North Korea's troop deployment unlikely to shift Ukraine war dynamics, experts say

North Korea is preparing to send tens of thousands of soldiers to Russia, and the missiles are already arriving. Intelligence agencies estimate that between 30,000 and 50,000 North Korean troops could be deployed in the coming months—a dramatic escalation that follows an initial deployment of 14,000 to 15,000 soldiers who arrived in late 2024 to help defend Russia's Kursk region. At the same time, Ukraine's military intelligence reports that North Korea has already delivered 148 ballistic missiles to Russian forces since 2025, with more on the way. The scale of the commitment is striking, yet military experts who study the conflict closely say it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the war's trajectory.

The question of where North Korean troops will actually fight matters more than the headline numbers suggest. Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst at the Ukrainian Center for Security Studies, believes these soldiers will be used primarily to hold Russian territory—remaining in Kursk and potentially moving into the southwestern Voronezh region. This defensive posture would serve a specific strategic purpose: freeing up Russian soldiers currently stationed in those areas so they can be redeployed to active combat zones along the front lines in Kharkiv, Sumy, Vovchansk, and Chernihiv. Kovalenko does not expect North Korean forces to cross into internationally recognized Ukrainian territory. Ruslan Leviev, a Russian military analyst, agrees on this point. "It's one thing to recapture Russian territory," he told Deutsche Welle, "and an entirely different thing to be present on internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, taking part in a war of aggression." The diplomatic distinction matters as much as the military one.

Some observers have questioned whether Russia even needs this infusion of foreign manpower. Leviev said he has seen no concrete evidence of a significant North Korean military presence in Russia so far, and he argues that Moscow has sufficient troops available without recruiting soldiers from abroad. The Russian military has remained fairly active since mid-July, he noted, which suggests the force is not yet depleted. An economist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Janis Kluge, estimated that Russia is still recruiting around 1,000 contract soldiers per day despite signs of strain in its recruitment campaign. If these assessments are accurate, the arrival of North Korean troops represents not a desperate measure but rather an opportunistic deepening of military cooperation.

The ballistic missiles, by contrast, are a different matter entirely. Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence confirmed that 148 North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 missiles have been delivered since 2025, with reports indicating that a North Korean missile unit is preparing to deploy to Russia's Voronezh region equipped with 120 additional warheads. These weapons are similar in function to Russia's Iskander missiles but carry larger payloads, have longer range, and are less accurate. In July, President Zelenskyy reported that one such missile struck a residential area near Kryvyi Rih, killing two adults and three children. Military expert Yuri Fyodorov describes these missiles as "instruments of terror," noting that their reduced accuracy makes them unsuitable for precision strikes against military targets. The real purpose, he suggested, is to terrorize civilian populations.

Ukraine's ability to defend against these weapons is deteriorating. Both the North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 and the Russian Iskander can only be effectively intercepted by US-made Patriot air-defense systems, and Ukraine's stockpile of these systems is critically low. As winter approaches and Ukrainian air defenses continue to deplete, Russia's access to a steady stream of North Korean missiles becomes strategically significant. Leviev observed that Russia has already launched far more ballistic missiles this summer than in previous years, and if Russian supplies run low by winter, North Korean reserves could sustain the campaign. "There will still be North Korea reserves," he said, "to make sure Ukraine cannot catch its breath."

None of the experts interviewed by Deutsche Welle believes North Korea's involvement will produce a turning point in the war. Jenny Town of the US-based Foreign Policy Research Institute said the moment for such a shift has already passed. Instead, she characterized the relationship between Russia and North Korea as a mutually beneficial partnership that will likely deepen as the conflict continues. Kovalenko does not expect Russia to make substantial territorial gains along the front lines, but he expressed concern about the winter months ahead. "October, November and December could become very trying for Ukraine," he said. The combination of a possible new Russian military call-up, the freeing of Russian troops through North Korean replacements, and a sustained barrage of ballistic missiles could create a grinding, exhausting period without necessarily breaking the stalemate. The war will not turn on North Korea's arrival, but the texture of it—the relentless pressure, the civilian casualties, the depletion of defenses—may become sharper and more punishing as the year darkens.