In the waters off North Korea's eastern coast, a regime pressed the boundaries of its naval ambitions twice within a single week, launching submarine-borne cruise missiles that flew for over two hours before finding their mark. Kim Jong Un stood watch as the Pulhwasal-3-31 system completed its trials — a deliberate signal that Pyongyang is not merely maintaining its arsenal, but reshaping it. Where ballistic missiles have long drawn the world's attention and condemnation, cruise missiles launched from beneath the sea move in quieter, harder-to-trace arcs — and it is precisely that obscurity th
North Korea Tests Submarine-Launched Cruise Missiles for Second Time in Week
Rapid tests compress the feedback cycle and build confidence before deployment
Mark
Why does it matter that North Korea tested the same missile twice in a week? Couldn't they have just tested it once and learned what they needed?
Mimi
The repetition serves multiple purposes. It validates that the first test wasn't a fluke—that the system can perform consistently. It also compresses the feedback cycle. Each flight generates data, and rapid successive tests let engineers iterate faster and build confidence in the design before moving toward operational deployment.
Luke
But we should be careful here. We have KCNA's account of what happened, and South Korea confirmed missiles were fired. The flight times and target information come only from North Korean state media. We don't have independent verification of those specific numbers or whether the missiles actually hit what they were aimed at.
Mark
So when analysts say cruise missiles are as threatening as ballistic missiles, what's the actual difference?
Mimi
Ballistic missiles follow a predictable arc—they go up and come down. Cruise missiles fly low and level, like an airplane. That makes them harder to detect on radar and harder to intercept. From a submarine, a cruise missile is especially dangerous because the platform itself is hidden underwater until it launches.
Luke
That's the theory, anyway. We should note that North Korea hasn't demonstrated an operational submarine-launched cruise missile in combat or in any scenario where we could independently verify performance. The regime has a history of exaggerating weapons capabilities in state media.
Mark
Kim Jong Un inspected a nuclear submarine during this period. Is that submarine actually operational?
Mimi
KCNA said he inspected its construction, so it's still being built. But the fact that he's personally overseeing both the missile tests and the submarine construction suggests these are linked programs—the submarine is meant to carry these missiles eventually.
Luke
Again, we're working from North Korean statements about their own military. We don't know the actual construction timeline, the submarine's readiness, or whether it will ever become operational. What we can say is that North Korea is investing resources in this direction and testing the weapons that would go aboard such a vessel.
Il Polso
- North Korea fired submarine-launched cruise missiles twice in seven days, each flight exceeding two hours — a compressed testing cycle that signals urgent momentum toward operational readiness.
- Kim Jong Un's personal presence at the launch and his inspection of a nuclear submarine under construction reveal this is not a single provocation but a coordinated strategic push.
- Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles fall outside the explicit prohibitions of UN Security Council resolutions, leaving the international community with fewer clear legal levers to respond.
- A submarine-based cruise missile capability would give North Korea a survivable second-strike option — a deterrent that endures even if land-based systems are destroyed in a first strike.
- South Korea confirmed the launches but offered no technical counter-assessment, reflecting the difficulty of tracking and characterizing a platform designed to evade detection.
In the waters off North Korea's eastern coast, a regime pressed the boundaries of its naval ambitions twice within a single week, launching submarine-borne cruise missiles that flew for over two hours before finding their mark. Kim Jong Un stood watch as the Pulhwasal-3-31 system completed its trials — a deliberate signal that Pyongyang is not merely maintaining its arsenal, but reshaping it. Where ballistic missiles have long drawn the world's attention and condemnation, cruise missiles launched from beneath the sea move in quieter, harder-to-trace arcs — and it is precisely that obscurity that makes this moment consequential for the stability of the region.
North Korea tested its submarine-launched cruise missile system, the Pulhwasal-3-31, for the second time in a week, with both flights lasting well over two hours before striking an island target off the country's eastern coast. Kim Jong Un personally oversaw the trial, which state media declared a success and a milestone in the regime's naval modernization.
