The region would be transformed into devastation and destruction
In the shadow of a fragile US-Iran ceasefire, the United Arab Emirates has been revealed to have conducted covert military strikes inside Iranian territory — a secret campaign that, now exposed, transforms Abu Dhabi from a quiet adversary into a declared target. The Gulf, long a theater of proxy tensions and careful restraint, is fracturing along new lines: between those willing to escalate and those who calculate that the cost of war outweighs any conceivable victory. What unfolds now is not merely a bilateral standoff, but the slow emergence of a multipolar regional order in which old alliances no longer hold and new ones form around grievances that predate this conflict entirely.
- The UAE's covert strikes on Iranian territory — including Lazan Island — have been exposed just weeks after a ceasefire was announced, placing the Emirates directly in Tehran's line of fire if the truce collapses.
- Kuwait's capture of four IRGC operatives attempting to infiltrate Bubiyan Island by fishing boat signals that Iran is probing Gulf defenses even while negotiations remain nominally alive.
- Saudi Arabia is refusing to follow the UAE into open confrontation, with former ambassador Turki al-Faisal warning that war with Iran would shatter oil infrastructure, desalination plants, and the kingdom's entire Vision 2030 modernization project.
- A counter-coalition of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar is coalescing — not around opposition to Iran, but around shared alarm over Israeli expansionism, pulling regional attention away from the US-Iran axis entirely.
- Iran is simultaneously reorganizing control over the Strait of Hormuz, negotiating with Oman to impose shipping fees on commercial vessels — a move that reads less like diplomacy and more like preparation for a prolonged standoff.
The ceasefire between the United States and Iran was already under strain when a new revelation deepened the crisis: the UAE had secretly conducted military strikes inside Iran during the conflict, including an attack on Lazan Island just days before the April 7 truce. Framed as retaliation for Iranian missile and drone strikes on Emirati infrastructure, the operation — carried out using French Mirage jets and Chinese Wing Loong drones — marks a decisive shift from defensive absorption to direct military escalation. With Donald Trump now describing the ceasefire as hanging by a thread over Iran's nuclear program, Abu Dhabi finds itself exposed as a primary target should the agreement collapse.
The UAE's aggression has not unified the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has chosen deliberate restraint, with former ambassador Turki al-Faisal articulating the kingdom's calculus plainly: a full war with Iran would devastate eastern oil facilities, destroy desalination infrastructure, disrupt the hajj, and bring Vision 2030 to a halt. The cost of victory, in Riyadh's view, is indistinguishable from the cost of defeat. This divergence between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh is now one of the defining fault lines of the crisis.
Kuwait, meanwhile, is managing its own provocation. Four IRGC members were captured attempting to infiltrate Bubiyan Island by fishing boat, prompting a formal diplomatic complaint and a statement of solidarity from the UAE. Yet even this episode carries ambiguity — Kuwaiti reporting noted a Chinese rather than American security presence on the island, hinting at a Gulf security architecture more fragmented than it appears.
The economic damage is accumulating. The UAE's largest gas plant has been offline for nearly two years following Iranian strikes, with full repairs not expected until 2027. The Pentagon's conflict cost estimate has climbed to nearly $29 billion. And Iran, far from retreating, is holding talks with Oman about asserting fee-based control over Strait of Hormuz shipping — a signal that Tehran is preparing for a long confrontation, not a negotiated exit.
Perhaps most consequentially, a new regional alignment is forming that bypasses the US-Iran conflict altogether. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar are coalescing around shared concern over Israeli expansionism — a priority Turkey's foreign minister made explicit by citing the toll of Israeli actions across Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Syria. For this quartet, the ceasefire is a sideshow. If it breaks, the Gulf will not face a single bilateral war. It will face a cascade of overlapping conflicts, each governed by its own logic, each carrying its own potential for catastrophe.
The fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran, already strained to its breaking point, faces a new and destabilizing threat: the revelation that the United Arab Emirates conducted a covert military campaign against Iran during the conflict, including a strike on Lazan Island just days before the April 7 truce was announced. The operation was framed as retaliation for Iranian attacks on Emirati facilities, but its exposure now places the UAE squarely in Tehran's crosshairs should the ceasefire collapse—a possibility that grows more likely by the day as Donald Trump signals the agreement is "hanging by a thread" over disputes about Iran's nuclear program.
The UAE's secret assault represents a fundamental shift in how Gulf states are responding to Iranian aggression. For months, Iran had targeted Emirati infrastructure with missiles and drones, partly because of the diplomatic hostility the UAE's leadership has openly expressed toward Tehran, and partly because of the Emirates' willingness to normalize relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. Rather than absorb these strikes defensively, the UAE decided to strike back—using French Mirage jets and Chinese Wing Long drones to carry out operations inside Iranian territory. The move signals that at least one major Gulf power is willing to escalate beyond defense into direct military retaliation.
