More than 40% of voting shareholders did not affirmatively support his continued directorship
At KADOKAWA Corporation's annual shareholder meeting in Tokyo, CEO Takeshi Natsuno's reappointment was confirmed by only 59.68% of votes — a dramatic fall from 90.26% the prior year — marking one of the most visible collapses of executive confidence in recent Japanese corporate history. Activist investor Oasis Management, holding over 15% of shares, has interpreted the result not as a narrow approval but as a collective rebuke, one that implicates the board's independence and the company's willingness to be held accountable. In the long arc of corporate governance, such moments rarely resolve quietly: they demand either genuine transformation or the slow erosion of institutional trust.
- CEO Natsuno's support cratered by more than 30 percentage points in a single year, a collapse that would prompt voluntary resignation at most major corporations.
- The weakness spread across the boardroom — the chair of the nomination committee and a long-tenured internal director both fell well below thresholds that signal healthy shareholder confidence.
- During the meeting itself, Oasis — KADOKAWA's largest shareholder — was blocked from asking questions, turning a governance forum into what the firm called a stage for avoiding accountability.
- High abstention rates signaled that dissatisfaction reached beyond activist investors to strategic and corporate shareholders, suggesting a broad and deliberate withdrawal of confidence.
- Oasis is now pressing for immediate CEO succession planning, a structural overhaul of the board, and a fundamental shift toward genuine dialogue with the shareholder base.
On June 24, KADOKAWA Corporation held its annual shareholder meeting in Tokyo, and the numbers told a stark story. CEO Takeshi Natsuno, who had received 90.26% shareholder approval the previous year, was reappointed with only 59.68% support — meaning more than four in ten voting shareholders withheld their backing. For a sitting chief executive of a major Japanese corporation, the decline was historic.
Oasis Management, which controls roughly 15.25% of KADOKAWA's shares, released a statement the following day framing the result as a turning point. The firm acknowledged that Natsuno retained his position, but argued that most executives facing such a dramatic year-over-year drop would recognize the message and step aside voluntarily. The weakness extended beyond the CEO: board chair Hiroo Unoura received only 75.56% support, and long-serving internal director Nobuo Kawakami garnered just 77.86%, suggesting that shareholder concerns ran deeper than any single executive's performance.
What unfolded during the meeting itself sharpened Oasis's frustration. Most outside directors attended remotely and appeared only briefly. When the floor opened for questions, Natsuno — presiding as meeting chair — declined to allow Oasis to participate in the Q&A, despite the firm's standing as the company's largest shareholder. Oasis characterized this as a failure of the very purpose of an annual meeting.
The firm also pointed to the significance of abstentions, arguing that the high rate indicated dissatisfaction extending across strategic and corporate shareholders — not merely activist investors — making the withdrawal of confidence a company-wide signal rather than a fringe protest.
Oasis closed by calling on the board to treat the vote as a mandate: to immediately pursue CEO succession planning, restructure board composition, and commit to genuine shareholder dialogue. The company, the firm argued, holds world-class assets that remain significantly undervalued — but realizing that potential requires leadership that earns, rather than assumes, the trust placed in it.
On June 24, KADOKAWA Corporation held its annual shareholder meeting in Tokyo, and the results landed like a warning shot across the company's boardroom. CEO Takeshi Natsuno, who had sailed through the previous year's vote with 90.26% shareholder approval, this time secured reappointment with only 59.68% support. For a sitting chief executive of a major Japanese corporation, this represents a historic collapse of confidence—more than four in ten voting shareholders withheld their affirmative backing.
Oasis Management Company Ltd., which controls roughly 15.25% of KADOKAWA's shares through its private funds, released a statement the day after the vote framing the result as a turning point. The firm acknowledged disappointment that Natsuno retained his position, but treated the voting outcome itself as something far more significant: evidence of a shareholder base in open revolt against the company's direction. Oasis argued that most CEOs facing such a dramatic year-over-year decline would recognize the message and step aside voluntarily, clearing the way for succession planning. Instead, Natsuno remained in place.
