Saudi Arabia mobilizes 100,000 Yemeni troops for Houthi offensive at Bab el-Mandeb

Whether fragmented forces can sustain an offensive remains genuinely uncertain
Anti-Houthi forces are competing factions, not a unified military, raising questions about operational effectiveness.
Mark

Why does control of this strait matter so much right now? It seems like a narrow piece of water.

Mimi

It's become the main alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, which is effectively closed due to regional tensions. If you're shipping goods between Europe and Asia, you have to go through the Bab el-Mandeb now. The Houthis controlling it means they can disrupt global commerce or extract leverage.

Luke

But we should be clear—the source says Hormuz has been "effectively closed" by the Iran conflict, but that's a characterization. We don't have hard numbers on how much traffic has actually shifted to the Red Sea route.

Mimi

Fair point. But the fact that Saudi Arabia is mobilizing 100,000 troops suggests they see it as worth the cost. That's a real signal of importance.

Mark

What's the actual problem with using these Yemeni forces? They've been fighting for years.

Mimi

They're not a unified military. They're factions armed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE separately, and they have competing territorial and political interests. Last winter, Saudi-backed and UAE-backed forces actually fought each other in eastern Yemen.

Luke

The source cites analysts saying they're "not organised or prepared," but that's one analyst's assessment. We don't have independent verification of their actual readiness or capability.

Mark

So this could fail?

Mimi

It could. The Houthis have shown they can apply pressure across multiple fronts. Whether fragmented anti-Houthi forces can sustain an offensive is genuinely uncertain.

Mark

And the US isn't helping directly?

Mimi

Trump rejected requests for direct US military support, including air strikes. The US is providing advisers and intelligence, but Saudi Arabia has to fly the air campaign itself.

Luke

Which is worth noting—the US is supporting but not committing. That's a constraint on what Saudi Arabia can do.

  • Houthi forces swept down Yemen's Red Sea coast last month and seized the Bab el-Mandeb, cutting off a shipping lane that has become the world's critical alternative to the now-closed Strait of Hormuz.
  • Saudi Arabia is racing to respond, with more than 100,000 Yemeni troops potentially mobilized and a timeline that could compress to days depending on regional and American political conditions.
  • The operation's deepest vulnerability is not firepower but cohesion — the anti-Houthi factions Saudi Arabia and the UAE have armed for years are competing rivals, not a unified army, and analysts warn many remain unprepared for sustained offensive action.
  • International partners are circling the effort with support that stops short of combat: the US provides intelligence and targeting data, Pakistan has deployed air-defence systems and drones, Turkey has supplied equipment, and France is protecting the Saudi port of Yanbu.
  • Military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey convened in Riyadh on September 25, with an emergency follow-up meeting called for the following week, signaling that the coalition is treating this as a regional security crisis rather than a local skirmish.
  • The coming weeks will reveal whether Saudi air power and international backing can compensate for the organizational fractures that have undermined anti-Houthi campaigns throughout a decade of conflict.

At the southern mouth of the Red Sea, where ancient trade routes once carried spices and silk, a modern contest for global commerce is taking shape. Saudi Arabia is marshaling over 100,000 Yemeni fighters to reclaim the Bab el-Mandeb Strait from Iran-backed Houthi forces, whose seizure of this narrow passage has disrupted shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia. The operation, expected within weeks, is less a bid to resolve Yemen's long war than a surgical attempt to restore the arteries of world trade — yet it rests on an alliance of fractured factions whose unity has never been its strength.

Saudi Arabia is preparing a major military operation to retake the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea that has become one of the world's most consequential shipping lanes. Reuters, citing six people with knowledge of the preparations, reported that more than 100,000 Yemeni troops could be mobilized, backed by Saudi air strikes. The timing remains uncertain — estimates range from within days to after the US midterm elections in early November — but the strategic pressure is acute. Last month, Houthi forces backed by Iran advanced rapidly down Yemen's Red Sea coast and seized the strait, disrupting shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia at a moment when the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed by regional tensions.

Former US Ambassador Michael Ratney told Reuters he expected a limited operation focused on coastal areas rather than a sweeping campaign to reshape Yemen's political landscape. The goal, as he framed it, is to restore maritime traffic through the strait — a tactical objective, not a transformational one. But even a narrow operation faces a fundamental problem: the anti-Houthi forces that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have armed and trained over years of conflict are a collection of factions with competing territorial and political interests. Yemen analyst Mohammed Albasha warned that many of these groups remain unprepared for the sustained offensive required, and last winter UAE-backed and Saudi-backed fighters clashed with each other in eastern Yemen over territory.

