Trump's Accommodating China Policy Is Backfiring, and Congress Has a Window to Correct It

Each time Washington stands aside, China has more reason to go further
The authors argue that U.S. restraint in Asia is raising the odds of a line Washington cannot ignore being crossed.
Mark

Why does this essay matter now, specifically?

Mimi

Timing. Trump heads to Manila and then China this week, likely meeting Xi for the third time this year, and the midterms just handed Democrats both chambers.

Mark

So the argument is really about Congress, not the summits.

Mimi

Yes. The authors say Congress can use hearings, budget leverage and confirmations to force changes the White House won't make on its own.

Luke

Before we go on, this is an opinion piece. The facts cited, like the $14 billion package on hold and half the Strait transits, are the authors' account, and I can't verify them from this text alone.

Mimi

Fair. Both authors are also former Biden-era-style Asia security officials, so they come with a perspective, though the essay lists specific events.

Mark

What's the causal claim?

Mimi

That accommodation emboldened Beijing. They point to the pressure on Japan, the December drills simulating a blockade, and the new outpost in Laos.

Luke

Those events happened, but whether U.S. restraint caused them is an inference. Beijing may have acted this way regardless, and the essay doesn't show otherwise.

Mark

And the White House's side?

Mimi

The essay only offers its reading: that calm buys time on rare earths, defense industry and Iran. No administration voice appears.

Luke

Same with Republicans. The hope that they'll join is a forecast, not something established. Only the call to release the Taiwan package is already on record.

  • Trump travels to Manila and then China for summits with Xi, even as Beijing presses Japan, Taiwan and the South China Sea harder than before.
  • A $14 billion Taiwan arms package sits unreleased, and Taiwan Strait transits by U.S. Navy ships have fallen to half their first-term pace.
  • Chinese fighters locked radar on Japanese aircraft, more than 100 vessels crowded East Asian waters, and live-fire drills simulated a blockade of Taiwan's ports.
  • The authors want the new Democratic Congress to move fast with hearings, spending leverage and confirmation conditions to force arms releases and a return of forces from the Iran war zone.
  • Bipartisan calls to release the Taiwan package are growing, and the coming months will show whether words become hearings, funding conditions and confirmation fights.

As President Trump heads into a set of Asian summits, with a warmer 'constructive relationship of strategic stability' now framing ties with Beijing, two former Pentagon and National Security Council officials argue in The New York Times that his bet on accommodation has backfired. Their concern is a familiar one in statecraft: that restraint offered to a rising power is read as permission, and that a quiet region can become a tense one before anyone chooses the escalation. Having watched the Democrats win both chambers of Congress in the midterms, they turn their attention to the legislature, urging it to use its hearings, its purse and its confirmations to restore American presence and support for allies while the administration still has two years to run.

This week President Trump travels to Asia for a series of summits, first with Southeast Asian leaders in Manila and then at a wider meeting in China, where he is expected to meet President Xi Jinping for the third time this year. Both sides now describe their relationship as a "constructive relationship of strategic stability," language that softens the competition framing of earlier administrations.

In an opinion essay, former Asia security officials Mira Rapp-Hooper and Ely Ratner argue that Mr. Trump's wager has failed. He bet that accommodating China's ambitions would earn Beijing's restraint. Instead, they say, it has emboldened China and raised the danger of a military crisis. The administration has granted much of what Beijing has long sought: defense contacts with Taiwan have been cut back, a $14 billion arms package is on hold, and Navy transits and South China Sea patrols have declined. The war with Iran has also pulled missile defenses, Marines and carriers away from the Indo-Pacific.

The White House seems to believe that calm buys time to reduce reliance on Chinese rare earths and rebuild the defense industrial base. The authors counter that Beijing has kept pressing, from an economic campaign against Japan to dense naval deployments, radar lock-ons on Japanese aircraft, blockade-style drills near Taiwan and new outposts in the South China Sea and Laos. Each unanswered push, they warn, invites the next and could make a single accident a crisis.

