Better a bad agreement than a good lawsuit
Un día después de que 140.000 personas llenaran la Plaza de Mayo, el gobierno argentino se preparaba para convocar a los rectores universitarios a una nueva ronda de negociaciones, consciente de que el verdadero árbitro de este conflicto podría terminar siendo la Corte Suprema. La oferta sobre la mesa —un aumento salarial del 12 por ciento en cuotas trimestrales— revela la distancia que separa a quienes administran las restricciones fiscales de quienes han visto erosionarse su poder adquisitivo durante meses. En el fondo, este enfrentamiento no es solo sobre presupuesto universitario: es sobre quién tiene la autoridad real para resolver una crisis cuando el poder está fragmentado entre ministerios, facciones y tribunales.
- 140.000 personas en Plaza de Mayo convirtieron una disputa presupuestaria en una demostración de fuerza ciudadana que el gobierno no puede ignorar.
- La oferta oficial del 12% es rechazada de plano por los rectores, quienes señalan que representa apenas una fracción de los 50 puntos de poder adquisitivo perdidos desde el inicio de la gestión.
- El gobierno negocia con urgencia no tanto por voluntad política sino por miedo: si la Corte Suprema falla, perderá el control sobre los términos de cualquier solución.
- El Ministerio de Economía bloquea propuestas más generosas desde el inicio, dejando a otras áreas del gobierno absorbiendo el costo político de una crisis que no pueden resolver.
- Las universidades exigen una convocatoria formal y un cálculo salarial que refleje las pérdidas reales, mientras observan con atención las fracturas internas de la coalición gobernante.
- A mediados de mayo, la reunión prometida aún no tiene fecha ni invitación oficial, y la pregunta central sigue sin respuesta: ¿quién dentro del gobierno tiene realmente la autoridad para cerrar un acuerdo?
Al día siguiente de la multitudinaria marcha universitaria en Plaza de Mayo, Casa Rosada ya trabajaba en una nueva convocatoria para los rectores. El objetivo era doble: retomar las negociaciones y, sobre todo, evitar que la Corte Suprema tomara cartas en el asunto y les quitara el control del desenlace.
La propuesta que el gobierno pensaba presentar giraba en torno a un aumento salarial del 12 por ciento, distribuido en cuotas trimestrales del 4,1 por ciento a partir de marzo, con ajuste automático si la inflación superaba el 14,3 por ciento anual y un refuerzo de 80.000 millones de pesos para los hospitales universitarios. Para los funcionarios, era un gesto razonable dentro de los márgenes que el Ministerio de Economía estaba dispuesto a tolerar.
Los rectores, en cambio, no lo veían así. Sin haber recibido siquiera una invitación formal, ya anticipaban que la oferta sería insuficiente. La ley original —aquella que los tribunales habían ordenado cumplir— prometía una recuperación muy superior. Frente a 50 puntos de poder adquisitivo perdidos y casi 79.000 millones de pesos en recortes acumulados, un incremento trimestral del 4 por ciento no era negociación: era, en palabras de uno de ellos, una agresión.
Lo que los funcionarios admitían en privado era que el verdadero obstáculo no estaba en la mesa de negociación sino en el propio gabinete. El Ministerio de Economía había vetado propuestas más ambiciosas desde el principio, y algunas voces internas señalaban que las tensiones dentro de la coalición libertaria —en particular, la rivalidad entre distintos centros de poder— estaban congelando deliberadamente cualquier acuerdo que pudiera beneficiar al asesor Santiago Caputo, quien supuestamente había facilitado un entendimiento en febrero.
El Consejo Interuniversitario Nacional declaró estar dispuesto a negociar, pero exigía formalidad y cifras honestas. La Universidad de Buenos Aires fue más lejos: acusó al gobierno de no tener intención real de resolver el conflicto, sino de desgastar al sector mediante la dilación. A mediados de mayo, la prometida reunión seguía sin convocatoria oficial, los tribunales observaban en silencio y la pregunta de fondo permanecía sin respuesta: ¿había alguien en el gobierno con la voluntad y la autoridad para cerrar un trato que la economía aceptara?
The day after 140,000 people filled Plaza de Mayo demanding university funding, the government was already preparing its next move. Officials at Casa Rosada, the presidential residence, were drafting a new meeting invitation for the following week—a calculated attempt to bring university rectors to the negotiating table and, more importantly, to head off another court ruling that might force their hand entirely.
