In the long and fractured story of Sudan's search for stable governance, a shift is quietly taking shape. The national army has secured critical supply corridors in North Kordofan, fraying the logistical sinews of the Rapid Support Forces and prompting hundreds of fighters — including field commanders — to abandon their cause. General al-Burhan, reading the battlefield as a political instrument, has opened a dialogue track not as a concession but as a maneuver, seeking to arrive at any future negotiating table from a position of earned advantage rather than desperate compromise.
Sudan's Battlefield Shifts May Reshape Political Negotiations
Military pressure to create the conditions for politics on his terms
Mark
Why does controlling a single road matter so much in a war this large?
Mimi
Because supply lines are the skeleton of any fighting force. Cut them, and you don't need to win every battle—you just need to make staying expensive. The Exports Road connects Khartoum to the western regions where the RSF has strength. If the army controls it, the RSF has to find other routes, spend more resources, move slower. That's when people start asking whether it's worth staying.
Mark
The defections seem small in number—a few hundred fighters. Does that really matter?
Mimi
It matters because of who is leaving. These aren't just foot soldiers. Twenty-one field commanders from one group alone. When officers defect, it signals something to the troops below them. It says the leadership is losing confidence. And it happens fastest when soldiers see the battlefield turning against them.
Mark
Al-Burhan is offering dialogue while saying the fighting continues. Isn't that contradictory?
Mimi
Not if you understand what he's doing. He's not choosing between war and politics. He's using military pressure to create the conditions for politics on his terms. The dialogue offer is real, but it comes with conditions: the RSF leaves cities, the rebellion ends. He's saying, negotiate from weakness, not strength.
Mark
What does Malik Agar mean when he says the war will ultimately end through negotiations?
Mimi
He's being honest about something al-Burhan leaves implicit. You can't kill an entire armed force. Eventually, you have to talk. But the timing matters enormously. Talk now, and the RSF negotiates as a fighting force. Talk later, after more defections and losses, and they negotiate as a weakened one. The government wants to wait.
Mark
Is the RSF actually collapsing, or is this analysis overstating the pressure?
Mimi
It's not collapsing yet. The RSF is still fighting on multiple fronts. But there's a difference between being strong and being perceived as losing. Once soldiers believe the tide is turning, defections accelerate. The RSF's real danger isn't the losses so far—it's whether it can stop the bleeding before it becomes a cascade.
Mark
What happens if the RSF can't contain the defections?
Mimi
Then al-Burhan gets to write the terms of Sudan's next phase almost unilaterally. He shapes who sits at the table, what conditions they accept, what the new state looks like. That's why the RSF's challenge is existential. It's not about this month's battles. It's about whether it remains a force that has to be negotiated with, or becomes one that can be dictated to.
Il Polso
- The army's seizure of the Exports Road — the artery linking Khartoum to el-Obeid — has placed the RSF's entire western supply network under mounting strain.
- Defections are accelerating in organized waves: over six hundred fighters, including dozens of field commanders, have crossed to the government side in a matter of days, signaling fracture rather than mere desertion.
- Al-Burhan launched a national dialogue initiative on August 15, offering temporary immunity to participants while insisting the RSF must vacate cities before any substantive peace talks can begin.
- Deputy council chairman Malik Agar acknowledged the war's deeper roots — state weakness and elite failure to manage Sudan's diversity — while affirming that military pressure remains the primary lever until real negotiating conditions emerge.
- The RSF retains territory and fighting capacity, but the convergence of battlefield losses, supply disruption, and internal defections is eroding its cohesion and future bargaining power.
In the long and fractured story of Sudan's search for stable governance, a shift is quietly taking shape. The national army has secured critical supply corridors in North Kordofan, fraying the logistical sinews of the Rapid Support Forces and prompting hundreds of fighters — including field commanders — to abandon their cause. General al-Burhan, reading the battlefield as a political instrument, has opened a dialogue track not as a concession but as a maneuver, seeking to arrive at any future negotiating table from a position of earned advantage rather than desperate compromise.
Sudan's war is beginning to tilt. In late July, the Sudanese Armed Forces retook several towns across North Kordofan — a state that serves as the connective tissue between Khartoum and the country's western regions — and in doing so secured the Exports Road, the main highway running through Omdurman to el-Obeid. Control of that road is not merely symbolic; it tightens the army's grip on RSF logistics across Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile, turning geography into pressure.
The defections that followed tell a story of internal fracture. In the days around August 20, over six hundred fighters — including twenty-one field commanders and four officers — abandoned the RSF and arrived at government-held positions in organized groups, some bringing combat vehicles with them. These are not stragglers drifting away in confusion. They are units making a calculation that the cost of staying has begun to outweigh the cost of leaving. The RSF remains a coherent force, but the pattern of departure points to battlefield strain, supply problems, and deepening social and tribal tensions within its ranks.
General al-Burhan has chosen this moment to move on two fronts simultaneously. On August 15, he announced a national dialogue initiative offering temporary immunity and legal protections to participants, framing it as a response to proposals brought to him by Sudanese citizens rather than a government-controlled process. At the same time, he made his conditions plain: the RSF must withdraw from cities and be confined to designated areas before any serious negotiations can begin. There will be no peace, he said, that delivers power to RSF commander Hemedti and his allies through the back door of a ceasefire.
