The miracle was real—just not quite as miraculous
Por décadas, o Brasil construiu sua identidade econômica sobre a crença de um século XX extraordinário — uma redenção nacional após um império supostamente estagnado. Agora, três economistas revisitam os alicerces estatísticos dessa narrativa e encontram fissuras: o crescimento entre 1900 e 1980 teria sido de 4,9% ao ano, não os 5,7% consagrados, graças a metodologias que ignoravam setores inteiros da economia. O milagre não desaparece, mas se torna mais humano — e o século XIX, antes descartado, ganha uma segunda chance na história.
- A revisão de uma única metodologia estatística é capaz de redimensionar um século inteiro de desenvolvimento econômico e a identidade que um país construiu sobre ele.
- A mudança de cálculo feita pela FGV em 1969, no auge da ditadura militar, inflou os números do 'milagre econômico' — e Edmar Bacha escolhe as palavras com cuidado ao comentar a coincidência.
- O período glorificado de 1968 a 1973, antes celebrado com crescimento de 11,5% ao ano, cai para 9,3% nas novas estimativas — robusto, mas despido de parte de seu brilho político.
- Se o século XX cresceu menos do que se pensava, o ponto de partida em 1900 era mais alto — o que reabilita, ao menos parcialmente, a economia imperial que a historiografia tratou como fracasso.
- Historiadores econômicos alertam que os dados do século XIX são escassos demais para conclusões definitivas, mas reconhecem que refinar os cálculos é um trabalho necessário e honesto.
Por décadas, o Brasil abraçou uma narrativa de redenção: o século XIX foi de tropeços, mas o século XX foi de voo. Entre 1900 e 1980, o país teria crescido a 5,7% ao ano — mais rápido do que quase qualquer outro lugar no mundo. Três economistas — Edmar Bacha, arquiteto do Plano Real; Guilherme Tombolo, da UFPR; e Flávio Versiani, da UnB — publicaram um estudo que questiona silenciosamente essa certeza. Suas novas estimativas apontam para 4,9% ao ano. A diferença parece pequena, mas o que ela implica é considerável.
O problema estava na metodologia. Os cálculos do PIB conduzidos pela Fundação Getulio Vargas entre 1947 e 1980 excluíam setores inteiros: gastos do governo, intermediação financeira e rendas de aluguel. Ao incorporar essas atividades, os três economistas não apenas reduziram o crescimento do século XX — eles sugeriram, por consequência, que o século XIX pode ter sido menos estagnado do que a história oficial admite.
O momento da revisão metodológica original carrega um peso próprio. Em 1969, em plena ditadura militar, a FGV alterou sua forma de calcular o PIB. O que se seguiu foi o chamado 'milagre econômico', com crescimento oficial de 11,5% ao ano entre 1968 e 1973. Pelas novas contas, esse mesmo período cresceu 9,3%. Bacha, ao ser questionado sobre se a mudança serviu aos interesses do regime, foi preciso na contenção: 'Não vou dizer mais nada, mas é muito curioso.' E acrescentou que a alteração 'facilitou a ideia do milagre'.
A pesquisa abre uma lacuna que os historiadores econômicos ainda tentam preencher. Se o ponto de partida em 1900 era mais alto do que se supunha, a lógica que justificava a estagnação imperial — construída sobre o contraste com o século seguinte — perde parte de seu fundamento. Thales Zamberlan Pereira, da FGV, é cético quanto a revisões dramáticas do século XIX, mas reconhece o valor do esforço. Os dados daquele período são escassos: existem registros de exportações e importações, mas a produção interna é quase invisível nos arquivos.
Bacha, por fim, não exagera nas conclusões. Mesmo a 4,9% ao ano, o Brasil do século XX cresceu muito acima da média global de 3,2%. O milagre existiu — apenas não era tão milagroso quanto os números, e talvez os interesses de uma época, fizeram crer.
For decades, Brazil's economic story has rested on a simple narrative: the nineteenth century was a bust, but the twentieth century roared. From 1900 to 1980, the country grew faster than almost anywhere else on earth. It was a redemption arc, a nation that stumbled through the imperial age and then found its footing in the modern one. But three economists—Edmar Bacha, who helped design the Real currency plan; Guilherme Tombolo of the Federal University of Paraná; and Flávio Versiani of the University of Brasília—have quietly upended that story.
