You can rebuild a facility, but you can't un-enrich uranium.
For decades, the question of Iran's nuclear ambitions has haunted the architecture of global security, demanding that nations choose between trust and verification, between engagement and isolation. Now, in the aftermath of military strikes that reshaped the physical landscape of Iran's enrichment program, the Trump administration moves toward a new agreement — one that promises the destruction of enriched uranium stockpiles and the reopening of a vital maritime corridor. Whether Sunday's announced signing materializes or not, this moment asks an older question anew: can adversaries construct a durable peace when the memory of broken agreements still shapes every word on the page?
- Trump declared a deal ready for Sunday signing, but Iran's foreign ministry immediately cast doubt on the timeline, leaving the world watching a negotiation that may not yet exist in the form either side describes.
- At the heart of the tension lies enriched uranium stored in underground tunnels at Isfahan — roughly 200 kilograms that IAEA inspectors cannot currently verify, making the core promise of the deal nearly impossible to confirm.
- The ghost of the 2015 JCPOA haunts every conversation: a deal that experts say worked until it was abandoned, and whose collapse sent Iran accelerating toward the very capabilities the new agreement now seeks to eliminate.
- The 2025 US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities changed the strategic calculus dramatically, degrading Iran's enrichment capacity but also complicating verification — negotiators are now bargaining over a program whose current state remains partially unknown.
- Sanctions relief remains Iran's non-negotiable demand, placing Trump in the uncomfortable position of offering economic concessions he once condemned Obama for granting, while needing to frame any agreement as categorically superior.
- Veteran negotiators warn that military superiority has never alone produced a lasting settlement — durable agreements require both sides to believe they have won something worth protecting.
President Trump announced on Saturday that a nuclear agreement with Iran would be signed the following day. Iran's foreign ministry moved quickly to soften expectations, signaling that timing and exact terms remained unsettled. The proposed deal, if completed, would see Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium destroyed and removed, while the United States would lift its blockade on Iranian vessels and reopen the Strait of Hormuz — a shipping corridor of enormous global consequence. The mechanics of how the uranium would actually be eliminated remain unresolved, with negotiators still working through technical details that could determine whether any agreement holds.
Enriched uranium sits at the center of this story because it serves two masters: it can power civilian reactors or, concentrated further, fuel a nuclear weapon. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — negotiated under Obama alongside other world powers — successfully constrained Iran's enrichment activities under robust international monitoring. Both the IAEA and American intelligence confirmed Iran's compliance. In exchange, the United States lifted sanctions and Iran regained access to billions in frozen assets. Trump withdrew in 2018, calling it a flawed deal that ignored Iran's ballistic missile program and contained inspection mechanisms he considered inadequate. Critics of his withdrawal argue that the deal's core purpose — preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon — was being achieved, and that other concerns could have been addressed through continued engagement.
After the US withdrawal, Iran accelerated its enrichment program. In June 2025, American and Israeli forces struck Iranian nuclear facilities, which officials said significantly set back Tehran's path to a weapon. Today, the IAEA estimates roughly 200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium may be stored in underground tunnels at Isfahan, though inspectors have been unable to verify this since the conflict began. That verification gap is not a footnote — it is the central practical challenge facing any new agreement.
Any deal will almost certainly require sanctions relief, a demand Iran has made non-negotiable. Trump faces the delicate task of offering economic concessions while insisting his agreement surpasses what Obama achieved. Analysts suggest he may point to concessions his predecessor could not secure — a suspension of enrichment or disposal of existing stockpiles — as proof of a harder bargain. But Iran's program today, substantially degraded by the 2025 strikes, is a different object than the one negotiators faced a decade ago, making direct comparisons difficult. Those with long experience in these negotiations offer a consistent caution: military pressure can reshape the landscape, but it has never, on its own, produced a settlement that lasts. Agreements endure only when both sides believe they have gained enough to make the commitment worthwhile.
President Trump announced on Saturday that a nuclear agreement with Iran was scheduled to be signed the following day, though Iran's foreign ministry quickly tempered expectations, suggesting the timing remained uncertain. The deal, if finalized, would reopen the Strait of Hormuz—a critical shipping corridor—in exchange for the United States lifting its blockade on Iranian vessels. At its core lies a deceptively simple promise: Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, the material that can fuel both power plants and nuclear weapons, would be destroyed and removed. Yet the mechanics of how this would actually happen remain unresolved, with negotiators still working through technical details that could determine whether the agreement holds.
Uranium enrichment is the process of concentrating uranium-235, the isotope essential for nuclear fuel. It is not inherently sinister—many nations enrich uranium for civilian power generation. But the same process can be weaponized, which is why the international community has long focused on controlling it. Since conflict erupted on February 28, Trump has repeatedly insisted that Iran surrender its stockpiles entirely. In a June interview with NBC, he described a scenario in which American equipment would be brought in to extract and destroy the material, whether at Iranian facilities or elsewhere. This language echoes his broader negotiating stance: he will solve what he sees as his predecessor's failures.