But the UAE's aggression has not unified the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, the region's other heavyweight, has deliberately chosen restraint, a position articulated this week by former Saudi ambassador Turki al-Faisal. In his view, an all-out war with Iran would transform the region into "a state of devastation and destruction." Saudi oil facilities on the eastern coast would be destroyed. Desalination plants would be struck. The hajj pilgrimage would be catastrophically disrupted. Vision 2030, the kingdom's ambitious modernization program, would grind to a halt. This calculation—that military victory against Iran is not worth the cost of victory—has created a visible rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over how to respond to Iranian threats.
Meanwhile, Kuwait is dealing with its own Iranian provocation. Earlier this month, four members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps attempted to infiltrate Bubiyan Island, Kuwait's largest island in its coastal chain, by fishing boat. Kuwaiti media published the names of the captured IRGC commanders, and the foreign ministry summoned Iran's ambassador to lodge a formal complaint. The UAE, seeking to build solidarity among threatened Gulf states, issued a statement of support for Kuwait's efforts to repel what it called "hostile and terrorist acts." Yet even this incident reveals the complexity of the moment: some Kuwaiti reporting emphasized a Chinese rather than American presence on the island, suggesting that the security architecture of the Gulf is more fragmented and multipolar than it once was.
The economic toll of the conflict is mounting. The Pentagon's cost estimate has risen to nearly $29 billion, up $4 billion in just two weeks. More immediately, the UAE's largest gas plant has been shuttered for nearly two years following Iranian attacks last month. The owner, Adnoc Gas, says the facility will not be fully repaired until 2027, with processing capacity reaching only 80 percent by the end of 2026. This is not abstract damage—it is the slow strangulation of the UAE's energy sector.
Yet the UAE's aggressive posture has failed to persuade Qatar or Saudi Arabia to escalate their own military response. Instead, a different coalition is taking shape. Pakistan's defense minister, Khawaja Asif, has identified an emerging alliance of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar—four nations united not primarily by opposition to Iran, but by concern about what they call Israeli expansionism. Turkey's foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, made this priority explicit, warning that Israeli actions in Gaza, Beirut, the West Bank, and Syria have "cost many lives and forced many more to flee home." For this quartet, the Iran-US conflict is a distraction from what they see as the region's true destabilizing force.
Meanwhile, Iran is moving forward with its own strategic calculations. This week, Tehran held talks with Oman about reorganizing shipping administration through the Strait of Hormuz, including plans to charge fees to commercial vessels. The move suggests Iran is preparing for a prolonged confrontation, establishing new revenue streams and asserting control over one of the world's most critical waterways.
The ceasefire, in other words, is not holding—it is merely pausing. The UAE's secret strikes have been exposed. Kuwait has captured Iranian operatives. Saudi Arabia is signaling it will not follow the Emirates into open war. And a new regional alignment is forming around concerns that have little to do with the US-Iran conflict itself. If the ceasefire breaks, the Gulf will not face a simple bilateral confrontation. It will face a cascade of conflicts, each with its own logic and its own risks.
Notable Quotes
If the Israeli plan succeeded in igniting war between us and Iran, the region would be transformed into a state of devastation and destruction, and Israel would succeed in imposing its will on the region.— Turki al-Faisal, former Saudi Arabian ambassador to the US
What the Gulf is going through should not lead to losing focus on Gaza. Expansionism in Gaza, Beirut, the West Bank and Syria has cost many lives and forced many more to flee home.— Hakan Fidan, Turkish foreign minister
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did the UAE decide to strike back at Iran rather than just defend itself?
The UAE felt it had been singled out for punishment. Iran was hitting its oil facilities, its ports, its infrastructure—partly because the Emirates had signed the Abraham Accords with Israel. At some point, the leadership decided that absorbing those blows without response was making them look weak and inviting more attacks. So they hit back.
And that worked?
No. It made them a clearer target. Now if the ceasefire collapses, Iran knows exactly where to aim. The UAE essentially painted a target on itself.
Why hasn't Saudi Arabia done the same thing?
Because Saudi Arabia has calculated that the cost of war with Iran is higher than the cost of restraint. If they go to war, their oil infrastructure gets destroyed, their desalination plants get hit, the hajj gets disrupted. They have too much to lose.
So the Gulf is divided?
Completely. The UAE wants escalation. Saudi Arabia wants de-escalation. Kuwait is dealing with its own Iranian infiltration attempts. And now a separate group—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar—is forming around the idea that Israel, not Iran, is the real problem.
Is the ceasefire actually going to hold?
Trump says it's hanging by a thread. Iran hasn't made the nuclear concessions he wants. The UAE's secret strikes have been exposed. Kuwait just captured four IRGC members. Every day that passes, the ceasefire looks more fragile. If it breaks, you won't have a simple two-sided conflict. You'll have multiple conflicts happening at once.
What happens to the UAE if the ceasefire breaks?
They become the first target. Iran has already shown it can hit their gas plants and keep them offline for years. If the ceasefire ends, the UAE will face a much more serious campaign.