We still have an extremely strong biosecurity system
When conflict sealed the Strait of Hormuz, Australia was reminded of a quiet vulnerability it had allowed to grow for decades — a complete dependence on imported nitrogen fertiliser despite possessing the raw materials to make its own. In the winter of 2026, with a million tonnes of urea fast-tracked through accelerated biosecurity channels and government underwriting shielding major importers from loss, the nation bought itself a season. The deeper question — why a country so reliant on agriculture surrendered its fertiliser sovereignty so gradually, and so completely — remains unanswered by any shipment.
- The Iran conflict shut the Strait of Hormuz and threatened to starve Australian winter crops of the nitrogen fertiliser they cannot grow without.
- Australia imports all of its urea despite having the raw materials for domestic production, a structural vulnerability that decades of industrial retreat quietly created.
- The federal government redesigned biosecurity inspections so that vessels could be tested before docking and assessments completed offshore, compressing a normally slow process without, officials insisted, lowering its standards.
- A government underwriting scheme protected two major importers against price falls if they ordered urea at inflated wartime prices — leaving smaller competitors to carry all the risk alone.
- A domestic urea plant in Western Australia is expected to begin production by mid-2027, offering a future buffer against the kind of global disruption that has just exposed how thin Australia's margins really are.
Australia's farmers entered winter 2026 facing a fertiliser crisis born far from their fields. The Iran conflict had closed the Strait of Hormuz — the chokepoint through which a third of the world's fertiliser normally moves — and Australia, which imported around 3.6 million tonnes of urea in 2025 alone, had no domestic production to fall back on. Despite possessing the raw materials for nitrogen-based fertiliser, the country's manufacturing capacity had wound down over decades, leaving agriculture entirely exposed to the rhythms of global trade.
The federal government moved quickly. Biosecurity checks on fertiliser shipments were redesigned so that samples could be tested on incoming vessels before docking, and certain assessments completed offshore. Agriculture Minister Julie Collins was careful to frame the changes as faster, not weaker — contaminated fertiliser, she noted, could damage both farming ecosystems and export markets. The government allocated $7.5 million for a fuel and fertiliser security facility and secured six additional shipments totalling more than 209,000 tonnes. By early June, a million tonnes of urea had already been fast-tracked through the new system.
But the response was not without controversy. The government also began underwriting fertiliser orders for two of the industry's largest importers, protecting them against losses if prices fell after they bought at inflated wartime rates. Shadow agriculture minister Darren Chester argued the arrangement favoured established players and left smaller competitors to absorb all the risk themselves — a well-intentioned scheme, he said, poorly executed.
The longer horizon offers some relief. The Perdaman urea plant in Western Australia is expected to begin production by mid-2027, which could eventually reduce the country's dependence on contested shipping lanes. For now, Australia's food security rests on the speed of ships and the willingness of government to bend its usual processes — a fragile arrangement that the season ahead will test.
Australia's farmers were facing a winter crop crisis. A war in the Middle East had choked off one of the world's most critical trade routes, and with it, the supply of nitrogen fertiliser that Australian agriculture depends on entirely. By early June, the government had already fast-tracked the import of a million tonnes of urea—the world's most widely used nitrogen fertiliser—to keep fields productive through the season ahead.
The disruption began when the Iran conflict closed the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which a third of the world's fertiliser normally flows. Australia, which imported around 3.6 million tonnes of urea in 2025 alone, suddenly faced the prospect of shortages that could drive food prices sharply higher. The country has no domestic production to fall back on. Despite having abundant raw materials for nitrogen-based fertiliser, Australia's manufacturing capacity had quietly wound down over decades, leaving farmers wholly dependent on imports.
In April, the federal government moved to address the crisis by streamlining its biosecurity checks on fertiliser shipments. The process, normally thorough and time-consuming, was redesigned to move faster without, officials insisted, sacrificing safety. Agriculture Minister Julie Collins explained the approach: samples could now be tested on incoming vessels before they docked, and certain assessments could be completed offshore rather than waiting for physical arrival. The government allocated $7.5 million in the federal budget for a fuel and fertiliser security facility, and secured six additional shipments totalling more than 209,000 tonnes, with the first expected to arrive within weeks.
The streamlining was done in consultation with industry bodies like Fertilizer Australia, whose chief executive Stephen Annells framed the collaboration as a balance between speed and rigour. Collins was careful to emphasise that the changes did not represent a weakening of Australia's biosecurity standards. Contaminated fertiliser could damage local farming ecosystems and export markets, she noted, so the inspections remained rigorous even as they moved faster.
But the government's response extended beyond faster processing. It also began underwriting fertiliser shipments for major importers—a move that drew sharp criticism from the opposition. Shadow agriculture minister Darren Chester, a Nationals MP, said the scheme appeared well-intentioned but poorly executed. Two of the industry's largest players had secured government backing to order urea at inflated prices, protected against losses if prices fell. Smaller importers, meanwhile, were left to absorb all the risk themselves, with little interest from government in extending the same safety net. Chester argued the arrangement created an unequal playing field, favouring established players over competitors trying to enter the market.
Looking ahead, the government pointed to a longer-term solution: the Perdaman plant in Western Australia, expected to begin producing urea by mid-2027. If that facility comes online as planned, it could eventually reduce Australia's vulnerability to global supply shocks. For now, though, the nation remains dependent on the speed of ships crossing contested waters and the willingness of government to bend its usual processes to keep the winter crop in the ground.
Notable Quotes
This is about trying to provide Australian farmers with some certainty in what is an uncertain time with this war in the Middle East impacting globally and including here at home in Australia.— Agriculture Minister Julie Collins
Two of the biggest players in the industry have been underwritten. They can order urea at inflated prices and if the prices happen to go down they are underwritten by the government.— Shadow agriculture minister Darren Chester
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does Australia import all its fertiliser when it has the raw materials to make it?
The domestic industry shut down over decades. It's cheaper to import than to rebuild manufacturing from scratch, so that's what happened. Now we're paying the price when global supply breaks.
What exactly did the government change about biosecurity?
They moved testing onto the ships before they dock, and did some assessments offshore instead of waiting for arrival. Faster, but they say still rigorous. The real question is whether speed and safety actually stay balanced under pressure.
The opposition is upset about the underwriting scheme. What's the actual unfairness?
Big importers can order at high prices and the government absorbs losses if prices drop. Smaller competitors have to own all that risk themselves. It's not illegal, but it does tilt the market toward players who already have scale.
Is the Perdaman plant a real solution?
It could be, if it actually opens mid-2027 as promised. But that's a year away, and it's one facility. Australia would still need imports to meet total demand. It's insurance, not independence.
How serious is the food price risk?
Real enough that the government moved fast. If urea supplies stay tight, yields drop, prices rise, and households feel it at the supermarket. That's the fear driving all of this.