Saudi Arabia entered the Sudan war as a self-declared even-handed broker, and the city that once hosted the Jeddah signing now carries a harder question about whether that neutrality has held. The kingdom's proximity to the Red Sea, its money and its American backing made it a natural mediator, yet the traces left by flights, shipments and a stalled arms deal suggest a closer tie to the army than the diplomatic language admits. Most of the evidence rests on unnamed sources and unpublished records, so the story remains a question as much as an accusation. Against a backdrop of millions in need,
Saudi Arabia's Red Sea Balancing Act: Mediating Sudan's War While Arming One Side
The UN estimates 33.7 million people in Sudan will need humanitarian assistance in 2026.
A mediator that stands at equal distance from both sides, reportedly leaning one way
Mark
Why does it matter that Saudi Arabia is both mediator and, reportedly, supplier?
Mimi
Because the Quad's truce plan depends on trust. If one mediator is seen leaning toward the army, the RSF has less reason to accept its terms, and Burhan has already rejected the plan.
Luke
Careful with 'supplier,' though. What is actually confirmed?
Mark
Go on.
Luke
The flight report has no named author, no named tracking service and no published records. The howitzer claim comes from unnamed security sources via Intelligence Online. Those are allegations, not established facts.
Mimi
Fair, and the think tank itself says the Indian explosives transit doesn't prove Saudi authorities knew the end use.
Mark
What about the Pakistani deal?
Luke
Reuters cited anonymous sources, and the official readouts of the Burhan meeting didn't mention it. It suggests Riyadh controlled financing, but nobody has confirmed it on record.
Mimi
And the Islamist angle is where the policy tension shows. Riyadh opposes the Brotherhood, yet the army fights alongside a brigade Washington links to it.
Luke
Which the analysts call a contradiction. Whether Riyadh sees it that way is unknown.
Mark
And the Somali recruits?
Luke
Unconfirmed on funding, unconfirmed on purpose. Ethiopia Insight says so itself.
Il Polso
- A mediator's credibility is fraying as flight logs, howitzer transfers and a suspended $1.5bn arms deal point toward Riyadh's quiet support for the army.
- Burhan's rejection of the Quad plan and his October vow to retake all RSF territory have pushed the truce process toward a dead end.
- Scrutiny is spreading beyond Sudan as Saudi-led Red Sea alliances and Somalia's recruitment programme draw doubts about where the troops are headed.
- Diplomats are still backing the Quad and the Jeddah Declaration, but the contradiction of backing a Brotherhood-linked brigade is becoming harder to explain away.
Saudi Arabia entered the Sudan war as a self-declared even-handed broker, and the city that once hosted the Jeddah signing now carries a harder question about whether that neutrality has held. The kingdom's proximity to the Red Sea, its money and its American backing made it a natural mediator, yet the traces left by flights, shipments and a stalled arms deal suggest a closer tie to the army than the diplomatic language admits. Most of the evidence rests on unnamed sources and unpublished records, so the story remains a question as much as an accusation. Against a backdrop of millions in need, the test of whether the Quad's mediation can survive these contradictions is still unfolding.
On May 11, 2023, in Jeddah, Sudan's army and the Rapid Support Forces signed a Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan, promising civilian protection and humanitarian access. The truces that followed collapsed under mutual violations, and the city that hosted the signing now sits at the center of a harder question: has Saudi Arabia, which casts itself as an even-handed mediator, been backing one side?
Riyadh presented itself as equidistant from both camps, and the claim carried weight. Jeddah faces Port Sudan across the Red Sea, the kingdom evacuated foreigners by sea in the war's first weeks, and it had the money and American backing to bring the sides together. In September 2025 the mediation widened into the Quad of the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt. Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan rejected its plan in November 2025 and in October 2026 ruled out talks with the RSF altogether.
A Brussels think tank now lists Saudi Arabia among the army's main foreign supporters, citing executive flights between Riyadh and Port Sudan and howitzer transfers reported by Intelligence Online. Its evidence rests largely on unnamed sources and unpublished records, and it concedes that transit through Jeddah does not prove Saudi authorities knew the final use of cargo. A stalled $1.5bn Pakistani arms deal, reportedly dropped after a March meeting in Riyadh, adds to the picture, though official readouts never mentioned it.
The contradiction reaches beyond Sudan. Saudi support for an army that fights alongside a US-designated Brotherhood brigade sits uneasily with both governments' opposition to the Brotherhood, and the Red Sea defence alliance and Somalia's recruitment programme raise similar questions. Meanwhile Riyadh insists it backs a ceasefire, the Quad and the Jeddah Declaration. The UN estimates 33.7 million people in Sudan will need aid in 2026, and whether the Quad holds remains the thing to watch.
