Across the narrow sea between eastern Libya and Crete, a familiar human story is being rewritten by the logic of markets and power. When one route is closed, the trade in desperate journeys does not vanish; it flows toward whatever coast remains open, carried by people who have paid heavily for the chance of a better life. The networks that move them have become entangled with armed factions and political ambitions, so that controlling the crossing can mean gaining standing in a fractured country. Whether this traffic becomes a lever in wider geopolitical disputes, or simply a grim consequence
Smuggling, Power and Profit: How Eastern Libya's Migration Route to Crete Ties Militias to European Interests
The more apparent control one has over this market, the greater one's influence.
Why does a route to Crete tie into militia politics at all?
Because smuggling runs on contacts, transport and security arrangements, and armed actors control those. Controlling the trade, or seeming to, brings money and influence.
So Haftar's family runs the smuggling?
Careful. The reporting says there are no proven links between the Haftars' networks and smugglers on that coast. The argument is about perceived influence, not documented control.
Right, and Hager Ali's point is that perception itself pays. Showing you can stop departures looks like legitimacy.
And Europe is part of that?
Andreas Dittmann says so. Cooperation can limit migration but also builds up the people Europe is dealing with.
That's one expert's reading of a contradiction, a reasoned one, but not a proven chain of cause.
What about the Turkey deal?
Timing only. Nobody has established a link to rising arrivals. Ali says using migrants as leverage wouldn't be inconceivable, which is a long way from evidence.
What is solid is the scale: almost 20,000 attempts this year, 710 people in 14 boats on October 20 alone.
And the people crossing?
They pay up to $4,000, and many in Libya lack permits and healthcare, which leaves them exposed to exploitation.
Le Pouls
- Almost 20,000 people have attempted the Libya-to-Crete crossing this year, and arrivals surged on Crete in late October alone.
- Smugglers, squeezed out of the Italy route in 2023, rerouted small boats from Tobruk and now charge up to $4,000 per passage.
- Armed actors in eastern Libya gain political legitimacy by appearing to control and crack down on the smuggling trade.
- A new Turkey-Tobruk maritime deal has Greece protesting, raising fears that migrants could be used as leverage.
- Europe deals with eastern Libyan leaders to curb departures, while migrants stranded in Libya face exploitation and no legal protection.
Across the narrow sea between eastern Libya and Crete, a familiar human story is being rewritten by the logic of markets and power. When one route is closed, the trade in desperate journeys does not vanish; it flows toward whatever coast remains open, carried by people who have paid heavily for the chance of a better life. The networks that move them have become entangled with armed factions and political ambitions, so that controlling the crossing can mean gaining standing in a fractured country. Whether this traffic becomes a lever in wider geopolitical disputes, or simply a grim consequence of blocked routes, remains an open question on the water.
On October 20, Greek authorities registered 710 people arriving on 14 boats on Crete, and hundreds more came ashore the next day. Nearly all had left from the coast of eastern Libya, where boats often depart from the port city of Tobruk. This year almost 20,000 people have tried the crossing, a journey of about a day and a half that can cost as much as $4,000.
The route grew busy because others closed. In 2023, eastern Libyan forces moved against smugglers bound for Italy, and the networks adapted by switching to smaller boats aimed at Crete. Other criminal groups, some previously dealing in goods, vehicles or drugs, have since joined the trade. Researchers describe a conflict economy in which armed actors gain money and influence by controlling informal markets and transport routes, and even measures against smuggling can become a way to win backing.
Eastern Libya has been split since 2014, with a UN-backed government in Tripoli and a rival leadership in the east backed by Khalifa Haftar and his sons. Reporting finds no proven links between the Haftar networks and the smugglers on that coast, but analysts note that the appearance of control can be enough to build influence. High-profile operations can present a leader as the one able to restore order.
