Serial rapist officer passed vetting despite prior warnings, BBC investigation reveals

Alan Greer was investigated by Strathclyde Police in 2002 for making inappropriate phone calls to a woman in Glasgow. Three years later, the Metropolitan Police issued him a formal caution after catching him making similar calls to a woman he knew in London. Four years after that caution, in 2009, Strathclyde Police hired him as a police officer. A BBC Disclosure investigation has now established that the vetting unit processing his application was aware of at least the 2005 caution when they approved him for the force.

Greer served as a police officer for 17 years before taking his own life in May, days after a police raid on his home as part of an investigation into offences dating back to 2012. By then, he had become a violent serial rapist who preyed on vulnerable women, including sex workers. He raped a woman just hours after meeting her on duty. He took inappropriate photographs of female colleagues. Police Scotland has identified 15 of his victims so far, though investigators fear the actual number is far larger. During his career, he had contact with hundreds of sex workers, many of whom he assaulted.

When the BBC first reported on Greer's crimes last month, Assistant Chief Constable Lynn Ratcliff was asked whether there had been opportunities to stop his offending earlier. She said there was nothing to suggest missed opportunities. When pressed on whether there were red flags, she said the force had no evidence of that. She acknowledged that vetting standards are markedly different today and that Greer would not pass current checks, but offered no detail on what went wrong in 2009.

The vetting records tell a different story. Police Scotland has now confirmed that Strathclyde's vetting unit in 2009 was aware of Greer's 2005 Metropolitan Police caution when he applied. A partial paper record exists showing the caution was referenced. The force said it remains unclear whether the 2002 investigation was known to vetting staff, though police sources say that adverse trace would have been discoverable on his record. A Strathclyde Police handbook from 2006 stated plainly: "The force should not recruit people with cautions or convictions, which may call into question the integrity of the applicant or the force." One police source told the BBC: "Two reported crimes related to women before he joined should have been raising all sorts of alarm bells. He was clearly a menace from the off and should never have been allowed near a uniform to abuse his position."

Craig Naylor, chief inspector for HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland, led a review of Police Scotland vetting processes in 2023. He told the BBC that even by 2009 standards, which were less strict than today, Greer's history should have disqualified him. "My view is that he should never have got in at that point," Naylor said. When asked directly if these were missed opportunities to stop Greer joining the police, he answered yes. He added that in his own experience running vetting, Greer would not have been accepted.

A confidential briefing document about the investigation, titled "Operation Submarine" and dated June 12, 2026, was prepared by the senior investigating officer. It detailed the 2002 and 2005 investigations under a section headed "Identified Criminality" and stated: "Within the current vetting regime, he would not have been granted Recruitment Vetting." This document was provided to the Scottish government and the Scottish Police Authority, the oversight body responsible for holding senior officers accountable. Yet at a public board meeting of the SPA on July 30, a week after the BBC broke the story, none of the board members pressed the deputy chief constable on vetting details. One board member asked which of Strathclyde's previous vetting arrangements were relevant to Greer's case but did not push for an answer. The SPA later told the BBC that only its chairman and chief executive had received the briefing about Greer's vetting record, and that operational briefings were not routinely shared with board members.

The vetting failures extend beyond Greer. A 2023 HMICS inquiry found significant gaps in Police Scotland's vetting processes, including a failure to re-vet legacy staff since the forces merged in 2013. Greer was one of approximately 8,800 police officers and staff who had still not been re-vetted, representing more than a third of the total workforce. The inquiry reviewed certain vetting categories from a sample of about 10 percent of total applications and found at least 29 cases where applicants' risk had been incorrectly assessed. Police Scotland also conducted a "historic data wash" following the review, intended to identify intelligence or allegations needing further investigation. The Anti-Corruption Unit and vetting unit concluded that no significant matters were uncovered that the force was not already aware of. Police Scotland confirmed the data wash flagged nothing about Greer. Naylor told the BBC this represented another missed opportunity. An independent review by the National Police Chiefs' Council will now examine the 2009 vetting process that allowed Greer to join the force.