US and Israel establish working groups for Gaza disarmament amid Kushner diplomacy

Jared Kushner arrived in Israel with a specific mandate: to move past the rhetorical stage of Gaza's future and into the mechanics of how it actually gets built. The United States and Israel have now established working groups dedicated to disarmament—the unglamorous but essential work of cataloging weapons, securing them, and preventing their reemergence once the immediate conflict winds down. It is the kind of thing that happens in the background of peace processes, the infrastructure nobody celebrates but everyone needs.

The timing matters. Kushner's visit to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu came at a moment when the two governments were not entirely aligned on what "next" looked like. According to officials briefed on the meetings, tensions surfaced over a specific and stubborn problem: Israeli military operations continued against remaining militant targets connected to October 7th. From the American perspective, the diplomatic window for establishing post-conflict frameworks was closing. From the Israeli perspective, certain security threats remained active and could not simply be negotiated away. The gap between these positions was real enough that it required direct, high-level intervention.

The working groups themselves represent a bet on a particular vision of Gaza's future. They are not about immediate ceasefire logistics or hostage negotiations—those are separate channels. Instead, they focus on the architecture that would need to exist after the fighting stops: how weapons get removed from circulation, how stockpiles are monitored, what international oversight might look like, and how a territory that has been militarized for decades begins the process of demilitarization. It is technical work, but it carries enormous political weight. Success or failure here will shape whether Gaza can transition toward stable governance or whether it remains a security flashpoint.

Kushner's presence signals that the Trump administration views this as a priority. His track record in Middle East diplomacy is contested—the Abraham Accords are cited by supporters as a breakthrough, by critics as a distraction from Palestinian issues. But his willingness to engage directly with Netanyahu, and to press on specific operational questions, suggests the administration is not content to let these processes unfold at their own pace. The clash over continued strikes indicates that even aligned parties have friction points when it comes to translating broad agreements into daily military decisions.

The human dimension remains largely in the background of these diplomatic discussions, but it is present. Ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza continue to displace people and create casualties among civilian populations. The establishment of disarmament working groups does not pause that reality. It exists alongside it. The question implicit in these meetings is whether the diplomatic track can move fast enough to create conditions where the military track becomes unnecessary—or whether the military track will continue to define the situation on the ground regardless of what working groups agree to in conference rooms.

What comes next is a test of whether these working groups can produce actual frameworks, not just talking points. Whether Netanyahu's government will accept constraints on military operations in service of a longer-term security architecture. Whether the United States will maintain pressure on both sides to move toward implementation rather than endless negotiation. The working groups exist now. Whether they matter will depend on what they actually produce.