Between the sound of summit declarations in Moscow and the slower movement of cargo across desert roads and sea lanes, Russia is reshaping its place in Africa's arms trade. The announced figures are large, but independent records show a shrinking export industry choosing its customers with care rather than conquering a market. In Algeria, in the Sahel, and along the Horn, weapons are increasingly bound up with energy, minerals, training and political loyalty, so that a sale can become a presence. The question that remains is whether the promised steel will arrive as promised, and whether what
Russia's African Arms Trade: Military Exports Expand as Moscow Pursues Influence Beyond Ukraine
Military equipment reportedly intended for Russian Africa Corps formations in Mali raises concerns about deployments in conflict-affected states, though no specific casualties are reported in the excerpt.
The objective is a permanent presence, not individual arms transactions.
Mark
Russia is fighting a huge war in Ukraine. Why is it still selling jets and air defences to Africa?
Mimi
Because the sales do more than bring in money. The article describes them as tools of influence, tied to energy, minerals, training and diplomacy. Ethiopia's Su-35s and S-400s put Moscow into the Horn of Africa's military balance.
Luke
Careful with the Ethiopia numbers, though. Twelve Su-35s and four S-400 batteries were announced. Rosoboronexport confirmed only two Su-35s delivered.
Mark
And the $20 billion figure?
Mimi
That's Rosoboronexport's own claim, from May 2026: about 150 documents since 2023, 30 per cent of its order book, agreements with 46 states.
Luke
Which can't be independently verified in full. Signed paper isn't deliveries, and deliveries aren't payments. Set that against SIPRI, which has Russian major arms exports down 64 per cent and a 12 per cent share in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mark
So is Russia winning or losing in Africa?
Mimi
Neither, exactly. It's a smaller export industry concentrating on politically useful customers like Algeria and the Sahel juntas.
Luke
On Algeria, the Su-57 story is reporting, not confirmation. Russia acknowledged two exports to an unnamed customer in November 2025, and Algeria is the likely recipient. The order size and value are unknown.
Mark
What about the 167 flights?
Mimi
They show a pattern, linked to military-associated operators, between Russian plants and Algerian military airfields.
Luke
But not all can be shown to carry weapons. And in Mali, The Sentry says much of the equipment was for Africa Corps, so some of these are deployments, not sales. The excerpt reports no casualties, so the human cost isn't established here.
Il Polso
- Russia's summit promises of fighter jets and air defences for Ethiopia collide with a region already strained by internal fighting and tension with Eritrea.
- Only two of the announced Su-35 fighters are confirmed delivered, leaving a wide gap between what was pledged in Moscow and what has actually reached the ground.
- Cargo flights and sanctioned vessels trace a quiet supply network through Algeria, Guinea, Libya and Togo, moving equipment toward Mali and the wider Sahel.
- Russian official figures claim $20 billion in deals, yet independent data shows Russian major arms exports down 64 percent, leaving analysts to weigh ambition against decline.
- Equipment bound for Russia's Africa Corps in Mali signals that some sales are turning into deployments, with Moscow keeping control of the weapons on the ground.
Between the sound of summit declarations in Moscow and the slower movement of cargo across desert roads and sea lanes, Russia is reshaping its place in Africa's arms trade. The announced figures are large, but independent records show a shrinking export industry choosing its customers with care rather than conquering a market. In Algeria, in the Sahel, and along the Horn, weapons are increasingly bound up with energy, minerals, training and political loyalty, so that a sale can become a presence. The question that remains is whether the promised steel will arrive as promised, and whether what arrives will serve the people who live where it lands.
At the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, held in late October 2026, Ethiopia announced it would acquire twelve Su-35 fighter aircraft and four batteries of the S-400 air defence system. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed presented the purchase as a major strengthening of his country's forces. Rosoboronexport, the Russian state arms exporter, would confirm only that two of the jets had arrived. That gap matters, and so does the moment: Ethiopia is facing renewed fighting at home and rising tension with Eritrea, and Moscow is becoming a part of the military balance in the Horn of Africa.
Ghana also signed a defence understanding with Russia at the summit, alongside pledges on nuclear energy, agriculture and economic development. No contract value or equipment list was published, so it cannot yet be called a completed sale. It does show how Russia now bundles weapons with energy, resources, training and diplomacy.
Russian officials speak of around 150 agreements and more than $20 billion in military cooperation with African states since 2023. Independent research paints a more modest picture. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute finds Russian major arms exports fell 64 per cent between 2016–2020 and 2021–2025, and Russia's share of African imports is well behind the United States and China. The pattern looks less like a conquest of the market than a careful cultivation of a few customers.
Algeria remains the oldest of these partners, and reports suggest it may be operating the Su-57, a fifth-generation fighter. Cargo flights between Russia and Algeria, numbering at least 167 over a year, point to an organised transport route that gives Moscow access toward the Sahel without relying on other countries' infrastructure.
