US Pressure on Iran Tests Brics Unity as Members Balance Competing Interests

The leaders of Brics are gathering in New Delhi this week at a moment when the global economy is fracturing along new lines. Six months of war in the Middle East has redrawn the map of energy flows, trade routes, and diplomatic allegiances. The strait through which a fifth of the world's oil and gas normally passes has been effectively closed since February, choked by Iranian missile and drone attacks on commercial vessels and a US naval blockade. Oil prices have climbed. Shipping routes have shifted. And now, as the summit convenes on September 12 and 13, the United States is tightening the screws on Iran with a campaign it calls Operation Economic Outcast.

The Trump administration's strategy is straightforward in its ambition: isolate Iran by threatening secondary sanctions against any country or bank that maintains financial ties with Tehran. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has made clear that the initial targets will be financial institutions, and that countries face a choice—sever economic ties with Iran or lose access to the dollar-based financial system that underpins global commerce. For some members of Brics, this ultimatum has created an impossible bind. China, which purchases more than 80 percent of Iran's shipped crude oil, has already felt the pressure. Iranian crude loadings plummeted to roughly 260,000 barrels per day in August, down from 1.7 million barrels a year earlier, according to commodity analytics firm Kpler. What remains is being moved by truck, train, or small boats across the Caspian Sea—a trickle where a torrent once flowed.

India finds itself in an equally awkward position. New Delhi is a critical strategic partner to the United States in the Indo-Pacific, yet it also has deep commercial and strategic interests in Iran that it is unlikely to abandon. The tension between these two commitments became visible just a week after the Trump administration launched Operation Economic Outcast, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kyrgyzstan. It was their first meeting since the war began. The message was clear: India intends to maintain its relationship with Iran even as Washington applies pressure. Meanwhile, the UAE, once one of Iran's most important commercial gateways, suspended all financial and economic transactions with Tehran last month following regional escalation. Iran responded by attacking all six Gulf states and Jordan, and has also targeted Gulf-owned commercial vessels.

China's position reveals the deeper complexity of the emerging global order. Beijing remains Iran's largest economic lifeline, but it also has substantial interests in the United States, the Gulf states, and elsewhere. Analysts say China is unlikely to confront Washington directly over Iran, preferring instead to push for de-escalation while protecting its broader economic interests. The asymmetry is stark: for Iran, China is essentially its only paying customer; for China, Iran is one of roughly fifty oil suppliers. China trades many times more with the Gulf states than with Iran, and it also trades heavily with the United States. When forced to choose, the math points in one direction. Yet China also wants to avoid US sanctions, which means it cannot afford to be seen as defying Washington too openly.

The result is not the emergence of two opposing blocs locked in ideological struggle, but rather a more fragmented system in which countries attempt to maintain relationships with multiple centers of power simultaneously. This is particularly true of the Arab members of Brics, as well as India. New Delhi wants Brics to give emerging economies greater room to maneuver, while avoiding an alignment that would make the grouping anti-American or overly dependent on China. Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to attend the summit, marking his first visit to India in seven years. The gathering follows a display of multipolar diplomacy at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, where Modi, Xi, and Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared together.

The United States will be watching closely. Experts say Washington's first priority is to improve relations with China, and then to assess what China might do for American interests elsewhere. This year, the Trump administration reduced tariffs on Indian goods from 50 percent to 18 percent, and the two countries are negotiating a trade agreement. Trump also held a meeting with Xi in China in May, and Xi is expected to travel to Washington after the Brics summit. With that high-stakes meeting on the horizon, Beijing has little appetite for confrontation. India, for its part, has already agreed to halt Russian oil purchases in exchange for tariff relief. Yet India remains heavily dependent on Russian crude, which accounted for more than 50 percent of its crude imports in June and July, and about 45 percent in August.

Experts expect the New Delhi summit to produce calls for greater intra-Brics trade conducted in national currencies rather than dollars. But India, as host, will likely be cautious about any moves that the United States could interpret as de-dollarization. The foreign ministers' meeting in May failed to produce a joint declaration for the first time in Brics history, a sign of the fractures running through the group. Brics, which originally stood for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, has expanded since 2024 to include the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, and Ethiopia. The group claims its members account for 49.5 percent of the world's population and about 40 percent of global gross domestic product at purchasing power parity. Yet the challenge facing the organization is whether that multipolarity can translate into collective action, or whether it will remain a forum where each member pursues its own interests while trying to maintain relationships with competing powers.