The proposal the government planned to offer was not new. It rested on a university financing bill sitting in the Chamber of Deputies, one that had been adapted and readapted through weeks of legal and political maneuvering. The core offer: a 12 percent salary increase for faculty and staff, distributed in quarterly installments of 4.1 percent each, beginning in March. The budget for university operations would adjust automatically if inflation exceeded 14.3 percent annually. An additional 80 billion pesos would flow to university hospitals. On paper, it looked like movement. In the halls of government, officials spoke of it as a reasonable compromise—the best they could manage given the constraints imposed by the Ministry of Economy, which had blocked larger expenditures from the start.
But the rectors were not waiting by their phones. They had not received a formal invitation, they said, and they were already dismissing what they knew was coming. The government's 12 percent offer, they argued, was an insult. The original law—the one the courts had ordered the government to implement—promised far more. When you lose 50 percentage points of salary recovery and someone offers you 12, one rector said, that is not negotiation. That is aggression. The universities had also lost 78.768 billion pesos in budget cuts and watched their workers' purchasing power erode month after month. A quarterly bump would not restore what had been taken.
The government's real fear was not the protest itself, though 140,000 people in the streets was impossible to ignore. The fear was the courts. The Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on the university funding dispute, and if it did, the government would lose the ability to shape the outcome. Better to settle now, officials reasoned, even on unfavorable terms, than to have the judiciary impose a solution. The strategy was to reach an agreement that both sides could present to a judge as a voluntary resolution—the government would comply, the universities would drop their lawsuit, and the whole matter would disappear from the docket.
What no one was saying publicly, but what several officials admitted in private, was that the Ministry of Economy was the real obstacle. The finance ministry had rejected larger salary proposals from the start, and now other parts of the government were absorbing the political cost. "We're taking these hits because the finance ministry won't accept the numbers," one frustrated official confessed. The tension was visible in the cracks: some government voices were even pointing fingers at the deputy chamber leadership, suggesting that internal libertarian faction politics—rivalry between different power centers within the ruling coalition—was deliberately freezing any agreement that might strengthen the presidential adviser Santiago Caputo, who had apparently brokered a deal back in February before the school year began.
The universities, meanwhile, were holding firm. The National Interuniversity Council, the CIN, said it was willing to negotiate a salary adjustment calculated from the start of the government's term to the present day. But it wanted a formal invitation, not informal calls. It wanted the numbers to reflect actual losses, not a fraction of them. And it was watching the government's internal divisions with interest. The University of Buenos Aires went further, declaring that the government had no real intention of resolving the conflict—that it was trying to isolate the country's flagship university and wear down the sector through delay.
By mid-May, the government was promising a meeting within the week. The rectors were waiting for a formal summons that had not yet arrived. The courts were watching. And the question hanging over everything was whether anyone in the government actually had the authority—or the will—to make a decision that the Ministry of Economy would accept.
Notable Quotes
We're taking these hits because the finance ministry won't accept the numbers— Government official
Of the 50 points initially promised, offering 12 seems like a disgrace. They only attack and destroy every chance for dialogue— University rector
The government has no real intention of resolving the conflict— University of Buenos Aires officials
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does the government think it can settle this with 12 percent when the universities are asking for so much more?
Because they're not trying to satisfy the universities. They're trying to satisfy the courts. If they can get both sides to agree to something, any agreement, they can present it to a judge as a settlement and avoid a Supreme Court ruling that would be even more expensive.
But the universities say that's not enough to cover what they've lost.
It's not. The universities lost purchasing power, lost budget cuts totaling nearly 79 billion pesos. Twelve percent spread over nine months doesn't touch that. But the government is betting that a formal agreement, even a bad one, is better than losing in court.
What's the Ministry of Economy's problem? Why won't they release more money?
That's the real question. Other parts of the government are frustrated too. They're taking political heat for a decision the finance ministry made. It's about fiscal constraints, or at least that's the official story. But there's also internal politics—different factions in the ruling coalition competing for power and resources.
Is there any chance this gets resolved?
Not this week, probably not next week either. The universities want a formal invitation and better numbers. The government is still working out its internal contradictions. And everyone's watching to see if the courts step in first.
What happens if they don't reach a deal?
The Supreme Court gets involved. And then the government loses control of the outcome entirely. That's what they're trying to avoid.