In mid-September 2021, the United Kingdom's energy market revealed the fragility beneath its surface, as two more household suppliers — Utility Point and People's Energy — ceased operations under the weight of wholesale gas prices that had climbed to a record 167 pence per therm, nearly three times their previous peak. More than half a million customers were swept into the regulator's safety net, even as Ofgem acknowledged that the forces driving the crisis — depleted gas stocks, low wind generation, and surging European demand — would not relent before winter. The collapse was not merely a bu
Two energy suppliers collapse as wholesale gas prices hit record 167p per therm
A perfect storm of events made it impossible to continue
So two suppliers just vanished. What made them vulnerable when others survived?
They were smaller, newer companies with thin margins. When wholesale prices spiked, they couldn't absorb the shock the way bigger suppliers with deeper pockets could. They also couldn't fully hedge their positions—lock in prices in advance—because they lacked the capital.
But the CEO blamed Ofgem's price cap too. He said it forced all suppliers to underprice. Is that actually true, or is that just blame-shifting?
It's a real tension. The price cap was meant to protect consumers, but if wholesale costs rise faster than the cap allows, suppliers get squeezed. Smaller ones can't survive the squeeze.
What happens to the 500,000 customers now?
Ofgem appoints a new supplier automatically. Their service continues uninterrupted. Any credit on their accounts is protected.
But their new tariffs will reflect current wholesale prices, right? So they're not really protected from the underlying problem.
Exactly. The safety net catches them from falling through the cracks, but it doesn't shield them from higher bills.
How long will prices stay this high?
Ofgem says for some time. The gas shortage is real—depleted stocks, low wind, high demand. It's not a temporary blip.
And the half million households pushed into fuel poverty—that's a projection based on the October price cap rise, not confirmed yet?
Right. It's Ofgem's estimate of the impact. The actual number depends on how households respond and whether prices move further.
What about the 200 people who worked at Utility Point?
They lost their jobs. The company couldn't find a buyer, so it shut down entirely.
El Pulso
- Wholesale gas prices hit 167p per therm — nearly triple the previous record — rising 8 percent in a single day and making it mathematically impossible for thin-margin suppliers to continue trading.
- Four energy companies collapsed in September alone, exposing a structural flaw: the price cap meant to protect consumers had inadvertently locked suppliers into selling energy below their true costs.
- Over 500,000 customers from two failed suppliers were funnelled into Ofgem's safety net, while 200 employees in Poole and Bournemouth lost their jobs with immediate effect.
- A £139 bill increase set for October — on top of a 50 percent rise in wholesale costs over six months — threatens to push an additional half million households into fuel poverty, just as a £20-per-week Universal Credit uplift is withdrawn.
- Ofgem's safety net offers continuity of service and protection of credit balances, but cannot address the underlying reality: energy costs are high, will stay high, and winter is approaching.
In mid-September 2021, the United Kingdom's energy market revealed the fragility beneath its surface, as two more household suppliers — Utility Point and People's Energy — ceased operations under the weight of wholesale gas prices that had climbed to a record 167 pence per therm, nearly three times their previous peak. More than half a million customers were swept into the regulator's safety net, even as Ofgem acknowledged that the forces driving the crisis — depleted gas stocks, low wind generation, and surging European demand — would not relent before winter. The collapse was not merely a business failure but a signal that a market designed for stable conditions had encountered something it was not built to survive.
On a September afternoon in 2021, the UK's energy market fractured further. Utility Point and People's Energy, serving more than half a million customers between them, announced they were ceasing operations as wholesale gas prices reached a record 167 pence per therm — a figure that, for context, had peaked at just 60.7 pence during the winter of 2018-19. The distance between those two numbers was not merely a price spike. It was the outline of a structural crisis.
Ofgem moved quickly to activate its safety net, arranging for customers to be transferred to new providers with credit balances protected. But the reassurance came with a warning: gas prices would likely remain elevated for months. This mattered enormously, because roughly 15 million households were already facing a £139 increase to their energy bills from October — a rise reflecting wholesale costs that had jumped 50 percent in six months. Ofgem's own analysis suggested this could push an additional half million homes into fuel poverty, arriving at precisely the moment the government was ending a temporary £20-per-week Universal Credit uplift.
The collapses were the fourth and fifth supplier failures in September alone — seven across the year in total. The pattern exposed a market that could not absorb the shock. Challenger suppliers had operated on thin margins, without the capital to hedge against price volatility, and found themselves structurally undercharging relative to their actual costs. Utility Point's chief executive described a perfect storm: soaring wholesale prices, a price cap that had inadvertently made fair pricing impossible, and a regulatory framework that had collided with international and national conditions simultaneously. Two hundred employees in Poole and Bournemouth lost their jobs.
