Each visit by a senior American military commander was a reminder of a hemisphere divided
Por segunda vez en tres meses, el almirante Craig Faller, jefe del Comando Sur de Estados Unidos, visitó Colombia para profundizar la cooperación militar con Bogotá, en un momento en que el presidente Duque se encontraba en Washington y la región atravesaba una fractura diplomática cada vez más pronunciada. La visita no ocurrió en el vacío: Colombia había boicoteado una cumbre regional donde apareció Maduro, rechazado su legitimidad y estrechado sus vínculos con el bloque occidental. Para Venezuela, la presencia de un alto mando militar estadounidense en suelo colombiano no era cooperación sino provocación, un síntoma de una América Latina dividida entre quienes orbitan Washington y quienes resisten esa órbita.
- El regreso del almirante Faller a Colombia en septiembre, apenas tres meses después de su visita anterior, intensificó las alarmas en Caracas y reavivó el debate sobre la soberanía colombiana frente a la presencia militar estadounidense.
- Las Fuerzas Armadas Bolivarianas emitieron un comunicado condenando la visita como una interferencia deliberada y un acto de agresión, rechazando la narrativa de cooperación antinarcóticos que Washington y Bogotá sostienen.
- La coreografía diplomática era difícil de ignorar: mientras Faller se reunía con mandos militares en Colombia, Duque estaba en la ONU y días antes había compartido escenario con Leopoldo López en España, consolidando el alineamiento colombiano con el bloque occidental.
- Un tribunal en Cundinamarca ya había suspendido actividades de la misión militar estadounidense por considerarla inconstitucional, y senadores colombianos habían advertido que su presencia podría fortalecer a grupos paramilitares, pero las visitas continuaron sin pausa.
- La región se asienta sobre una fractura ideológica que cada visita de un comandante estadounidense vuelve más visible: Colombia como avanzada de Washington, Venezuela como símbolo de resistencia a esa influencia.
El almirante Craig Faller llegó a Colombia a finales de septiembre para reunirse con la cúpula militar del país y avanzar en acuerdos de cooperación en seguridad. Era su segunda visita en tres meses, una cadencia que reflejaba el ritmo acelerado del vínculo militar entre Washington y Bogotá bajo la administración Duque.
El momento no era casual. El presidente colombiano se encontraba simultáneamente en Estados Unidos, participando en la Asamblea General de la ONU, y días antes había estado en España reunido con el rey Felipe VI, tres expresidentes españoles y Leopoldo López, figura de la oposición venezolana. Colombia también había boicoteado la cumbre de la CELAC en México, donde apareció Maduro, y había rechazado formalmente su legitimidad, calificando las elecciones de 2018 como fraudulentas. La posición no era nueva, pero su reiteración pública en un foro regional tenía peso simbólico.
Venezuela respondió con dureza. Las Fuerzas Armadas Bolivarianas emitieron un comunicado en el que calificaron la visita de Faller como una interferencia y una provocación deliberada, descartando los argumentos de cooperación bilateral. El antecedente era fresco: tres meses antes, cinco días después de la primera visita del almirante, el helicóptero del presidente Duque recibió disparos al aterrizar en Cúcuta. El gobierno colombiano culpó a un disidente de las FARC supuestamente operando desde territorio venezolano, aunque con pruebas escasas.
Dentro de Colombia, la presencia militar estadounidense también generaba resistencia. Un grupo de senadores había cuestionado la constitucionalidad de la misión militar norteamericana, y un tribunal en Cundinamarca llegó a suspender sus actividades por considerar que la decisión se había tomado sin la consulta debida. Aun así, las visitas continuaron.
Cada regreso de Faller a suelo colombiano se convertía en un espejo de la división hemisférica: un lado alineado con Washington, el otro resistiéndolo. Colombia había elegido su posición con claridad, y Venezuela leía cada visita como una confirmación de lo que ya sabía.
Admiral Craig Faller, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, arrived in Colombia in late September to meet with the country's military leadership and discuss security cooperation. It was his second visit in three months—a pattern that underscored Washington's deepening military engagement with Bogotá, even as the move drew sharp criticism from across the border in Venezuela.
