The two-state solution is not even on your agenda
Across fifteen Arab nations and beyond, foreign ministry officials gather weekly to study Israeli politics with a seriousness once reserved for existential threats — a quiet testament to how profoundly October 7th reshaped the region's diplomatic imagination. Despite deep reservations about Netanyahu, a consensus has formed that he will prevail, while frustration mounts over Israel's apparent indifference to Palestinian futures and the squandered possibility of a historic opening with Saudi Arabia. The Arab world watches, analyzes, and prepares — not as adversaries plotting, but as neighbors who have concluded that Israel's internal choices will determine whether the region moves toward architecture or rubble.
- Fifteen Arab nations — including countries that don't recognize Israel — now run structured weekly working groups dedicated entirely to tracking Israeli domestic politics, a level of institutional attention that signals how high the stakes feel.
- Arab analysts are baffled and frustrated that Israeli leaders like Netanyahu, Bennett, and Eisenkot ignore outreach to Israel's own Arab citizens, a political blind spot they see as both strategically reckless and diplomatically insulting.
- Beneath the tactical analysis runs genuine anger: Arab officials believe Israel has no real agenda for the West Bank, no interest in Palestinian leadership, and no plan — and they insist no durable arrangement is possible without one.
- Arab capitals are quietly drafting a coordinated position paper on Palestinian solutions, intended for the Trump administration, built around connecting West Bank and Gaza through intelligence and security cooperation — a plan they hope Washington will champion as its own.
- The greatest wound in the room remains Saudi Arabia: a secret 2020 meeting in Neom that was leaked — almost certainly deliberately — cost Israel what many believe was its best chance at a normalization that could have redrawn the entire Middle East.
Across fifteen Arab nations — from Cairo to Riyadh, and even in Indonesia and Malaysia — foreign ministry officials now gather weekly to do something that would have seemed unthinkable a generation ago: they study Israeli politics like a chess match, tracking every coalition shift and electoral signal with the focus of people who believe the outcome will shape their own futures. These are not casual conversations. Academics, former diplomats, intelligence officers, and business leaders sit together with a single item on the agenda: who will lead Israel next, and what will they do?
A clear consensus has already formed. Despite serious misgivings, they expect Netanyahu to win again. What puzzles them more is why he — and figures like Bennett and Eisenkot — seem unwilling to engage Israel's Arab citizens, a missed political opportunity Arab analysts find genuinely baffling. They have also developed a nuanced view of Avigdor Lieberman: a principled strongman, they say, though Egyptian officials remain wary of his past rhetoric about the Aswan Dam.
Beneath the tactical analysis runs a deeper frustration. Arab officials describe palpable anger at Israel's apparent indifference to the West Bank's future and its disengagement from Palestinian Authority leadership. A former Egyptian army officer put it plainly: the two-state solution isn't even on Israel's agenda. And without addressing the Palestinian question, he insisted, nothing lasting is possible. The working model they envision — Palestinian forces entering Gaza, security cooperation across territories — can only happen with Israeli participation.
Arab capitals are already preparing for what comes next. One country is expected to lead a coordinated initiative, drafting a unified position paper for Washington and distributing it across the Arab world and Europe, with the hope that the Trump administration will present it as an 'Arab peace plan' focused on connecting West Bank and Gaza through security cooperation — modeled loosely on arrangements being attempted in southern Lebanon.
The actual texture of Israel's Arab relationships tells a more complicated story. Peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan exist on paper, but citizens cannot freely cross borders, direct flights don't operate, and the atmosphere has cooled. Jordanian workers still cross into Aqaba each morning to staff hotels, but Israeli tourists have largely stopped coming. The Abraham Accords left ambassadors in Morocco, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain — while Sudan, the fourth signatory, has quietly disappeared from the picture.
The greatest missed opportunity, Arab observers agree, was Saudi Arabia. In November 2020, Netanyahu attended a secret meeting in Neom alongside then-Secretary of State Pompeo. It was meant to stay confidential. It did not — leaked the very next day, to the fury of the Saudi hosts. Many Arab officials believe that leak cost Israel something far larger than the Abraham Accords: a normalization with the kingdom that could have reshaped the entire region. A thousand days later, that door remains closed.
Across the Arab world, from Cairo to Riyadh to Jakarta, foreign ministry officials are gathering weekly to do something that would have seemed unthinkable a generation ago: they are studying Israeli politics with the intensity of a chess match, betting their diplomatic capital on who will lead the country next. These are not casual conversations. In fifteen Arab nations, at the State Department in Washington, and in Indonesia and Malaysia—the two largest Muslim countries in Southeast Asia—working groups of academics, current and former diplomats, intelligence officers, and business leaders meet regularly with a single item on the agenda: Israel's political future.
