Prabowo's Concentric Strategy: Indonesia's Free-and-Active Doctrine as a Path to Middle-Power Status

An op-ed published by Eurasia Review on the first of November sets out how Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto approaches the world, and it begins with an old idea: bebas dan aktif, free and active. The principle holds that Indonesia protects its national interests while using every diplomatic tool to speed its development and widen its influence abroad. The piece is opinion, and its argument is the author's own.

It leans on a description from Ian McMahon, a professor at the Australian National University. McMahon says Prabowo's foreign policy is shaped partly by his years as Defense Minister, and that he treats diplomacy as a way to add to national power, to accelerate and sustain economic development, and to raise Indonesia's influence.

The author reads Prabowo's method as a set of concentric circles with four layers. At the center sit national interests and domestic resilience. Next comes ASEAN and Indonesia's immediate strategic surroundings. Beyond that lie relations with major countries and strategic partners, and at the outer edge is representation in global forums.

The core is about sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Partners, in this reading, are valued by how much they help Indonesia improve its defense, raise prosperity and build self-reliance. Diplomacy also serves Indonesia Emas 2045, the goal of reaching developed-country status by the centenary of independence. The tools named are investment, technology, human resource development, infrastructure, education and market access, and partners are measured by how far they support that aim.

Resilience is the next ring. It covers food and energy supplies, access to critical minerals, stable supply chains, and avoiding heavy dependence on foreign technology. The author says this requires defense modernization, including defense diplomacy, procurement, training and security cooperation.

The ASEAN circle goes back to the bloc's founding in 1967. With the South China Sea disputes and the rivalry between American and Chinese camps, the author argues that keeping Southeast Asia from becoming a battlefield for the two powers depends on ASEAN unity. Dialogue, peaceful settlement of disputes and regional norms are described as key, and ASEAN centrality as essential to Indonesian independence.

On major powers, the piece says Prabowo views China, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, Europe, Russia and the Middle East through mutual benefit and balance. Indonesia wants good relations with all and does not intend to take sides. Ties with China must be balanced to protect maritime interests and avoid strategic dependence, and the same holds for the United States. Japan is a partner on security, technology and trade. India and Australia are to be strengthened for Indo-Pacific stability. Europe, Russia and the Middle East are to be deepened in trade, technology, energy and diplomacy. The outer circle is Indonesia's role as a middle power from the Global South, pressing for action on climate, food security, energy transition, development finance and reform of global governance.

The author admits the approach will be tested. US-China competition over technology, supply chains and the seas narrows room for maneuver. The hardest task is keeping strategic autonomy without sliding into two camps, handling issues one at a time, and holding ASEAN together. Success is not guaranteed, the author writes, but if Indonesia strengthens its domestic base, keeps the region cohesive, diversifies partnerships and builds durable defense capability, it can protect its independence and become a strong middle power in a multipolar world.