The timing of Faller's visit was deliberate. Colombian President Iván Duque was simultaneously in the United States, attending the UN General Assembly and discussing what his office described as environmental, migration, and credit matters. Just days before heading to Washington, Duque had been in Spain, where he met with King Felipe VI, three former Spanish presidents, and Leopoldo López, the Venezuelan opposition figure and fugitive from Venezuelan justice. The diplomatic choreography was unmistakable: Colombia was positioning itself firmly within the Western alliance, while keeping its distance from Nicolás Maduro's government.
That distance had hardened considerably. Colombia had boycotted the Latin American and Caribbean States Community summit in Mexico, where Maduro appeared. In a formal statement, Bogotá rejected Maduro's legitimacy, characterizing his 2018 election as fraudulent and marred by the absence of opposition safeguards. The position was not new—Colombia had maintained it with U.S. backing and support from several other Latin American governments—but the public rejection at a regional gathering sent a message. When Maduro responded by challenging the presidents of Paraguay and Uruguay, who had also questioned his legitimacy, to debate democracy and revolution, the ideological fault lines were clear.
Venezuela's military establishment saw Faller's presence as a provocation. The Bolivarian National Armed Force issued a statement expressing alarm at the visit, dismissing claims of bilateral security cooperation and instead characterizing it as interference and a deliberate act of aggression. This was not mere rhetoric. Three months earlier, when Faller had visited in June, tensions had spiked. Five days after that visit, a helicopter carrying President Duque came under rifle fire as it landed at the airport in Cúcuta, in northern Santander. The aircraft sustained damage but the crew escaped unharmed. Duque's government blamed a dissident member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, allegedly operating from Venezuelan territory, though it offered limited evidence.
The presence of U.S. Southern Command in Colombia had become a recurring flashpoint. When the late Defense Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo announced that an American military mission would operate in the country to combat drug trafficking, a group of Colombian senators objected, arguing that the decision violated national sovereignty and the constitution. They worried it would embolden paramilitary groups—a concern that had been raised before by Salvatore Mancuso, a former commander of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. A court in Cundinamarca ultimately suspended the U.S. military's activities pending review, ruling that the decision had been made without proper consultation and was unconstitutional.
Yet the visits continued. Faller's return to Colombia in September represented a continuation of military ties that had defined the Duque administration. The U.S. framed the engagement as essential to regional security and counternarcotics efforts. Colombia, for its part, had embraced the partnership as a counterweight to what it saw as Venezuelan aggression and instability. But for Venezuela and its allies, each visit by a senior American military commander was a reminder of what they viewed as a hemisphere divided—one side aligned with Washington, the other resisting it.
Notable Quotes
Venezuela's military characterized the visit as interference and provocation, not bilateral security cooperation— Bolivarian National Armed Force statement
Colombia expressed interest in deepening security cooperation with the United States as a vital and trusted partner— President Iván Duque, via U.S. Southern Command announcement
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does a routine military visit from the U.S. commander provoke such a sharp reaction from Venezuela?
Because it's not routine to them. They see it as part of a coordinated effort to isolate and delegitimize Maduro's government. The visits happen in tandem with diplomatic moves—Duque meeting with Venezuelan opposition figures, Colombia boycotting regional summits where Maduro appears. It's a pattern.
But the U.S. says it's about counternarcotics and security cooperation. Is that not a legitimate reason?
It may be. But legitimacy depends on who's reading the situation. From Bogotá and Washington's perspective, yes—they're addressing real security threats. From Caracas, the same actions look like military encirclement, especially given the history of U.S. interventions in Latin America.
What changed between Faller's June visit and this one in September?
Not much, structurally. But the helicopter attack on Duque five days after the June visit hardened positions. It gave both sides evidence for their narrative—Colombia saw Venezuelan aggression, Venezuela saw proof that the U.S. military presence was destabilizing.
Is there actual evidence the attack came from Venezuelan territory?
Duque's government blamed a dissident FARC member allegedly in Venezuela, but offered limited proof. That's the problem—accusations fly, but verification is scarce. It leaves room for both sides to believe their own story.
What does Duque gain from aligning so visibly with the U.S. against Maduro?
Security support, military aid, diplomatic backing at the international level. But also domestic risk—Colombian courts have already questioned whether these arrangements violate the constitution. He's betting that the benefits outweigh the legal and political costs.
Where does this lead?
Deeper entrenchment. More visits, more military cooperation, more Venezuelan accusations of interference. Unless something shifts—a change in government, a negotiated settlement—this cycle likely continues.