The weakness extended beyond the CEO's chair. Hiroo Unoura, the board's chairperson and head of the nomination committee, received only 75.56% support. Nobuo Kawakami, an internal director since 2014, garnered just 77.86%. These figures suggested to Oasis that shareholder concerns transcended any single executive—the board itself faced questions about its independence, effectiveness, and willingness to hold management accountable.
What happened during the meeting itself deepened the activist investor's frustration. Most of KADOKAWA's outside directors attended remotely and made only brief appearances at the start of proceedings. When the floor opened for shareholder questions, Natsuno, acting as meeting chair, declined to allow Oasis to pose any questions despite the firm's status as the company's largest shareholder. Oasis had sought multiple times to participate in the Q&A session. The firm characterized this as a failure of corporate governance—an annual meeting should function as the formal venue where shareholders engage directly with the full board and hold directors accountable, not a stage where difficult questions from major investors are sidestepped.
Oasis framed the vote as a mandate for urgent action. The board, the firm argued, must immediately revisit CEO succession planning and actively evaluate both internal and external leadership candidates. Beyond that, directors needed to undertake a serious review of governance structures, board composition, and management organization, devoting substantially more time and resources to the company than they had demonstrated to date. The voting outcome should not be treated as routine approval, Oasis insisted, but as a clear signal that fundamental change was necessary.
The firm also noted the significance of abstentions—shareholders who neither voted for nor against reappointment. In Oasis's reading, the high abstention rate indicated that dissatisfaction extended beyond institutional investors and retail shareholders to strategic and corporate shareholders, for whom declining to affirmatively support a sitting CEO represents a serious and deliberate statement. This suggested that confidence in management had weakened across KADOKAWA's entire shareholder base, not just among activist investors.
Oasis closed its statement by expressing gratitude to employees, creators, fans, and business partners who had supported what the firm called "A Better KADOKAWA," and reiterated its belief that the company possessed world-class assets that remained significantly undervalued. Realizing that potential, the firm argued, required leadership accountability, disciplined oversight, credible execution, and genuine dialogue with shareholders. The board, Oasis concluded, should treat the vote for what it was: not a routine approval, but a clear warning that meaningful change remained necessary.
Notable Quotes
For a sitting CEO of a major Japanese listed company, this is an exceptionally weak mandate, pursuant to which most other CEOs would understand that their continued leadership was untenable and therefore resign.— Oasis Management Company Ltd.
The Board should treat this outcome as evidence of materially weakened confidence in management across KADOKAWA's shareholder base.— Oasis Management Company Ltd.
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does a 59.68% approval rate matter so much? Isn't that still a majority?
It is a majority, yes, but barely. For a sitting CEO at a major Japanese company, this represents a historic collapse. He had 90% support a year ago. That 30-point drop signals something has broken between management and shareholders.
What specifically went wrong at KADOKAWA under Natsuno's leadership?
The source material doesn't detail specific failures, but Oasis points to deteriorating performance, missed targets, poor execution, weak governance, and lack of accountability. The pattern suggests a company underperforming relative to its assets.
Why did the board chair and other directors also receive weak votes?
Because shareholders aren't just frustrated with the CEO. They're questioning whether the board itself is doing its job—whether it's independent enough, whether it's actually overseeing management, whether it's responsive to shareholders at all.
The meeting itself sounds contentious. What was that about?
Oasis, the largest shareholder, tried to ask questions during the Q&A period and was shut down. Most outside directors didn't even show up in person. It sent a message that the company wasn't interested in dialogue with its shareholders.
What does Oasis want to happen now?
Immediate CEO succession planning—actively looking for new leadership, either from inside or outside. But also a fundamental rethinking of how the board operates, its composition, and how seriously it takes its fiduciary duties.
Is there any chance Natsuno stays in place despite this vote?
Technically, yes—he was reappointed. But Oasis is arguing that any reasonable CEO would read this as a mandate to resign. The question now is whether the board will treat the vote as a warning or as routine business.