The two missiles flew for 7,421 and 7,445 seconds respectively — a level of endurance that demonstrates meaningful range for a weapon launched from beneath the sea. South Korea's military confirmed the launches but declined to offer technical analysis. The rapid back-to-back testing suggests a deliberate effort to validate the system across multiple launch cycles, moving it swiftly toward deployment.
Kim framed the tests as part of a larger vision: building a formidable naval force capable of projecting nuclear power from the sea. He also reviewed construction of a nuclear submarine and plans for additional warship types, making clear that submarine-launched missiles are one piece of a broader modernization campaign.
The strategic weight of this development lies in what cruise missiles represent compared to their ballistic counterparts. Ballistic missiles are explicitly banned under UN Security Council resolutions and carry heavy diplomatic consequences. Cruise missiles occupy a grayer legal space — yet analysts increasingly argue they pose equivalent or greater threats, particularly when launched from submarines that are far harder to detect and track than land-based systems.
A functioning sea-based nuclear strike capability would give North Korea something it has long sought: a second-strike option — weapons that survive an initial attack and can still be used in retaliation. That possibility fundamentally alters the security calculus for South Korea, Japan, and the United States, and it arrives at a moment when North Korea's broader weapons portfolio — including underwater drones and new ballistic systems — is expanding with notable speed.
North Korea conducted a second test of submarine-launched cruise missiles within seven days on Sunday, according to state media reports released Monday. The weapon system, designated Pulhwasal-3-31, flew for more than two hours off the country's eastern coast before striking an unspecified island target. Leader Kim Jong Un personally oversaw the trial, which the state news agency KCNA characterized as a success and a demonstration of the regime's accelerating naval nuclear capabilities.
The missiles remained airborne for 7,421 and 7,445 seconds respectively—each flight exceeding two hours—marking a significant test of endurance and range for a cruise missile platform launched from beneath the sea. South Korea's military confirmed that multiple cruise missiles were fired off the North's coast but offered no additional technical assessment. The rapid succession of tests, with an identical system tested just days prior, suggests a deliberate campaign to validate the weapon's performance across multiple launch cycles.
Kim Jong Un framed the test within a broader strategic vision. KCNA reported that he characterized the trial as holding "strategic significance" for the regime's plan to modernize its armed forces and construct what it describes as a powerful naval force. Beyond the missile test itself, Kim inspected ongoing construction of a nuclear submarine and reviewed plans for manufacturing additional warship types, signaling that submarine-launched weapons represent only one component of a larger naval modernization effort.
The distinction between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles carries weight in international law and strategic assessment. Ballistic missiles face explicit prohibition under United Nations Security Council resolutions, making them the focus of diplomatic pressure and sanctions. Cruise missiles occupy a different regulatory space, yet military analysts have increasingly argued that intermediate-range cruise missiles pose threats equivalent to or potentially exceeding those of ballistic systems. North Korea's cruise missile capability, particularly when deployed from submarines, complicates regional defense calculations by introducing a platform that is harder to detect and track than land-based systems.
In recent months, North Korea has conducted tests across a widening arsenal. The regime has demonstrated ballistic missile systems still in development phases and tested an underwater drone, suggesting a comprehensive effort to expand its military options rather than focus narrowly on any single weapon class. Each test generates data that feeds into refinement cycles, and the compressed timeline of these submarine-launched cruise missile trials indicates the regime is moving rapidly through validation phases.
The strategic context extends beyond the weapons themselves. A functioning submarine-based cruise missile capability would grant North Korea a second-strike option—the ability to launch nuclear weapons from a platform that survives initial attack. This represents a qualitative shift in the regime's deterrent posture and complicates the security calculations of neighboring states and the United States. The tests underscore that North Korea's weapons development remains active and accelerating, with each successful flight moving the regime closer to operational deployment of systems that regional powers and their allies have not yet fully countered.
Citazioni salienti
Kim Jong Un characterized the test as holding strategic significance for modernizing the armed forces and building a powerful naval force— KCNA (North Korean state news agency)
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