UK security chief: Europe must endure winter hardship to maintain Ukraine pressure

Jonathan Powell, Britain's national security adviser, stood before Ukraine's leadership and international allies at a conference in Kyiv last weekend and delivered a message that cut against the grain of growing European anxiety: the West must accept genuine hardship this winter if it wants to keep Russia under pressure.

Powell's remarks were striking partly because he rarely speaks publicly. He had arrived in Kyiv just days after meeting with Donald Trump's envoys, who had themselves come from Moscow. His tone was distinctly more optimistic than others at the Yalta European Strategy forum, where the mood had grown darker as Russian drone strikes continued to ravage Ukraine's energy infrastructure and the continent braced for severe winter shortages.

The core of his argument was straightforward: Europe's strategy of supporting Ukraine militarily and economically while maintaining sanctions on Russia was working. The signs of Russian strain were visible. Since 2022, Russia had suffered 1.5 million casualties. Putin's forces had failed to seize the entire country. And crucially, Powell believed the political landscape had shifted. Trump, he said, was now "in a very different place"—no longer leaning toward Putin as he had before, but recognizing that Ukraine was holding its ground. The so-called Anchorage compromise, a supposed Trump-Putin agreement from last year that Ukraine should cede territory and abandon NATO membership, was "firmly dead," Powell insisted.

Yet the winter ahead posed a genuine test. Ukraine's economy minister, Oleksandr Kravchenko, had just told the same conference that Russian attacks this year would destroy $10 billion in infrastructure and assets. With Ukraine's sea ports blockaded, grain exports were crippled, and the country's GDP was expected to contract by 1.5 percent. Meanwhile, Europe itself faced an energy crisis. The EU still imported 12 percent of its gas from Russia, though it had planned a complete phase-out by January. That plan was now described by the European Court of Auditors as "faltering" amid global shortages tied to the Iran war. Some European countries were dragging their feet on sanctions, tempted by the prospect of cheaper Russian liquefied natural gas.

Powell's message to European leaders was blunt: this was not the moment to ease off. "What we don't want to do at this stage is take our foot off the gas," he said, acknowledging the grim irony of his phrasing. "It will require some real hardship and difficulties on our parts. But we will have to swallow that and we have to keep the economic, military, political and diplomatic support going for Ukraine." He framed Russian escalation not as a sign of Western failure but as evidence that pressure on Putin was finally working.

Yet Powell also argued something more subtle: that Ukraine had already won in the way that mattered most. Not because it had recovered all its territory—it hadn't—but because it had secured its independence and its right to choose its own European future. "To the extent that [Putin] gains another 10 kilometers of land or loses another 40 kilometers of land, this war is already won," Powell said. The real threat to Putin at home, he suggested, was the existence of a free, independent Ukraine that Russians could see thriving in Europe.

This framing opened the door to negotiation, which Powell said was inevitable and necessary. He had helped broker the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, and he believed dialogue was essential—even with an adversary. "I would certainly be in favour of talking to this terrorist as well," he said of Putin, emphasizing the need to maintain communication to prevent miscalculation and clarify red lines. The CIA's recent visit to Moscow, he noted, served that purpose.

Powell acknowledged the difficulties on the ground. Russian jets and drones were relentless. Ukrainian air defenses were stretched thin against ballistic missiles. The government faced a budget crisis. But he saw reasons for optimism that others at the conference did not. The question now was whether Europe would hold firm through the winter, or whether the prospect of energy shortages would fracture the coalition that had, so far, remained remarkably solid in its support for Ukraine.