SAS missions in the 2020s: From Baltic counter-sabotage to Red Sea raids

Sudan evacuation involved rescue of British diplomats and families from active civil war fighting; no casualties reported in described operations.
Small teams of highly trained operators stretched across multiple theaters
The SAS operated simultaneously in the Baltic, Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, and domestically throughout the 2020s.
Mark

Why does the SAS keep showing up in so many different places at once? Are they stretched thin?

Mimi

They're not stretched thin so much as they're the tool that fits every job. When you need precision, deniability, and people who can operate in chaos, you call them. The alternative is sending larger forces or doing nothing.

Mark

The Sudan evacuation sounds like it could have gone very wrong. What made it work?

Mimi

Speed and coordination. They knew exactly where the diplomats were, they had air support waiting, and they moved through the fighting without stopping. The risk was real, but it was calculated.

Mark

Why were there fifty British special forces in Ukraine? That seems like a lot.

Mimi

It was more than half of all Western special forces there. The Ukrainians needed training and they needed people who could plan operations. The UK was betting that this investment would matter in how the war turned out.

Mark

The Red Sea raids—those sound like they're trying to fix a problem that keeps coming back.

Mimi

Exactly. You can strike the same targets over and over, but unless you break the supply chain and the command structure, the attacks continue. Ground operations let you do both at once.

Mark

And the domestic stuff—the oil tanker, the Liverpool raids. Does that feel different to the operators?

Mimi

It's different in scale but not in principle. You're still moving into a hostile situation with incomplete information, trying to control the outcome. The stakes are smaller, but the work is the same.

  • Hybrid warfare in the Baltics has pushed SAS operators into the unglamorous work of tracking sabotage networks threatening energy infrastructure — a shadow conflict with no front line and no formal declaration.
  • In Sudan, a city in civil war gave British special forces no margin for error as they moved diplomats and families through active combat zones to waiting aircraft eighteen miles away.
  • Leaked documents exposed the quiet depth of Britain's commitment to Ukraine — fifty special forces personnel training and operating alongside Ukrainian fighters, representing the largest Western special forces presence in the country.
  • Red Sea raids against Houthi positions brought SAS and SBS teams onto Yemeni soil to physically dismantle missile guidance systems and recover Iranian components, turning intelligence into degraded capability.
  • At home, from a hijacked oil tanker off the Isle of Wight to a Liverpool bombing aftermath, the SAS has never stopped performing the essential, unglamorous work of domestic counter-terrorism.

Across the fractured landscape of the 2020s, Britain's Special Air Service has moved quietly through the world's most volatile edges — Baltic borders, collapsing capitals, contested coastlines, and familiar streets at home. These deployments, taken together, reveal not a single dramatic moment but a sustained and adaptive presence: a small institution absorbing the complexity of modern conflict so that larger systems do not have to. The SAS of this era is less a symbol of martial glory than a precision instrument of statecraft, deployed wherever the gap between war and peace has grown dangerously thin.

The Special Air Service has spent the better part of six years threading itself through the world's most unstable seams — and what emerges is a portrait of an institution reshaped by the demands of a new kind of conflict.

In the winter of 2025 and into 2026, G Squadron deployed to Estonia and Latvia under Operation Northern Sentinel, tasked with dismantling sabotage networks targeting Baltic energy infrastructure. The threat was hybrid warfare — coordinated disruption designed to destabilize without triggering open conflict. Working with local security services, operators tracked intelligence assets near the Narva border, detaining several high-value targets by January 2026.

Two years earlier, in April 2023, the urgency was more immediate. Civil war had engulfed Khartoum, trapping British diplomats and their families. Following a COBR meeting, Prime Minister Sunak authorized a night extraction. A joint SAS, Royal Marines, and RAF team flew into the city on an American aircraft, navigated active combat zones and checkpoints, and drove the diplomats eighteen miles to waiting transport planes — without reported casualties, though the risk was acute.

Around the same period, SAS personnel were operating in Ukraine, training special forces and supporting reconnaissance and sabotage missions against Russian positions. Leaked American documents confirmed approximately fifty British special forces in-country — more than half of all Western operators present at the time — a commitment whose scale surprised many observers.