The 2015 nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was negotiated by the Obama administration alongside other world powers. It imposed strict limits on Iran's enrichment activities and allowed only small amounts of low-enriched uranium under international monitoring. Baroness Ashton, who led negotiations for the UN Security Council, describes it as remarkably successful. Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and American intelligence repeatedly confirmed that Iran was complying with its terms. The agreement included what Ashton calls "extraordinary and robust" monitoring and inspection regimes. In return, the United States lifted sanctions on Iranian oil, trade, and banking, and Iran gained access to billions of dollars in previously frozen assets.
Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018, calling it a "horrible, one-sided deal." His criticisms centered on three points: the agreement did not address Iran's ballistic missile program; the inspection mechanisms lacked teeth to detect and punish violations; and Israeli intelligence suggested Iran had a history of pursuing nuclear weapons. Jacob Olidort of the America First Policy Institute argues Trump was correct—that critical issues were sidelined and deprioritized. Ashton counters that the deal's central purpose was to prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon, which it accomplished. She notes that other issues, including ballistic missiles, could have been addressed afterward, and that Trump's first administration could have built on the agreement rather than abandoning it.
Olidort also raises the sunset clause argument: certain restrictions on uranium enrichment and stockpile size were set to expire after fifteen years. By January 2031, Iran could theoretically have expanded its program. Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association acknowledges this timeline but points out that many provisions were permanent, including IAEA safeguards. She argues that any move toward weaponization would have been quickly detected. The debate over the JCPOA's adequacy remains unresolved, but its practical effects are not: after the United States withdrew, Iran accelerated its enrichment program. In June 2025, the US and Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities, which American officials said significantly delayed Tehran's path to a weapon.
Today, the IAEA estimates that roughly 200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—about 440 pounds—is likely stored in underground tunnels at Iran's Isfahan nuclear complex, roughly 273 miles south of Tehran. IAEA inspectors have been unable to verify this since the conflict began. The agency also wants access to facilities at Natanz and Fordo. These verification challenges underscore why technical details matter: destroying a stockpile is straightforward in principle but complex in practice, especially when inspectors cannot confirm what exists or where it is located.
Any new agreement will almost certainly require sanctions relief to succeed. Iran has made clear that access to frozen assets and economic benefits are non-negotiable. Trump, however, may resist comparisons to the JCPOA, given his past criticism of Obama's sanctions relief. Davenport suggests he will likely claim victory by pointing to concessions Obama could not secure—perhaps a temporary suspension of enrichment or the disposal of existing stockpiles. Yet Iran's nuclear program today is fundamentally different from the one negotiators faced in 2015. Most enrichment capacity appears to have been destroyed in the 2025 strikes, making direct comparison difficult. Olidort believes the United States negotiates from a position of strength; Iran's conventional military capabilities and regional proxies have also been weakened. Ashton, however, offers a cautionary note: military pressure alone has never secured a lasting settlement. In her experience, negotiations succeed only when both sides feel they have gained enough to make participation worthwhile.
Notable Quotes
The deal was remarkably successful. Any move to nuclear weapons, any deviation from the JCPOA's terms would have been detected.— Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association
If you sanction someone because they're doing some behaviour and they change the behaviour, then by definition the sanction cannot stay.— Baroness Ashton, former JCPOA lead negotiator
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does the uranium stockpile matter so much if Iran's enrichment facilities have already been damaged?
Because the material itself is the weapon. You can rebuild a facility, but you can't un-enrich uranium. If 200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium exists somewhere—and inspectors can't even verify where—it's a permanent threat. Destroying it removes the option entirely.
So the 2015 deal actually worked, then?
By every measure that mattered, yes. Iran complied. Inspectors confirmed it. But Trump saw it as incomplete because it didn't address missiles or have permanent restrictions. The question is whether perfection is worth abandoning something that was working.
What does Iran actually want from a new deal?
Money. Access to the billions in frozen assets. Sanctions relief. They won't sign anything without it. The real tension is that Trump criticized Obama for offering exactly that, so he has to claim he got something better while offering the same thing.
Can he actually claim victory?
Possibly. Iran's military is weaker now, its facilities are damaged. He can say he negotiated from strength where Obama negotiated from weakness. But that's partly because of the 2025 strikes, not the negotiation itself.
What's the biggest risk in this new deal?
Verification. If inspectors can't confirm what's in those underground tunnels, how do you know the stockpile is actually destroyed? You're trusting Iran to tell you the truth about something it has every reason to hide.