In Serbia, more than a dozen opposition figures and student activists have found themselves caught in the invisible net of state-grade surveillance — their phones quietly turned against them by spyware tools that governments deploy to watch those who dare to organize. The discovery of Pegasus and NoviSpy infections, documented by digital rights investigators, places Serbia within a global pattern where the instruments of political power are increasingly digital, and where dissent itself becomes a target. It is a reminder that in the modern era, the most consequential intrusions into human free
Serbian opposition and students targeted with advanced spyware
Opposition and student activists subjected to invasive digital surveillance, compromising their privacy and potentially exposing them to state monitoring.
Their private communications, movements, and associations have been monitored
Mark
So more than a dozen people had their phones infected with Pegasus. How do we know it was the government?
Mimi
Pegasus isn't sold on the open market. It's a tool that only state agencies can license and deploy. The fact that opposition activists and students had it on their devices points toward state involvement, but the investigation documented the technical evidence of infection—the spyware was actually there.
Luke
Right, but "points toward" isn't the same as "proves." We know Pegasus was on their devices. We don't know who deployed it or authorized it. Serbia hasn't commented. That's an important distinction.
Mimi
Fair. What we can say with certainty is that someone with significant resources and technical capability infected these devices. The targeting pattern—opposition figures and student activists—suggests it wasn't random.
Mark
What can the spyware actually do once it's on a phone?
Mimi
Everything. Messages, emails, photos, location history, call recordings. It can activate the microphone and camera without the user knowing. It's total access to the device.
Luke
And we should note that the investigation was conducted by digital rights organizations. They found the evidence and made it public. We don't have independent confirmation from Serbian authorities or a second investigation yet.
Mark
What happens next?
Mimi
That depends on whether there's political pressure for accountability, whether international bodies get involved, and whether this prompts any technical response from phone manufacturers.
Luke
And whether anyone else was infected that we don't know about yet.
Le Pouls
- More than a dozen Serbian activists and opposition members discovered their devices had been silently compromised by Pegasus and NoviSpy — spyware so sophisticated it can activate cameras and microphones without a trace.
- The coordinated pattern of infections across multiple individuals signals a deliberate surveillance campaign, not opportunistic hacking — pointing unmistakably toward state-level resources and intent.
- Student activists were targeted alongside opposition politicians, suggesting authorities sought to monitor not just established dissent but the emerging generation of civic organizers before they could gain broader influence.
- No Serbian government agency has acknowledged involvement, leaving investigators, international observers, and the activists themselves in a charged silence that raises more questions than it answers.
- The public disclosure now sets in motion potential consequences — international pressure, demands for accountability, and a reckoning for civil society about how to organize when the device in your pocket may be working against you.
In Serbia, more than a dozen opposition figures and student activists have found themselves caught in the invisible net of state-grade surveillance — their phones quietly turned against them by spyware tools that governments deploy to watch those who dare to organize. The discovery of Pegasus and NoviSpy infections, documented by digital rights investigators, places Serbia within a global pattern where the instruments of political power are increasingly digital, and where dissent itself becomes a target. It is a reminder that in the modern era, the most consequential intrusions into human freedom often leave no footprint visible to the naked eye.
More than a dozen Serbian opposition figures and student activists discovered that their personal devices had been infected with advanced surveillance software, according to digital rights organizations that conducted forensic investigations into the campaign. The spyware found — Pegasus and a less-documented variant called NoviSpy — are commercial tools sold exclusively to state actors and intelligence agencies, placing the source of the intrusion well beyond the reach of ordinary criminal groups.
Digital rights investigators established a clear pattern of coordinated targeting across multiple devices, ruling out coincidence. Pegasus, the more widely known of the two tools, has been linked to government surveillance operations across dozens of countries. The appearance of NoviSpy alongside it on several devices suggests either a deliberate dual-infection strategy or parallel surveillance operations running simultaneously against the same individuals.
The inclusion of student activists alongside opposition politicians revealed the campaign's ambition — not merely to monitor established political opponents, but to track younger civic organizers and protest participants before their networks could grow. Spyware of this caliber can silently capture messages, photographs, location data, and activate microphones and cameras without the user's knowledge, meaning those targeted faced the prospect that their private lives had been comprehensively exposed.
Serbia has drawn international scrutiny over press freedom and democratic backsliding in recent years, and the discovery fits a pattern seen in other countries where governments have turned surveillance tools against their own civil society. No Serbian government agency has publicly acknowledged responsibility. What remains open is whether this represents a new escalation or the belated uncovering of a campaign that had been running undetected for far longer — and what accountability, if any, will follow.
More than a dozen Serbian opposition figures and student activists discovered that their phones and devices had been infected with sophisticated surveillance software, according to digital rights organizations that investigated the campaign. The spyware variants found—including Pegasus and NoviSpy—are commercial tools typically deployed by state actors and intelligence agencies, not common criminals. The discovery marks a significant escalation in digital surveillance targeting political dissent in Serbia.
Digital rights groups documented the infections across multiple devices belonging to activists and opposition members, establishing a pattern of coordinated targeting rather than random compromise. Pegasus, the more widely known of the two spyware variants, has been linked to government surveillance operations in dozens of countries and is sold exclusively to state clients. NoviSpy, a less documented variant, appeared on several of the compromised devices alongside Pegasus, suggesting either a deliberate dual-infection strategy or multiple surveillance operations running in parallel.
The targeting of student activists alongside opposition politicians indicates the scope of the surveillance campaign extended beyond traditional political opposition to include younger civic organizers and protest participants. This breadth suggests either a comprehensive effort to monitor all forms of organized dissent or a systematic approach to identifying and tracking emerging activist networks before they gain broader influence.
The investigation by digital rights organizations raises immediate questions about the source and authorization of the surveillance. Pegasus and similar tools require significant technical infrastructure and financial resources to deploy—they are not accessible to private actors or criminal groups. The presence of these tools on the devices of political opponents points toward state-level involvement, though no Serbian government agency has publicly acknowledged responsibility or commented on the findings.
For the activists and opposition members whose devices were compromised, the implications are severe. Spyware of this sophistication can capture messages, emails, photographs, location data, and even activate microphones and cameras without the user's knowledge. Anyone targeted with Pegasus faces the prospect that their private communications, movements, and associations have been monitored and recorded. The psychological weight of knowing one's device has been weaponized against oneself extends beyond the technical breach—it signals that political activity itself has become a surveillance target.
The timing of the discovery and public disclosure raises questions about what prompted the investigation. Digital rights groups typically conduct forensic analysis of devices after activists report suspected compromise or after security researchers identify new infection vectors. The fact that more than a dozen individuals were found to be infected suggests either a long-running campaign that went undetected until recently, or a coordinated effort by the investigating organizations to document a known problem.
Serbia has faced international scrutiny over press freedom and democratic institutions in recent years. The use of advanced spyware against opposition and student activists fits a pattern observed in other countries where governments have deployed surveillance tools to suppress dissent and monitor political opponents. The discovery adds concrete evidence to concerns that have been raised by international observers and local civil society organizations about the state of democratic freedoms in the country.
The investigation and public disclosure of the spyware campaign may prompt responses from multiple directions—international pressure on Serbian authorities, demands for investigation and accountability from opposition parties, and potentially technical responses from device manufacturers and security firms. What remains unclear is whether this represents a new escalation in surveillance tactics or the first documented evidence of a campaign that has been running undetected for months or longer.
Citations marquantes
Digital rights groups documented the infections across multiple devices belonging to activists and opposition members, establishing a pattern of coordinated targeting— Investigation findings
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