US sanctions lift on Eritrea as Tigray fighting resurges, raising regional war risks

On September 23, fighting erupted across Ethiopia's Tigray region with sudden force. Tigrayan forces seized control of three local airports and the violence spilled into neighboring Afar and Amhara territories. Both sides blamed the other for starting the escalation. The timing was striking: this renewed fighting came just five days after the United States removed key sanctions on Eritrea, a strategic shift that analysts say reflects Washington's calculation that the Red Sea nation has become indispensable to American security interests in the region.

The connection between these two events—the lifting of sanctions and the return to war—reveals how deeply Eritrea's fate is now entangled with the broader geopolitical struggle for control of the Red Sea. On September 18, the US Treasury Department allowed a national emergency declaration underlying its Ethiopia-related sanctions to expire, then removed several Eritrean individuals and entities from its sanctions list, including senior financial official Hagos Ghebrehiwet and the Red Sea Trading Corporation. These measures had been imposed in 2021 during the previous Tigray war. Washington has not publicly acknowledged striking a deal with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, nor has it formally described the move as an endorsement of his government. But the effect is clear: a layer of international pressure has been removed from one of Africa's most repressive regimes at precisely the moment when its strategic importance has grown.

The reason is geography and geopolitics. Eritrea controls a long coastline opposite Yemen and sits at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's most critical maritime passages. Its southern port of Assab lies close to this chokepoint. As Iran-backed Houthi forces have escalated attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and as the broader Middle East has become increasingly volatile, Washington has concluded that securing Eritrea's cooperation—or at minimum, its non-hostility—is essential to maintaining freedom of navigation. Martin Plaut, a British journalist specializing in the Horn of Africa, argues that the Trump administration has made a deliberate strategic calculation: mend fences with Eritrea, lift sanctions, and gain leverage over a nation whose Red Sea position gives it outsized influence. Abdurahman Sayed, director of the Horn of Africa Centre for Regional Integration, frames it differently but reaches the same conclusion: with the Strait of Hormuz blocked and the Bab el-Mandeb now contested, Eritrea has leverage it has never had before.

But this bargain carries profound risks. The renewed fighting in Tigray threatens to unravel the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement that ended the previous war, which killed hundreds of thousands. On September 21, seven Ethiopian armed and political groups—including the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the Amhara Fano National Movement, and the Oromo Liberation Army—announced an alliance aimed at removing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government. Two days later, fighting erupted. The TPLF claims federal forces attacked first; Addis Ababa says the TPLF launched the offensive. What is clear is that the conflict has resumed, and the question now is whether Eritrea will be drawn in.

During the 2020-22 Tigray war, Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian federal troops. But relations between Afwerki and Abiy have deteriorated sharply since then. A major source of tension is Ethiopia's demand for reliable access to the Red Sea. Landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993, Ethiopia views maritime access as a strategic necessity. Eritrea has rejected any coerced arrangement, insisting on its sovereignty. The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups in the new conflict; Eritrea denies this. There is no public evidence that the US sanctions decision was designed to encourage Eritrean military intervention. But if the Tigray fighting intensifies, Eritrea could see a direct security interest in entering the war, transforming what is now an Ethiopian conflict into a potential interstate confrontation.

The danger extends far beyond Ethiopia's borders. Sudan remains at war. Somalia is unstable. Ethiopia and Egypt are locked in a dispute over the Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing their own interests across the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. Yemen's conflict is directly connected to the security of the Bab el-Mandeb. Moses Okello, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa, notes that the regional context has fundamentally changed since the previous Tigray war. "In 2020, the concern was the TPLF versus the Ethiopian National Defense Force," he said. "Today, the entire Middle East is up in flames, and now the tensions in the Red Sea. So this changes the strategic value of not just the Eritrean coast, but the entire Red Sea waterway." Plaut warns that regional alliances could interact in dangerous ways: the UAE backs the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, the Saudis back Eritreans and Sudanese Armed Forces, and one conflict could lead into another.

For Eritrea's Afwerki, the US decision is an opportunity. The end of sanctions removes international pressure and gives him greater diplomatic room. More importantly, it signals to the world that Eritrea's Red Sea position has made it strategically valuable to Washington. But this creates a paradox: the more important Eritrea becomes to US and regional security calculations, the greater the risk that strategic interests will overshadow concerns about its authoritarian system—a state with no national elections since 1993 and an extensive system of indefinite national service. For Ethiopia, the immediate question is whether the renewed fighting can be stopped before it draws in Eritrea. For Washington, the challenge is whether Eritrea can be engaged as a Red Sea security partner without giving the country greater freedom to destabilize its neighbors. With fighting again raging in Tigray, Houthis threatening the Red Sea, and Washington reopening its channel to Asmara, Eritrea could become one of the key players in the Horn of Africa's next chapter.