The convergence of multiple indicators pointing to integrated industrial capacity
North Korea has demonstrated willingness to use chemical weapons, including the 2017 VX assassination of Kim Jong-nam, and experts believe the regime won't abandon this arsenal. Intelligence suggests Pyongyang can produce large quantities of mustard gas, sarin, and VX through government-controlled industrial facilities and research institutions.
- North Korea possesses an estimated 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons
- In 2017, North Korean agents used VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim Jong-nam in Malaysia
- The regime controls industrial facilities and research institutions with equipment and materials for chemical weapons production
- North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
A new analysis reveals North Korea possesses industrial capacity to produce chemical weapons and likely holds 2,500-5,000 tons of such arsenals, raising concerns about potential use in regional conflict.
A study released in late May 2026 has pulled back the curtain on North Korea's chemical weapons program, revealing something more troubling than speculation: the regime possesses the industrial machinery and raw materials to manufacture these weapons at scale. The research, published on the 38 North website and conducted through the Anthracite Project—a collaboration between security experts at London's Royal United Services Institute—relied entirely on open-source intelligence to map out Pyongyang's chemical weapons potential.
What the researchers found was not a smoking gun but something arguably more alarming: convergence. Government-controlled factories, universities, and research institutions across North Korea have the equipment and materials needed to produce chemical weapons. The study stops short of claiming the regime is actively manufacturing them, but it does something perhaps more useful—it establishes the plausible foundation for such production and identifies specific indicators worth monitoring. As the report states, the most striking conclusion is not the presence of irrefutable proof, but rather the alignment of multiple data points suggesting an integrated industrial capacity.
This assessment arrives against a backdrop of demonstrated intent. In 2017, North Korean agents used the nerve agent VX to assassinate Kim Jong-nam, the estranged brother of dictator Kim Jong-un, at Kuala Lumpur airport in Malaysia. That killing was not theoretical; it was a public execution using a weapon of mass destruction. Margaret Kosal, director of graduate studies at Georgia Tech's security program, is unambiguous about what this means: North Korea can manufacture chemical weapons and has already done so. Compared to other chemical weapons programs—past or present—remarkably little is known about what actually happens inside North Korea's facilities. The regime's nuclear and biological warfare capabilities remain largely opaque. But based on available evidence, experts assess that Pyongyang can produce large quantities of mustard gas and sarin, along with smaller amounts of VX.
Estimates suggest North Korea possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. The original theory was that this arsenal served as a poor man's deterrent before the regime developed nuclear capability, a temporary substitute for the real thing. But nothing indicates Pyongyang has abandoned these weapons. Dan Pinkston, a professor of international relations at Troy University in Seoul and author of a report on North Korea's chemical and biological weapons programs for the International Crisis Group, believes the regime would use them without hesitation if facing imminent collapse. The North Korean government, he explains, is deeply paranoid; any lethal weapon is rationalized as necessary for survival.
If conflict erupted on the peninsula, Pinkston argues, chemical weapons would likely be deployed before nuclear ones. A nuclear strike would trigger overwhelming retaliation that would end the regime entirely. But chemical weapons offer a different calculus: they could degrade or delay a South Korean advance toward Pyongyang without crossing the nuclear threshold. The consequences would be catastrophic, especially for civilians caught between combatants without protective equipment. History provides grim precedent. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces in the 1980s. Syria deployed them against rebels and civilians. Russia has reportedly used them in Ukraine. Yet North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, evidence suggests it has already used these weapons, and there are no signs it intends to renounce them.
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, a military affairs expert at Tokyo's International University, finds the new data deeply alarming, particularly because it corroborates information from other sources, including high-ranking defectors. While the regime's actual deployment capabilities remain uncertain, Hinata-Yamaguchi agrees that Pyongyang would not hesitate to use chemical weapons to prevent total collapse. The 2017 VX assassination in a public space demonstrated the regime's willingness to deploy these agents openly. North Korea regularly defies international law, and the regime appears to view chemical weapons as having useful psychological impact. The professor suspects Pyongyang would deploy whatever tools might level the playing field against a technologically superior opponent, making the probability of chemical weapons use in wartime very high.
What makes this moment distinct is not that experts have discovered something entirely new, but that open-source analysis has now provided a detailed map of how the machinery works. The regime's chemical arsenal is no longer a distant abstraction. It is industrial capacity, sitting in facilities that can be identified, monitored, and understood. The question is no longer whether North Korea can produce these weapons. The question is what happens when the regime believes it has nothing left to lose.
Notable Quotes
It is absolutely clear that North Korea can and has fabricated chemical weapons, and the 2017 VX use confirms it— Margaret Kosal, Georgia Tech security studies director
If a conflict developed against North Korea and South Korean troops advanced toward Pyongyang, the regime could use chemical weapons to degrade or delay that operation— Dan Pinkston, Troy University professor and International Crisis Group researcher
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does this study matter if we already knew North Korea had chemical weapons?
Because knowing something exists and understanding how it's made are different things. This research shows the actual infrastructure—the factories, the universities, the supply chains. It gives you something to watch.
The 2017 VX killing of Kim Jong-nam—that already proved they had chemical weapons, didn't it?
It proved they had VX and were willing to use it. But one assassination doesn't tell you about production capacity or stockpiles. This study maps the industrial foundation that makes large-scale production possible.
Between 2,500 and 5,000 tons—how do experts arrive at those numbers?
Through a combination of defector testimony, satellite imagery, and analysis of what facilities like theirs typically produce. It's not precise, but the range is grounded in multiple intelligence streams.
If North Korea used chemical weapons in a conflict, who would be most at risk?
South Korean soldiers first, if they're advancing toward Pyongyang. But civilians in Seoul and other cities could be targeted too. The real horror is that most people wouldn't have protective equipment.
Why hasn't North Korea signed the Chemical Weapons Convention?
Because signing it would require inspections and transparency. The regime won't accept that constraint. It's the same reason they've resisted most international agreements that limit their weapons.
Could North Korea actually deploy these weapons effectively in war?
That's the uncertainty. They have the chemicals and some delivery systems, but whether they could actually use them at scale in combat is less clear. But the regime doesn't need perfect execution—just the threat is destabilizing.
What would trigger actual use?
Experts think it would happen if the regime faced existential threat—if South Korean forces were advancing on Pyongyang and the government believed it was about to fall. At that point, the calculation changes entirely.