In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, juntas that have broken with France have turned to Moscow for weapons and instructors, often without the conditions Western partners attach. Some shipments to Mali appear to have been destined for Russian Africa Corps units rather than Mali's own army, which means the line between selling arms and deploying forces has grown thin. Investigations of vessels routed through Conakry, Tobruk and Lomé add to this picture of a network that is still taking shape.
The Africa Corps, now under direct state control since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, sits at the centre of it all. What happens next will depend on whether delivered equipment matches the deals announced in Moscow, and how the logistics routes through Algeria and the Sahel continue to develop.
At the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, held on 28 and 29 October 2026, Ethiopia announced it would acquire twelve Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft and four batteries of the S-400 long-range air defence system. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed called the purchase a substantial boost to his country's military capabilities. Rosoboronexport, the Russian state arms exporter, confirmed only that the first two Su-35s had been delivered. The gap between what is announced and what has arrived matters, but so does the timing: Ethiopia is dealing with renewed internal fighting and rising tension with Eritrea, and Moscow is now part of the military balance in the Horn of Africa.
Ghana also announced a new defence agreement with Russia at the summit, covering the prospective purchase of strategic military equipment. It came alongside commitments on nuclear energy, agriculture and economic development. No inventory or contract value was made public, so it cannot yet be called a completed weapons sale. What it shows is the way Russia now packages arms with energy, natural resources, military training and diplomacy.
The figures Russia offers are large. In May 2026, Rosoboronexport said it had signed roughly 150 contractual documents with African countries since 2023, worth more than $20 billion in military-technical cooperation. Its director, Aleksandr Mikheev, said Africa made up 30 per cent of the company's order book and that Russia had cooperation agreements with 46 African states. These numbers come from Russian official statements and cannot be fully verified. Signed contracts, framework agreements, deliveries and payments are separate things.
The independent data is less flattering. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reports that Russian exports of major conventional weapons fell 64 per cent between 2016–2020 and 2021–2025. Russia's share of global arms exports dropped from 21 per cent to 6.8 per cent, placing it third behind the United States and France. Of arms imported by African states in 2021–2025, 19 per cent came from the United States, 17 per cent from China and 15 per cent from Russia. In sub-Saharan Africa Russia's share was 12 per cent, behind China's 22 per cent. The picture is of a contracting export industry that is cultivating selected customers, not conquering a market.
Algeria is the longest-standing customer, with ties reaching back to Soviet support after its independence from France. Its forces rely heavily on Soviet and Russian aircraft, tanks, missiles and air defences, and its rivalry with Morocco keeps demand for advanced equipment high. In 2026 evidence emerged that Algeria is operating the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter, which would make it the first foreign customer for the type. Russia acknowledged exporting two Su-57s to an unnamed buyer in November 2025, and later reporting pointed to Algeria. The number ordered and the contract value remain uncertain. Morocco, for its part, has close defence ties with the United States and European suppliers.
Algeria is also a logistics hub. A Defense News investigation published in April 2026 identified at least 167 cargo flights between Russia and Algeria from March 2025 to April 2026, including movements between Russian aerospace plants and Algerian military airfields. Not every flight can be shown to have carried weapons, but the frequency and the links to military-associated operators suggest an organised transport network, and one that gives Russia a route toward the Sahel that does not depend on other countries' infrastructure.
In the Sahel, the approach is different. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have had coups and strained relations with France, and their juntas have turned to Russia for weapons, instructors and security help without the political conditions Western partners attach. In the first five months of 2025, three large consignments of Russian equipment reached Bamako, including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery and support vehicles. The Sentry, in an April 2026 investigation, found that much of it was meant for Russian Africa Corps units, not only for Mali's army. In those cases an arms export is closer to a deployment, because the equipment stays under Russian control.
On 10 November 2026, Defense News reported a C4ADS investigation that tracked twelve cargo vessels tied to Russian military shipments to Africa between 2023 and 2026. Routes ran through Conakry in Guinea, Tobruk in Libya and Lomé in Togo, with equipment then moved overland toward Mali and the wider Sahel. Five vessels linked to Russian military transport sailed from Baltic and Arctic ports to Conakry between December 2024 and March 2026. Cargo included T-72 tanks and Spartak mine-resistant armoured vehicles. Ten of the twelve vessels were under American sanctions.
The Africa Corps is the institutional core of this effort. After Yevgeny Prigozhin died in August 2023, the Russian state took more direct control of the Wagner Group's African operations, and Africa Corps now sits within a governmental structure. Arms sales, deployments and diplomatic agreements are increasingly parts of one foreign policy. Analysts also point to Africa's gold, uranium and bauxite as part of the calculation. What to watch next is whether delivered equipment matches the announced deals, and how the logistics networks in Algeria and the Sahel develop.
Citazioni salienti
Rosoboronexport's director said Africa accounts for 30 per cent of its order book, with cooperation agreements with 46 African states.— Aleksandr Mikheev, Rosoboronexport director
Ethiopia's acquisition substantially enhances the country's military capabilities.— Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (paraphrased)
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