Malik Agar, the deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, gave the clearest articulation of the government's logic in interviews on August 22 and 23. The path remains military resolution unless genuine conditions for negotiation emerge — and those conditions begin with RSF withdrawal from populated areas. Yet Agar also acknowledged what everyone understands: the war will eventually end at a table, not on a battlefield. Sudan's crisis is rooted in the chronic weakness of its state and the failure of its political class to govern a country of profound ethnic, cultural, and geographic complexity. The army's strategy is to keep fighting until the RSF's cohesion and leverage have eroded enough that al-Burhan can determine not just the outcome of negotiations, but who is permitted to participate in them at all.
No single battle or defection has decided anything yet. The RSF remains active across multiple fronts, and the wider contest is still unresolved. But the conditions shaping Sudan's next political phase are shifting — and the question now is whether the RSF can arrest its internal unraveling before al-Burhan consolidates enough advantage to write the terms of whatever comes next.
Sudan's war is beginning to turn. The Sudanese armed forces have seized territory in North Kordofan, a central state that connects Khartoum to the western regions, and in doing so they have cut into the supply lines that keep the Rapid Support Forces fed and armed. Hundreds of fighters from the RSF—the paramilitary force that has been battling the army since 2023—have begun defecting to the government side. And General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who commands the armed forces and chairs the Transitional Sovereignty Council, is now pursuing a political track alongside the military campaign, positioning himself to shape Sudan's next phase from a position of growing strength.
The concrete gains came in late July, when the army announced it had retaken Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, and Umm Sayala, along with other positions across North Kordofan. More significantly, these advances secured the Exports Road, the main highway that runs from Khartoum through Omdurman to el-Obeid. That road is not just territory—it is a lifeline. By controlling it, the army has tightened the noose around RSF logistics across Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile region. The RSF still holds significant territory and remains active on multiple fronts, but the pressure is mounting.
The defections tell a story of fracture. On August 20, the army announced that roughly 318 people, including four officers, had switched sides and arrived in Northern state in about fifty combat vehicles before being moved to Omdurman. Separate groups followed: 270 fighters from Kordofan and Khartoum, among them twenty-one field commanders; forty-five more from the Bara area. The numbers matter less than the pattern. These are not random stragglers but organized units, including commanders, abandoning the RSF at a moment when the battlefield is shifting against them. The defections point to internal strain—battlefield losses, supply problems, tribal and social fractures within the force—but they do not yet signal total collapse. The RSF remains a coherent fighting force. What is changing is the calculation of whether staying is worth the cost.
Al-Burhan has read this moment and is moving on two fronts at once. On August 15, he announced a national dialogue initiative that would offer temporary immunity and legal protections to participants, suspending criminal proceedings while preserving the rights of those who had filed complaints. He framed this as a response to Sudanese who had approached him with a proposal; the state would not control the agenda or outcomes, he said. At the same time, he began engaging with national forces that had supported the government, aiming to involve them in rebuilding state institutions, including a legislative council. This is not a pivot away from war. Al-Burhan made clear he would not accept what he called a "peace without substance" that would bring RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo—known as Hemedti—and his allies to power. The RSF must leave cities and be gathered in designated areas before any serious negotiations could begin. The fighting would continue until the rebellion was ended.
Malik Agar, the deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, crystallized the government's strategy in interviews with journalists on August 22 and 23. The current path is military resolution, he said, unless serious conditions for negotiations emerge. The RSF must withdraw from cities and residential areas first. But Agar also acknowledged a deeper truth: the war would ultimately end through negotiations. Sudan's crisis runs deeper than the current fighting—it is rooted in the weakness of the state and the failure of political elites to manage the country's ethnic, cultural, religious, and geographic diversity. The government's calculation is clear: maintain military pressure, weaken the RSF's cohesion and bargaining position, and then negotiate from strength.
What makes this moment significant is not any single battle or defection but the convergence of them. The army's control of the Exports Road has real strategic weight. The defections, if they continue, could become an internal crisis for the RSF. And al-Burhan's political initiative, launched while the military campaign intensifies, suggests he believes the battlefield is beginning to shift in his favor. For the RSF, the challenge is no longer just holding territory—it is preventing military setbacks from becoming a collapse of internal cohesion and bargaining power. For al-Burhan, the potential prize is not simply territorial control but the ability to shape who sits at the negotiating table and on what terms.
None of this amounts to a decisive victory. The RSF remains active and dangerous. The wider battlefield is still contested. But the conditions under which Sudan's next phase will be fought and negotiated are beginning to change. The question now is whether the RSF can contain the defections and preserve its leverage, or whether continued military pressure will give al-Burhan the upper hand in determining Sudan's political future.
Citazioni salienti
Al-Burhan said he would not accept a 'peace without substance' that would bring RSF commander Hemedti and his supporters to power— General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan
The current option is military resolution unless serious conditions for negotiations emerge; the RSF must withdraw from cities before talks can begin— Malik Agar, deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council
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War & Conflict