U.S. Exits Iraq With Iran Conflict Unresolved, Repeating Past Mistakes

On Wednesday, the last American soldiers will board a plane out of Iraq, marking the end of a military footprint that has stretched across nearly a quarter century. The withdrawal closes one chapter of American interventionism just as another opens—two carrier strike groups are already positioned in the Arabian Sea, conducting operations against Iran, seven months into a conflict that began with airstrikes in February.

The Iraq story began with certainty and ended in ambiguity. In March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced with overwhelming force. By April, Baghdad had fallen and Saddam Hussein's government was overturned. The dictator himself was captured before year's end. The promised weapons of mass destruction never materialized, but at that moment, American military dominance seemed complete. It was not.

By the time combat troops finally departed Iraq in 2011, the arithmetic of the war had become stark: 4,492 American soldiers dead, nearly 32,000 wounded. The Iraqi toll dwarfed these numbers. Conservative estimates place civilian deaths from direct violence between 2003 and 2011 at 180,000 to 210,000, with hundreds of thousands more perishing as hospitals failed, water systems collapsed, and basic infrastructure disintegrated. When American forces returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State, another 123 U.S. service members died, and Iraq lost more than 26,000 soldiers and military personnel in that four-year campaign.

Yet Iraq today, despite its fragility, looks better than the darkest years of occupation suggested it might. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi told American lawmakers in July that the United States remains Baghdad's "most important strategic partner." He promised that after September 30, Iraq's federal forces would be capable of protecting the nation without armed factions. That second claim is already fraying. The removal of Saddam Hussein eliminated a regime that had spent eight years fighting Iran. What followed was the rise of Iraqi Shiite political movements with deep ties to Tehran. Iran armed, trained, and supported military groups across the border. When Iraqi forces collapsed before ISIS in 2014, Iran-backed militias became essential to the Popular Mobilization Forces that eventually defeated the extremists. Al-Zaidi now governs in the space between two powers—America's pull is stronger, but Iran is geographically closer and politically embedded. His coalition includes Iran-allied Shiite parties. Several Iran-backed forces still operate on Iraqi soil. Good relations with Washington cannot erase the networks, armed groups, and institutional leverage that give Tehran serious influence inside Iraq. Twenty-three years, untold billions of dollars, and tens of thousands of American casualties have purchased a precarious arrangement.

The Afghanistan withdrawal five years earlier had been far messier. Two decades of American presence, vastly more money spent, thousands of lives lost—and the Taliban seized Kabul before the last American soldier had even left Afghan airspace. When President Trump launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran on February 28, he appeared to have absorbed a different lesson. No occupation force followed the airstrikes. No provisional authority waited to govern. No nation-building infrastructure was prepared. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine said Trump ordered the military to destroy Iran's ballistic missiles, drones, navy, and the industrial base supporting its power projection. After 38 days of combat, Caine declared the military objectives achieved. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was dead, along with several senior political and military leaders. Washington claimed Iran's air force, navy, and much of its missile capability had been eliminated, along with large portions of its military-industrial base. The administration insisted Iran would never obtain a nuclear weapon.

This appeared to be the lesson learned. In reality, it revealed the same underlying problem: overwhelming firepower produces quick battlefield results, but converting that destruction into a durable political and military outcome remains elusive. Nearly six months after the White House declared victory, Tehran continues to pose serious problems. The Islamic Republic did not collapse with Khamenei's death. His son Mojtaba, experts told Newsweek, is an absent and ineffectual leader, while hardline cadres within Iran's security establishment have tightened their grip on power. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained. Oil and fuel costs have soared. America's Gulf partners have endured Iranian drone attacks. No amount of American bombs has solved these problems or prevented diesel prices from climbing above six dollars a gallon.

Washington has avoided the occupation trap, but it has yet to devise a strategy beyond military force that produces acceptable results. Tehran is now attempting to negotiate terms. Iran says it will reopen the Strait of Hormuz within a week if Washington lifts its naval blockade, waives sanctions on oil sales, and agrees to a wider ceasefire. The White House wants normal shipping, access for nuclear inspectors, and guarantees over Iran's nuclear program. Neither side wants to move first. Trump insists Iran is bargaining from weakness, pointing out that around 10 million barrels of oil per day passed through Hormuz in September, with wider Gulf exports at their highest level since the war began. But the president who once told Volodymyr Zelensky he didn't "have the cards" may not hold many himself.

The political ground has shifted beneath American interventionism. After 9/11, President George W. Bush's approval rating reached 90 percent. A month later, 92 percent of Americans approved of airstrikes in Afghanistan. Days after Iraq's invasion began in 2003, 72 percent backed the war. This month, a Reuters/Ipsos poll found 64 percent of Americans disapproved of Trump's handling of Iran, with only 24 percent approving. His overall approval rating stands at 32 percent, the lowest recorded across his two presidencies. Congress is applying pressure. On July 23, the House passed a War Powers resolution directing Trump to remove forces from hostilities with Iran by a vote of 214-208. The Senate rejected it by the narrowest margin, 49-50. The House tried again on September 15, passing a second resolution 220-204, which the Senate has yet to consider. The last troops are leaving Iraq 23 years after they first took Baghdad. The American public will not permit the Iran conflict to stretch that long. The exit from Iraq should serve as a warning about what happens when the lessons of previous conflicts are ignored in the next. Launching a war is straightforward. Finding a way out is far more difficult.