North Korean troops unlikely to shift Ukraine war's balance, experts say

By late 2024, North Korea had already committed boots to Russia's war. Between 14,000 and 15,000 North Korean troops moved into the Kursk region, tasked with defending Russian territory against Ukrainian incursions. Now, according to Ukrainian and international intelligence agencies, Pyongyang is preparing to send another 30,000 to 50,000 soldiers across the border. The scale is striking. The strategic question is simpler: will it matter?

Experts who study this war closely say probably not. The arrival of North Korean forces will not tip the balance in Russia's favor, they argue, though it will certainly change the texture of the conflict. Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst at the Ukrainian Center for Security Studies, sees the deployment as a way for Russia to shuffle its existing manpower. North Korean troops, he told Deutsche Welle, would likely stay in Kursk and southwestern Voronezh—holding Russian territory rather than invading Ukrainian soil. That frees up Russian soldiers, perhaps 15,000 of them, to redeploy to the grinding front lines around Vovchansk, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv. It's a substitution play, not a reinforcement.

Ruslan Leviev, a Russian military analyst, agrees on the diplomatic calculus: there is a world of difference between defending Russian territory and fighting on internationally recognized Ukrainian land. The latter carries weight in the court of global opinion. The former, less so. Leviev also notes that Russia has not demonstrated a critical shortage of troops. Since mid-July, Russian forces have maintained steady offensive pressure along the front. Janis Kluge, an economist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, estimates that Russia is still recruiting roughly 1,000 contract soldiers per day, despite visible strain in its recruitment machinery. Moscow may want North Korean reinforcements, but it does not appear to need them to keep fighting.

What Russia does need, increasingly, is missiles. Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence reports that North Korea has delivered 148 ballistic missiles—the KN-23 and KN-24 models—since 2025. These weapons are crude compared to precision-guided systems, but they are plentiful and they are terrifying. A North Korean missile struck a home near Kryvyi Rih in July, killing two adults and three children. The weapons are less accurate than Russia's Iskander missiles but carry larger payloads and fly farther. They are, as military expert Yuri Fyodorov put it, instruments of terror—designed to spread fear rather than hit specific targets. Ukrainian sources say the missiles can only be reliably intercepted by American-made Patriot air-defense systems, of which Ukraine has a dwindling supply.

This is where the partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang becomes strategically significant. Russia has been firing ballistic missiles at a higher rate than in previous years. As winter approaches and Ukraine's air-defense stockpiles shrink, Russia will need a steady stream of replacements. North Korea is offering exactly that. Leviev expects that if Russia's own missile reserves run low by winter, North Korean supplies will keep the pressure on Ukraine, preventing it from catching its breath during the coldest months.

Yet none of the experts interviewed by Deutsche Welle believe the North Korean deployment will be a turning point in the war. Jenny Town of the Foreign Policy Research Institute says the moment for such a shift has passed. What is happening instead is the crystallization of a mutually beneficial partnership—Russia gains manpower and missiles, North Korea gains combat experience and international standing. Kovalenko does not expect Russia to make substantial territorial gains, but he is worried about the winter ahead. October, November, and December could be grueling for Ukraine. Russia might launch a new military call-up, redeploy freed-up fighters, and maintain a steady barrage of North Korean missiles. That combination, Fyodorov said, would not be good for Ukraine's war interests. The North Korean involvement will not win the war for Russia. But it may sustain the war through the season when Ukraine is most vulnerable.