By late 2025, attention had shifted to Yemen, where SAS and SBS teams conducted coastal ground raids against Houthi command infrastructure. Rather than air strikes, small teams moved in to disable missile guidance systems and disrupt drone supply lines, recovering Iranian-manufactured components for technical analysis in the process.

At home, the unit has never stood down. A 2020 boarding of the oil tanker Nave Andromeda off the Isle of Wight and support for Liverpool police raids following a 2021 taxi bombing reflect the SAS's enduring domestic counter-terrorism role — the so-called Black Role, essential and largely invisible.

Taken together, these operations describe an institution that has moved well beyond its legendary past. The SAS of the 2020s is distributed, embedded, and adaptive — less a symbol than a mechanism, quietly absorbing the complexity that modern conflict keeps producing.

The Special Air Service has spent the past six years operating across a landscape of fragmented threats—from the frozen borders of Eastern Europe to the chaos of collapsing states and the contested waters of the Arabian Peninsula. What emerges from these deployments is a picture of a unit stretched across multiple theaters, adapting its methods to match the shape of modern conflict.

In the winter of 2025 and into early 2026, G Squadron of the SAS was stationed in Estonia and Latvia as part of Operation Northern Sentinel. The assignment was straightforward in concept but complex in execution: identify and dismantle sabotage networks targeting energy infrastructure across the Baltic region. The threat was not conventional military invasion but what strategists call hybrid warfare—coordinated attacks on critical systems designed to destabilize without triggering a formal declaration of war. Working alongside local security services, the SAS operators tracked intelligence assets attempting to slip across the Narva border. By January 2026, several high-value targets had been detained, though the full scope of the operation remains classified.

Three years earlier, in April 2023, a different kind of urgency drove SAS personnel into Sudan. Civil war had erupted in Khartoum, and British diplomats and their families were trapped in the capital. After a COBR meeting at Downing Street, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak authorized a night extraction. A joint team of SAS operators, Royal Marines, and RAF personnel boarded an American military aircraft and flew into the city. They moved through active combat zones and past multiple checkpoints to locate the diplomats, then drove them eighteen miles to an airfield where RAF transport planes waited. The operation succeeded without reported casualties, though the risk was substantial—moving through a city in the grip of armed conflict, with no guarantee of safe passage.

During 2022 and 2023, SAS deployments to Ukraine operated in a different register entirely. The unit's role was to train Ukrainian special forces and support sabotage and reconnaissance operations against Russian positions. Leaked American military documents from early 2023 revealed that the UK had deployed approximately fifty special forces personnel to Ukraine, representing more than half of all Western special forces operating in the country at that time. The scale of the commitment was significant, though the nature of the work—training, advising, conducting operations alongside Ukrainian forces—remained largely out of public view.

By late 2025, SAS and SBS teams were conducting coastal raids in Yemen against Houthi command and control centers. These were not air strikes but ground operations—small teams moving into position to disrupt the infrastructure supporting attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. The missions targeted the guidance systems used in anti-ship missiles and the supply lines feeding drone operations. Teams recovered Iranian-manufactured missile components for technical analysis, gathering intelligence while degrading the Houthis' operational capacity.

On the domestic front, the SAS has maintained its traditional role in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue. In October 2020, special forces boarded the oil tanker Nave Andromeda off the Isle of Wight after stowaways made threats to the crew. In November 2021, SAS operators supported police raids in Liverpool following a taxi explosion outside Liverpool Women's Hospital. These operations, though smaller in scale than overseas deployments, reflect the unit's continued responsibility for what the military calls the "Black Role"—the unglamorous, essential work of protecting the country from internal threats.

What these five operations reveal is an institution operating across multiple time zones and threat environments simultaneously. The SAS of the 2020s is not the unit of legend that stormed the Iranian Embassy in 1980. It is something more distributed, more specialized, more embedded in the machinery of modern statecraft. Whether the pattern continues depends on how the world's conflicts evolve—and whether the demand for small teams of highly trained operators continues to outpace the supply.

The mission was in response to escalating hybrid warfare threats targeting energy infrastructure in the Baltic region
— Operation Northern Sentinel briefing details
The operations were 'boots on the ground' missions, distinct from US airstrikes, aimed at securing sensitive guidance technology used in anti-ship missiles
— Red Sea coastal raids assessment
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