Their remedy rests on the Democratic majorities in both chambers. They urge quick hearings to press for the Taiwan arms release and the return of forces, budget leverage for Asian partners and base upgrades, confirmation conditions tied to restoring Navy transits, and dedicated funding for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. They hope Republicans, long hawkish on China but quiet under Trump, will join. The question now is whether the bipartisan calls for action become real leverage before the administration's final two years.

This week President Trump travels to Asia for a run of summits: a gathering of Southeast Asian leaders in Manila, then a wider Asia-Pacific meeting in China, where he is expected to sit down with President Xi Jinping for the third time this year. The framing for those talks is already set. Both Washington and Beijing now describe their relationship as a "constructive relationship of strategic stability," a phrase that replaces the language of strategic competition used by earlier administrations.

That is the context for an opinion essay in The New York Times by Mira Rapp-Hooper and Ely Ratner. Rapp-Hooper is a visiting senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a former senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the National Security Council. Ratner is a principal at the Marathon Initiative and a former assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs. Their argument is that Mr. Trump's bet has failed: he wagered that accommodating China's ambitions in Asia would draw restraint from Beijing, and nearly two years into his second term they say it has emboldened China and raised the risk of a military crisis.

The authors list what China's leaders have long wanted: U.S. warships kept away from China's coast, an end to arms sales to Taiwan, no challenge to Beijing's sweeping maritime claims, American forces withdrawn from the region, and no support for allies that cross China. They say the administration has granted much of this. It has canceled or downgraded defense talks with Taiwan and is holding up a $14 billion arms package for the island. The Navy is on pace for only half as many publicly announced Taiwan Strait transits as in Mr. Trump's first term, and it has reported fewer freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea. The open-ended war with Iran, the authors add, has pulled missile defenses, Marines and aircraft carriers out of the Indo-Pacific.

The White House, they write, appears to believe that calm with China buys time to reduce dependence on Chinese rare earths, rebuild the defense industrial base and manage the Iran war. But they say Beijing has kept pressing. Last November it began an economic pressure campaign against Japan after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested Japan might intervene in a Taiwan conflict. In December China put more than 100 naval and coast guard vessels in East Asian waters, and Chinese fighters twice locked targeting radar on Japanese aircraft. That month it also held live-fire drills closer to Taiwan than ever, simulating a blockade of the island's major ports. It has expanded its presence on disputed features in the South China Sea and, in late September, unveiled a new defense outpost in Laos.

Past administrations, the authors note, opposed China's militarization of the South China Sea, stood by coerced allies and worked to block Chinese bases abroad. This one has largely stood by. Their warning is that each time Washington stays aside while Beijing presses an ally, China gains reason to think it can go further, making it likelier to cross a line the United States cannot ignore, and that a single accident at sea or in the air could trigger a crisis. They acknowledge that Americans are weary of war after Iran and that pulling back may be tempting.

Their proposed remedy rests on the Democratic victory in this month's midterms, which gives the party both chambers of Congress. They urge the armed services and foreign affairs committees to hold hearings quickly to press for release of the Taiwan arms package and the return of forces from the Middle East. If the administration stonewalls, they say, Congress can hold up spending on other White House priorities. In budget talks it could lock in more security assistance for Asian partners and speed upgrades to bases in Japan and the Philippines. The Senate could make Pentagon and State Department confirmations contingent on commitments to restore regular Navy transits and back allies facing intimidation. And the next defense bill should fund the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which Congress created in 2021 without dedicated money.

They hope Republicans, long among Beijing's sharpest critics but mostly quiet under Mr. Trump, will feel freer after the voters' rebuke. Leading members of both parties have already called on the president to release the Taiwan package. What to watch is whether that bipartisan call turns into hearings, spending conditions and confirmation fights while the administration has two years left.

Trump's approach is backfiring, emboldening China and raising the risk of a military crisis.
— Mira Rapp-Hooper and Ely Ratner, New York Times opinion essay
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