Their research, published in August as a working paper at the Casa das Garças economic policy institute, suggests the twentieth-century growth was not quite as explosive as the official numbers claim. Where the accepted statistical series shows an average annual growth rate of 5.7 percent between 1900 and 1980, their recalculation yields 4.9 percent. The difference might sound small. But it reshapes how we understand a century of Brazilian development.
The culprit is methodology. For much of the twentieth century, Brazil's GDP calculations—particularly those overseen by the Getulio Vargas Foundation between 1947 and 1980—excluded entire sectors of economic activity: government spending, financial intermediation, and rental income. The three economists incorporated these missing pieces. The result is a lower twentieth-century growth rate, which in turn implies something counterintuitive: the nineteenth century, long dismissed as stagnant, may have performed better than anyone thought.
The timing of this revision carries its own weight. In 1969, right in the middle of Brazil's military dictatorship, the Getulio Vargas Foundation changed its calculation methodology. What followed was the so-called "economic miracle"—the years 1968 to 1973 when, by official accounts, the economy expanded at 11.5 percent annually, a rate that would make modern China envious. Under the new calculations, that same period grew at 9.3 percent. Still robust, but notably less miraculous. Bacha, when asked whether the statistical shift served the political interests of the regime, was careful but pointed: "They changed the accounts in 1969. I won't say much more, but it's very curious." He added that the methodology change "made the idea of the miracle easier."
The research opens a gap in the historical record that scholars are only beginning to fill. Earlier this year, economists from PUC-Rio and the Getulio Vargas Foundation published a book called "A Passos Lentos"—"At Slow Pace"—examining the imperial economy. The conventional wisdom has long held that Brazil stagnated under the empire, then accelerated sharply after 1900. But if twentieth-century growth was lower than believed, the nineteenth century's performance looks less dismal by comparison. The economists suggest what they call an "extraordinary structural break" in growth rates—the dramatic shift from stagnation to acceleration—may be partly statistical illusion.
Estimating nineteenth-century growth is harder because the data is sparse. Export and import figures exist, but internal production statistics are scarce. Bacha notes the irony: "For the nineteenth century, we don't have quantities, production statistics. Only exports and imports. Internal production, we don't have." Yet the absence of data became a kind of argument. To justify the idea that the empire had stagnated, economists reasoned that if the twentieth century grew so explosively, the starting point in 1900 must have been very low. This logic reinforced the narrative of imperial failure.
Thales Zamberlan Pereira, an economic historian at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, is skeptical that revised estimates will show the nineteenth century growing much faster. The period after Pedro I's abdication in 1831 was marked by relative stability, he notes, following an earlier crisis of high inflation and wage arrears that had helped fuel the independence movement in 1822. Even so, Pereira acknowledges that refining the calculations is important scholarly work. But he doubts the revisions will fundamentally change how economists understand that distant era.
For now, Bacha is careful not to oversell the findings. Even at 4.9 percent annually, Brazil's twentieth-century growth was "very good." The global average, according to the Maddison Project at the University of Groningen, was 3.2 percent. Brazil still outpaced the world. It may not have been the fastest-growing economy on earth, as some have claimed, but it was respectable. The miracle, it turns out, was real—just not quite as miraculous as the numbers suggested.
Notable Quotes
They changed the accounts in 1969. It's very curious. The methodology change made the idea of the miracle easier.— Edmar Bacha, economist and Real Plan architect
Brazil grew well more than the world. It may not be the biggest growth in the world, but it is respectable growth.— Edmar Bacha
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does it matter if the number is 4.9 percent instead of 5.7 percent? Aren't both strong growth rates?
They are both strong. But the difference changes the entire story Brazil tells itself about its own history. If the twentieth century wasn't as exceptional as we thought, then the nineteenth century—the imperial period—wasn't as much of a failure. The narrative of redemption collapses a little.
So this is really about the nineteenth century, not the twentieth?
Partly. But it's also about how statistics can shape what we believe happened. The 1969 methodology change happened during the dictatorship, right when the regime wanted to show the economy was booming. That's not necessarily conspiracy—it's just how power and numbers sometimes align.
Did the researchers prove the change was intentional?
No. Bacha said it was "very curious" but didn't accuse anyone of deliberate manipulation. The point is that the methodology change made the miracle look bigger than it was. Whether that was the goal or just a convenient side effect, we can't say for certain.
What happens now? Does this change policy or teaching?
Probably not much in the short term. One historian said the revisions are good scholarship but unlikely to shift how people understand that era. But over time, if the numbers become accepted, it could reshape how Brazil thinks about its economic trajectory—less a story of collapse and recovery, more one of persistent, uneven development.