The roots of the crisis ran through the supply side of the energy system. A cold winter had depleted gas stocks. A low-wind summer had forced greater reliance on gas-fired generation, which accounts for nearly half of UK electricity output. National Grid had been forced to restart coal-fired stations at short notice — costly both economically and environmentally. The gas shortfall was not uniquely British; it had driven energy costs across Europe, and those costs were now flowing into household bills as fixed-rate deals expired.
The safety net would catch the customers of failed suppliers. It could not catch the underlying problem. With inflation already rising, the Bank of England uncertain about timelines, and winter approaching, the cost of energy itself remained the force that no regulatory protocol could contain.
On a September afternoon, the UK's energy market fractured further. Utility Point and People's Energy, two household suppliers serving more than half a million customers combined, announced they were ceasing operations. The news arrived as wholesale gas prices reached 167 pence per therm—a record high that had climbed 8 percent in a single day. For context: during the winter of 2018-19, the previous peak stood at 60.7 pence per therm. The gap between then and now measured not just a price spike but a structural crisis in the making.
Ofgem, the energy regulator, moved quickly to contain the damage. Under its established safety net protocol, the failed suppliers' customer bases would be transferred to new providers, ensuring continuity of service. But the reassurance came wrapped in a grimmer acknowledgment: gas prices, Ofgem warned, would likely remain elevated for months. This mattered because roughly 15 million households were already braced for a £139 increase to their energy bills starting in October—a rise that reflected wholesale costs that had jumped 50 percent over the preceding six months. The regulator's own analysis suggested the increase could push an additional half million homes into fuel poverty, arriving precisely as the government ended a temporary £20-per-week uplift to Universal Credit.
The collapse of Utility Point and People's Energy marked the fourth and fifth supplier failures in September alone. Seven companies had folded across the entire year. The pattern revealed a market structure that could not absorb the shock: challenger suppliers operated on wafer-thin margins, lacked the capital reserves to hedge their positions against price volatility, and found themselves undercharging for energy relative to their actual costs. Ben Bolt, Utility Point's chief executive, described the convergence of forces that had made continuation impossible. Wholesale prices had soared to record levels. The price cap on default tariffs, intended to protect consumers, had instead created a perverse incentive: every supplier was undercharging relative to their true costs, which meant the fair pricing the regulator had sought to encourage produced the opposite effect. International circumstances, national conditions, and the mechanics of the regulatory framework had collided into what Bolt called a perfect storm.
The immediate human cost was concrete. Utility Point employed 200 people in Poole and Bournemouth. Those jobs were gone. The company had served 225,000 customers, who would now be transferred to another provider. People's Energy's customer base added another 275,000 to the total being shuffled into the safety net. For these households, the transition was meant to be seamless—Ofgem would appoint a new supplier, protect any credit balances on their accounts, and notify them of new tariffs. But the underlying condition remained: prices were rising, and they would stay high.
The root of the crisis lay in the supply side of the energy system. A cold winter had depleted gas stocks. Low wind levels through the summer had forced greater reliance on gas-fired generation to meet electricity demand. Gas-fired power stations account for nearly half of UK electricity generation, which meant that any shortage rippled through the entire system. The grid operator, National Grid, had been forced to activate coal-fired stations at short notice to maintain supply—a costly measure both economically and environmentally. The gas shortfall was not confined to Britain; it had driven energy costs across Europe upward, and those costs were now flowing into household bills as fixed-rate deals expired and customers moved onto new tariffs reflecting the new wholesale reality.
The broader economic context sharpened the stakes. Inflation was already rising, much of it driven by energy costs as economies restarted after COVID-19 disruption. The Bank of England expected this period of elevated prices to be temporary, but the timeline remained uncertain. Ofgem's own spokesman offered no comfort: gas prices would remain high for some time, putting pressure on both customers and the energy companies trying to serve them. For households already managing the effects of higher inflation and the loss of the Universal Credit uplift, the prospect of winter bills climbing further represented a deepening squeeze on household budgets. The safety net would catch the customers of failed suppliers, but it could not catch the underlying problem: the cost of energy itself.
Citas Notables
Recent international and national circumstances have created a perfect storm of events in the energy market which has meant that Utility Point has not been able to find a buyer for its business.— Ben Bolt, chief executive of Utility Point
We do expect that gas prices will remain high for some time, unfortunately putting pressure on both customers and energy companies.— Ofgem spokesman