International allies are lending support, though carefully. The United States is providing military advisers, intelligence, and targeting data for Saudi air operations, but has declined direct combat involvement. Pakistan has deployed air-defence systems, drones, and light artillery, with 30,000 to 40,000 troops stationed inside Saudi Arabia for border defence. Turkey has supplied drones and military equipment, while France has announced defensive systems for the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu. Military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey met in Riyadh on September 25, with an emergency follow-up meeting called for the following week — a sign that the coalition views this as a matter of regional security, not a bilateral Yemeni affair.

The central question hanging over the entire enterprise is whether fractured, competing local forces — however well-armed and supported from the air — can execute a coherent offensive against an adversary that has shown both tactical skill and resilience. Saudi Arabia's strategy of mobilizing Yemeni proxies while providing air cover has been tested before, and the organizational weaknesses that have plagued anti-Houthi efforts for years have not disappeared. The coming weeks will determine whether this time the calculus is different.

Saudi Arabia is preparing to move against Houthi forces in Yemen with a military operation that could unfold within weeks. The plan centers on retaking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway at the southern mouth of the Red Sea that has become one of the world's most consequential shipping lanes. According to reporting from Reuters, which spoke to six people with knowledge of the preparations, more than 100,000 Yemeni troops could be mobilized for the campaign, supported by Saudi air strikes. The timing remains fluid—estimates range from as soon as a week to after the US midterm elections in early November—but the strategic urgency is clear. Last month, Houthi forces, backed by Iran, advanced rapidly down Yemen's Red Sea coast and seized control of the strait. That seizure matters far beyond Yemen's borders. The Bab el-Mandeb has become a critical alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, which has been effectively closed by regional tensions. Shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia now depends on this narrow passage, making its control a question of global commerce and geopolitical leverage.

The immediate military objective is narrower than it might appear. Michael Ratney, who served as US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, told Reuters he expected a limited operation focused on coastal areas rather than a sweeping campaign to defeat the Houthis across Yemen. The goal, as Ratney framed it, would be to retake the Red Sea coast and restore normal maritime traffic. This suggests Saudi planners are thinking tactically about the strait itself, not strategically about remaking Yemen's political landscape. But even a limited operation faces a fundamental problem: the forces that would carry it out are not a unified military.

The anti-Houthi forces that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have armed and trained over years of conflict are a collection of factions with competing political and territorial interests. Yemen analyst Mohammed Albasha told Reuters that many of these groups remain "not organised or prepared" for the sustained offensive required to push back Houthi pressure, which is being applied across multiple fronts. The fractures run deep. Last winter, UAE-backed southern fighters clashed with Saudi-backed forces in eastern Yemen as they competed for territory. Ali Shihabi, a Saudi political analyst with close ties to government thinking, acknowledged that the operation's success would depend entirely on how these local forces perform—whether they can transition from defending fixed positions to mounting an effective offensive.

Saudi Arabia's international allies are providing support, but mostly at arm's length. The United States, Riyadh's most powerful partner, is supplying military advisers and intelligence, including targeting data for Saudi air operations. But President Trump had previously rejected Saudi requests for direct US military involvement, including American air strikes. That leaves Saudi Arabia to conduct the air campaign itself. Pakistan, bound to Saudi Arabia through the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed in August alongside Turkey, has stopped short of committing combat forces to Yemen. Instead, Islamabad has sent air-defence systems, light artillery, drones, and anti-drone equipment. Some 30,000 to 40,000 Pakistani troops are deployed inside Saudi Arabia for border defence and missile interception. Turkey has supplied military equipment and drones for operations over Yemen. France has announced defensive systems and troops for protecting Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port of Yanbu.

The diplomatic machinery is moving. Military chiefs from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey met in Riyadh on September 25 to discuss the situation. Pakistan's foreign minister said on October 2 that the three countries would convene an emergency meeting in Riyadh the following week. These consultations suggest the operation is being treated as a matter of regional security, not merely a Saudi-Yemeni affair. Yet the core challenge remains unchanged: whether a collection of fractured, competing Yemeni forces—however well-armed and supported from the air—can execute a sustained offensive against an adversary that has demonstrated both tactical skill and staying power. The coming weeks will test whether Saudi Arabia's strategy of mobilizing local forces and providing air support can overcome the organizational weaknesses that have plagued anti-Houthi efforts throughout Yemen's conflict.

Ideally, it would be a fairly limited operation to retake coastal areas and get back to normal maritime traffic
— Michael Ratney, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Many anti-Houthi forces are still not organised or prepared for the sustained offensive needed to push back the Houthis
— Mohammed Albasha, Yemen analyst
Kontakt FAQ