SPD faces existential crisis as German voters abandon center-left party

Matthias Miersch, leader of the Social Democratic Party's parliamentary group, was doing aerobics to a German pop song at a fitness class in Saxony-Anhalt when the weight of his party's crisis became impossible to ignore. He had come to the eastern state for a single day to campaign, moving between a queer advocacy center, a housing cooperative, and a refugee integration initiative—the traditional terrain of center-left politics. At the Rainbow Cafe in Magdeburg, he spoke openly about his own identity as a gay man and listened as others described the hostility they faced, particularly in rural areas, and their fear of a state government controlled by the far-right Alternative for Germany. The AfD's Saxony-Anhalt branch has been classified by Germany's domestic intelligence agency as a confirmed right-wing extremist organization. Yet the numbers told a story Miersch could not talk away: the SPD was polling at 7 to 8 percent in the state, while the AfD stood at 42 percent. The party risked falling below the 5 percent threshold needed for parliamentary representation.

The crisis extends far beyond Saxony-Anhalt. Nationwide, the SPD polls at around 12 percent, trailing not only the AfD but also the center-right CDU/CSU and the Greens. Germany's oldest political party—once able to claim every second voter—now faces the prospect of political irrelevance. The year 2026 is a super election year, with contests scheduled in five of Germany's 16 states and city-states. Two have already occurred, and the results have been devastating. In Baden-Württemberg, the SPD recorded its worst postwar result and barely retained parliamentary representation. In Rhineland-Palatinate, after 35 years in power, the party was pushed decisively into second place by the CDU, with its worst result in the state's history. September threatens more losses: in Berlin, the SPD languishes in fifth place at 12 percent; in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the party faces the possibility of losing power entirely.

The source of the party's collapse lies partly in federal politics. The SPD serves as the junior coalition partner alongside the CDU/CSU under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and that partnership has become deeply unpopular. At the heart of internal party anger are specific policy compromises that critics argue have stripped the SPD of its identity. The planned reform of the pension system—particularly the abolition of early retirement after 45 years, often called retirement at 63—has proven especially toxic in Saxony-Anhalt, a state long grappling with an aging population and demographic decline. Beyond pensions, the party has made concessions on housing benefits, implemented a requirement for doctor's notes from the first day of illness, and adopted a tougher migration policy. For many Social Democrats, these moves represent a betrayal of core principles.

The frustration is now spreading openly through party ranks. Orkan Özdemir, a Berlin state legislator and co-chair of the SPD's Working Group on Migration and Diversity, told the German Press Agency in early August: "I see a party that is dying." His group's leadership has written to the party executive demanding a special party conference this autumn and a restructuring of party leadership. They are far from alone. The dual role of party leaders Bärbel Bas and Lars Klingbeil—who serve simultaneously as labor minister and finance minister in the federal government—has become a focal point of criticism. Many argue that the arrangement prevents the party from developing a distinct political profile. Bas herself acknowledged the problem after the first two state election defeats, saying the party had been unwilling to take clear positions and had failed to communicate what it stands for.

The defection of the party's traditional base has been particularly alarming. According to polling data from the Forsa institute published in November 2025, only 9 percent of blue-collar workers and unemployed voters would choose the SPD. An infratest dimap analysis from February 2025 found that 38 percent of workers were voting for the AfD instead. For a party born from the labor movement, this represents a catastrophic loss of its core constituency. Those who feel socially disadvantaged are increasingly drawn to the far-right alternative, a shift that has prompted some Social Democrats to call for the party to rebuild from opposition benches if necessary.

Klingbeil has expressed understanding for the critics while remaining publicly unfazed, noting that debate within the party is normal and that the times are extraordinarily turbulent. Yet the question facing the SPD has become existential: What does the party stand for? Whom does it represent? What should it support in the future? More and more Social Democrats see their party at a turning point, caught between the demands of governing, internal factional struggles, and the hemorrhaging of its former working-class electorate. The upcoming September elections will test whether the party can arrest its decline or whether it will continue its descent toward political irrelevance.