.S. support for Argentina's economic crisis.
What about that space base in Neuquén? Why is it such a big deal?
Because nobody really knows what it does. China says it's for scientific research. The U.S. says it's military surveillance. Argentina officially denies it's military, but the U.S. ambassador basically said he doesn't believe that. It's been operating since 2014 under different governments, which suggests either Argentina doesn't want to confront China, or they've made a quiet peace with it.
So the U.S. is trying to change that arrangement?
Not openly. But by increasing military and intelligence presence, by getting involved in the waterway, by emphasizing the security threat—yes, they're applying pressure. It's subtle, but it's there.
What does Milei actually gain from this alignment?
Economic support, military aid, and legitimacy. Argentina is in crisis. The U.S. can help stabilize it. For Milei, alignment with Washington also gives him cover domestically—he can point to security partnerships and defense modernization as proof his government is serious.
Is this sustainable? What happens if Argentina's economy doesn't improve?
That's the real question. Ideological alignment only goes so far. If Milei can't deliver economically, the political pressure to reconsider relationships with China—which remains a major trading partner—will grow. This alliance is real, but it's also fragile.