Petroperú posts $208M profit but S&P maintains negative outlook amid strategy uncertainty

Petroperú turned a corner in April, posting a net profit of $208.4 million—a sharp reversal from the $197 million loss it had recorded in the same month a year earlier. The turnaround came from a combination of operational tightening: the company slashed its cost of sales by 45.4 percent, squeezed its inventory management, and streamlined its supply chain. The EBITDA figure of $395 million underscored the scale of the improvement. On paper, it looked like a company finding its footing.

But the balance sheet told a more complicated story. Petroperú's total liabilities sat at $8.048 billion as of April, barely budging from the $8.010 billion recorded three months earlier. The company remained deeply indebted—obligated to banks, suppliers, employees, and the Peruvian state for commitments made in years past. The profit, in other words, was real, but it existed in the shadow of a debt load that had not meaningfully shrunk.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledged the operational gains. In a recent assessment, the agency reaffirmed Petroperú's B- credit rating—a below-investment-grade designation that signals elevated risk but not imminent default. The company, S&P noted, retained enough financial flexibility to service its near-term debt obligations. The agency also removed Petroperú from its CreditWatch list, where it had been flagged with negative implications since December 2025.

Yet S&P maintained a negative outlook, and the reasoning revealed the real source of concern: nobody knew what Petroperú was supposed to become. The Peruvian government had issued a decree in December 2025 instructing ProInversión, the state investment agency, to develop a new business plan for the company. That plan had not materialized. The strategic direction remained undefined. Without clarity on operational objectives, on timelines, on what the company would actually do going forward, S&P could not assess whether the current profit represented genuine recovery or merely a temporary respite before deeper structural problems reasserted themselves.

In May, the government moved to ease the immediate pressure. A new emergency decree authorized the Ministry of Energy and Mines to establish a special-purpose vehicle backed by roughly $2 billion in contingent government support. The money would flow toward working capital, fuel inventory replenishment, and the operational costs of hydrocarbon production. S&P acknowledged the relief this would provide to Petroperú's liquidity crisis. But the agency also signaled what it wanted to see next: a credible operational strategy, not just another financial patch.

The path forward remained uncertain. S&P laid out the conditions under which it would cut Petroperú's rating: continued delays in implementing the business plan, a downgrade of confidence in government support, or evidence that the government lacked the capacity to sustain corrective measures. The agency also flagged a procedural hurdle: any restructuring plan would likely require approval from both bondholders and creditors of CESCE, the Spanish export credit insurer, given the potential need to sell or redeploy assets. Once ProInversión finally published its plan, S&P said, it would analyze the implications for Petroperú's operational and financial structure. Until then, the company remained suspended between operational improvement and strategic uncertainty.