On May 11, 2023, in Jeddah, Sudan's army and the Rapid Support Forces signed a Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan. It bound both sides to protect civilians and allow humanitarian access. The truces that followed collapsed under mutual violations, and later rounds of talks faltered. The city that hosted the signing is now at the center of a harder question: whether Saudi Arabia, which presents itself as an even-handed mediator, has been backing one side.
Within days of the war breaking out on April 15, 2023, Riyadh cast itself as a mediator that would stand at equal distance from both camps. The claim had weight. Jeddah faces Port Sudan across the Red Sea, the kingdom evacuated thousands of foreign nationals by sea in the war's first weeks, and it had the money, access and American backing to bring both sides to the table. In September 2025 the mediation widened into the Quad, made up of the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt, which proposed a three-month humanitarian truce, a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month transition. Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan rejected the plan on November 23, 2025, calling it "the worst yet." On October 7, 2026, he ruled out talks with the RSF and vowed to retake all the territory it holds.
As the war dragged on, a Brussels think tank now lists Saudi Arabia among the army's primary foreign supporters. On July 14, 2026, the European Centre for Strategic Studies and Policy published an investigation into non-commercial executive flights between Riyadh and Port Sudan, naming aircraft operated by Alpha Star Aviation and Sky Prime Aviation between December and February. The report has no individual author, does not name its tracking service and does not publish the underlying records. It also cited an Intelligence Online report of February 13, 2026, based on unnamed security sources, that Saudi Arabia had sent the army three batteries of M777 155mm howitzers, with ammunition and training, through Port Sudan.
The same think tank traced commercial explosives from India routed through Jeddah Islamic Port in January 2026 to a Sudanese company it links to the army's Defence Industries System. It conceded that the transit does not in itself establish Saudi authorities knew the final use. In an earlier report, on May 26, it said a chlorine shipment passed through Jeddah to Sudan without Saudi knowledge. Its July report argued that Saudi support strengthens the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, which fights alongside the army. Washington calls the brigade the armed wing of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood. It sanctioned the brigade in September 2025, and the State Department designated the Brotherhood a terrorist organisation in March 2026.
A further report concerns a stalled arms deal. On April 20, 2026, Reuters cited two Pakistani security sources and a diplomatic source saying Islamabad had put on hold a $1.5 billion sale of weapons and jets to Sudan, after Saudi Arabia dropped plans to finance it and signalled it should be terminated, as carried by The New Arab. One source said the financing ended after a March meeting in Riyadh between Sudanese army leaders and Saudi officials. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted Burhan in Jeddah the same day. Official readouts spoke of Sudan's security, stability and territorial integrity and did not mention the deal, Al-Monitor reported.
The contradiction is not only Sudanese. A policy paper by Sara Senno and Elisabetta Arba for the European Foundation for Democracy, published October 23, 2026, says Saudi and Egyptian backing for an army fighting alongside a US-designated group, while both governments oppose the Brotherhood, creates a contradiction within the Quad itself. In Yemen, Riyadh has led a coalition since March 2015, yet the Houthis still hold Sanaa and most of the populated north, and Riyadh's closest partner there has been Islah, an Islamist-tinged party.
The Red Sea is the wider frame. Saudi Arabia announced a Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance on July 30, 2026, formally launched in Jeddah on August 13, with 15 states signing and 13 fully joining. Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Egypt and Yemen are among the first signatories; Eritrea is not. Somalia signed a military cooperation agreement with Riyadh on February 9. Somali media reported 5,107 recruits in a nine-month programme in Galgaduud, figures the federal government has not confirmed, and Ethiopia Insight said it had not established that graduates were meant to fight alongside Sudan's army.
At the sixth consultative meeting on Sudan in Geneva on October 21, Deputy Foreign Minister Waleed Al-Khereiji said the kingdom was working for a ceasefire, backed the Quad and the Jeddah Declaration, and rejected parallel entities outside Sudan's official institutions. He said the government could not be equated with militias. The UN estimates 33.7 million people in Sudan will need humanitarian aid in 2026. Whether the Quad holds is the thing to watch.
Citazioni salienti
Saudi Arabia was working to secure a ceasefire, supported the Quad and the Jeddah Declaration, and rejected parallel entities outside Sudan's official institutions.— Waleed Al-Khereiji, Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, Geneva, October 21, 2026
The Quad's truce plan was 'the worst yet.'— Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, November 23, 2025
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War & Conflict