Meanwhile, the Tobruk government has signed a maritime agreement with Turkey, which Greece rejects as an infringement on its economic rights. No direct link to rising arrivals has been established, though some analysts consider it plausible that migrants could be used as leverage. The European Union, for its part, works with Libyan actors to restrain departures, a cooperation that may reduce arrivals while strengthening those same actors.
For the people making the crossing, and the roughly 950,000 migrants and refugees registered in Libya, the situation remains precarious. Limited healthcare, missing permits and dependence on informal markets leave them exposed to exploitation. The coming months will show whether the new agreements change the flow of boats or the leverage of those who seem to control them.
On October 20, Greek authorities registered 710 people arriving on 14 boats. Hundreds more came ashore the next day. The arrivals were on Crete, and nearly all had set out from the coast of eastern Libya.
The numbers are large. Almost 20,000 people have tried to cross from Libya to the Greek island this year, according to the Greek daily Kathimerini, which describes the route as an increasingly significant corridor into Europe. Many boats leave from the area around Tobruk, a port city on Libya's eastern Mediterranean coast. Migrants pay as much as $4,000 (€3,600) for the passage, which takes about a day and a half.
The route is busy partly because other routes were squeezed. In 2023, eastern Libyan armed forces moved against smugglers sending people toward Italy. The networks adapted, switching to smaller boats and pointing them at Crete. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, a Swiss-based think tank, says other groups have since joined the trade, including some that had mostly moved goods, vehicles or drugs.
Researchers describe this as part of a "conflict economy," in which armed actors gain money and political influence by controlling informal markets and transport routes. Local power brokers can also use measures against smuggling to win financial or political backing. Chatham House researchers, after studying three transit hubs in Libya, wrote that instability created a fertile environment for smuggling and trafficking in persons, which in turn expanded the conflict economy. Hager Ali of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies told DW that a whole business has grown around smuggling routes, whether they carry weapons, goods, people or drugs. Where contacts, transport and security arrangements already exist, she said, they can be reused for trafficking.
Libya has been split since 2014. A UN-backed administration sits in Tripoli, while the second leadership, in the east, is backed by Khalifa Haftar, a former warlord turned politician. He has consolidated control over various armed militias, and his sons hold important positions. The reporting is explicit that there are no proven links between the Haftars' networks and the smugglers on that coast. Ali's point is that the appearance of control can be enough: the more apparent one's grip on the market, the greater one's influence. High-profile operations against smugglers can signal legitimacy, presenting someone as able to restore order and curb migration.
Geopolitics adds another layer. In late October, the Tobruk government signed a maritime agreement with Turkey, a deal Turkey had originally concluded with the Tripoli government. Turkey fought Haftar-sponsored militias in the Libyan civil war, so the agreement marks a rapprochement. Greece rejects it, arguing it infringes on Greek economic rights around islands such as Crete and Rhodes. A direct link between the deal and rising arrivals on Crete is not established, though Ali said it would not be inconceivable for migrants to be used as leverage in such disputes.
The European Union, meanwhile, has cooperated with Libyan actors to keep migrants from reaching Europe, despite their ties to armed groups and disputed legitimacy. Andreas Dittmann, a retired Giessen University professor of human geography, sees a plain contradiction: such cooperation may restrain migration but also strengthens local power. If eastern Libya's leaders can shape the scale and timing of departures, he told DW, they demonstrate their strategic importance to European governments.
For migrants, the position is precarious. An IOM report based on May and June data counted around 950,000 migrants and refugees registered in Libya. Many have limited access to healthcare and lack residence or work permits, which deepens their reliance on informal markets and their exposure to exploitation. What to watch next is whether the Turkey-Tobruk agreement and Europe's dealings with eastern Libya change either the flow of boats or the leverage of those who appear to control it.
Citations marquantes
If those in charge in eastern Libya can influence the scale and timing of migrant movements, they demonstrate their strategic importance to European governments.— Andreas Dittmann, retired professor, Giessen University (paraphrased)
They present themselves as somebody who can restore order and curb migration.— Hager Ali, GIGA researcher