What makes this remarkable is how openly they conduct their work. These officials maintain regular contact with Israeli Arabs, former Israeli diplomats, military figures, and journalists who cover the Middle East. They do not hide their interest in Israel's next election. And a clear consensus has already formed among them: despite serious misgivings about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, they believe he will win again. What puzzles them more is why Netanyahu, along with figures like Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot, seem unwilling to reach out to Israel's Arab citizens—a missed political opportunity that Arab analysts find baffling.
This pattern of engagement captures something essential about how the Arab world has watched Israel over the thousand days since October 7, 2023. The debate unfolds even in countries that do not officially recognize Israel at all—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Algeria, Somalia, Djibouti, Syria, and Lebanon all follow the daily political battles between Netanyahu and his opponents. Arab analysts have developed particular interest in Avigdor Lieberman, viewing him as a principled strongman, though Egyptian officials remain wary of his past threats against the Aswan Dam. Yet some Arab observers argue that Lieberman maintains practical relationships that matter, and that he will likely join a Netanyahu coalition if the election goes that way.
But beneath the tactical analysis runs a deeper current of frustration. In these working groups, there is palpable anger at what Arab officials see as Israel's sweeping indifference to the future of the West Bank and its apparent lack of interest in Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas or other Palestinian leadership. A former Egyptian army officer, familiar with Israel's past negotiators, put it sharply: the two-state solution is not even on Israel's agenda. Without addressing the Palestinian question, he insisted, no lasting arrangement is possible. And that solution—bringing Palestinian forces into Gaza to displace Hamas, establishing security cooperation across the territories—can only happen through coordination with Israel.
Arab capitals are already positioning themselves for what comes next. The working theory is that one Arab country will eventually lead a coordinated initiative, first drafting a unified position paper to send to Washington, then distributing it across the Arab world and Europe, with the expectation that the Trump administration will present what they are calling an "Arab peace plan." This plan would focus on the Palestinian issue, the West Bank, and Gaza, with emphasis on connecting the two through cooperation between intelligence and military forces—a model similar to what is being attempted in southern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, the actual state of Israel's relationships with the Arab world tells a more complicated story. Peace treaties exist with Egypt (since 1979) and Jordan (since 1994), yet citizens cannot freely visit across borders, and no direct flights connect them. Israelis can enter Sinai without visas, but the atmosphere has grown noticeably cooler even in tourism areas. In Jordan, dozens of workers cross the Aqaba border terminal each morning to work in hotels—a lifeline for Jordanian employment—while Israeli tourists have largely stopped coming. The Abraham Accords, once celebrated, have left Israel with ambassadors in Morocco, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain, while Sudan, the fourth signatory, has dropped out of the picture entirely.
The greatest missed opportunity, according to Arab observers, involved Saudi Arabia. In November 2020, Netanyahu was invited to a secret meeting in the Saudi city of Neom, where then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also appeared. The meeting was meant to remain confidential. It did not. Someone leaked it the next day, angering the Saudi hosts. It is not difficult to guess who. That leak, many Arab officials believe, cost Israel a chance at something far larger than the Abraham Accords—a normalization with the kingdom that could have reshaped the entire region. A thousand days later, that door remains closed.
Notable Quotes
There is no chance of reaching an arrangement without a solution to the Palestinian issue, without bringing Palestinian forces into the Gaza Strip to crush Hamas and take its place.— Former Egyptian army officer familiar with Israel's past negotiators
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why are Arab governments spending this much energy analyzing Israeli elections? What's in it for them?
Because whoever leads Israel shapes what's possible for them. If Netanyahu stays, they know the Palestinian question stays frozen. If someone else wins, there might be an opening. They're not being altruistic—they're protecting their own interests.
But the source says they expect Netanyahu to win anyway. So why keep betting on him if they dislike him?
Because they're pragmatists. They know the Israeli political math better than anyone. And Netanyahu, for all his faults, is predictable. They can work with predictable.
What about this anger over the Palestinian issue? Is that genuine concern or diplomatic theater?
Both. The Palestinian question is real—it's the thing that keeps the whole region unstable. But it's also leverage. If Israel won't engage on it, Arab states can use that refusal to justify their own positions to their populations.
The piece mentions a leaked meeting in Saudi Arabia. How much did that one leak cost Israel?
Potentially everything. A Saudi normalization would have been transformative—bigger than the Abraham Accords, bigger than Egypt or Jordan. The leak killed it. And now, a thousand days later, that window looks closed.
So what are these Arab states actually hoping for now?
They're drafting a plan to present to Trump. They want a coordinated Arab position on the Palestinian issue that the U.S. might actually push. They're trying to make the Palestinian question impossible to ignore.