Netanyahu Seeks India Alliance as Hedge Against Potential Hostile US President

Benjamin Netanyahu stood before Israel nine days before a national election and posed a question that cut to the heart of his political calculation: what happens when the United States stops being Israel's reliable patron? The Israeli Prime Minister did not wait for an answer. Instead, he sketched out a doctrine built on a stark premise—that within two years, a new American president, hostile to Israel, could take office. To survive such a rupture, Netanyahu argued, Israel needed to stop treating Washington as its sole strategic anchor and begin weaving a thicker web of international partnerships.

The timing was deliberate. Netanyahu unveiled this security doctrine on a Sunday, just hours before Donald Trump publicly endorsed his re-election campaign. Yet the doctrine itself was framed around a future without Trump, or at least without the kind of American president Netanyahu has grown accustomed to. "In two years, a President, man or woman, could come to power who is very hostile to Israel," Netanyahu said. "How would you deal with that? How would you operate in relation to the United States? And beyond that, what solutions would be necessary?" The questions were rhetorical. His answer was already formed.

Netanyahu's strategy rested on two pillars. First, maximize Israel's advantage during the remaining years of Trump's presidency—whatever time remained in the current American political cycle. Second, cultivate alternative power centers that could sustain Israeli interests if Washington's orientation shifted. India emerged as the centerpiece of this second pillar. Netanyahu has long emphasized the relationship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and in May of that year, amid an ongoing war and mounting international criticism, he had already described India as a "huge power" where there existed "crazy love" for Israel. Now, facing an election, he elevated India from diplomatic talking point to strategic necessity. "India is not a small country, and there are many others," Netanyahu said, signaling that his government was actively working to deepen ties not only in the region but far beyond it.

Latin America featured in this calculus as well. Netanyahu pointed to political shifts unfolding in the region, particularly the prospect of major changes in Brazil, as an opening for Israel to expand its diplomatic footprint. The logic was straightforward: if the United States could become unreliable, Israel needed to become valuable to as many powers as possible. "We must expand our pool of alliances and develop capabilities that make us valuable to everyone," Netanyahu said.

This framing of Israel's future was not abstract. It reflected real tensions that had marked Netanyahu's relationship with Democratic administrations. His strained ties with Barack Obama and Joe Biden had become a recurring theme in Israeli politics, and Netanyahu had long presented his willingness to challenge American presidents as evidence of his strength as a leader. Now, with an election looming and Trump's support secured, Netanyahu was essentially arguing that his combative approach to Washington had been vindicated—and that Israel needed to prepare for a world in which such combativeness might become necessary again.

But the doctrine drew immediate fire from Gadi Eisenkot, Netanyahu's main challenger in the election and a former chief of the Israel Defence Forces. Eisenkot dismissed the announcement as a hollow political exercise, a distraction from the actual security challenges facing Israel. "Nine days before the election and three years after the gravest failure and disaster in Israel's history, with every war front still open, Netanyahu decided to present his 'security doctrine' to the public," Eisenkot said. He characterized the doctrine as two pages of slogans masquerading as strategy, a symptom of the "strategic vacuum" Netanyahu had created. Eisenkot accused Netanyahu of using fear and political messaging to manipulate voters, of frightening the public and diverting attention from what he called a "parade of lies and racism" surrounding the campaign.

The clash between Netanyahu and Eisenkot captured a deeper debate about Israel's actual security posture. Netanyahu's doctrine assumed that diplomatic diversification could substitute for or complement traditional reliance on the United States. Eisenkot argued that such framing was a distraction from the immediate, unresolved conflicts that continued to drain Israeli resources and lives. Whether India and Latin American partners could ever provide the kind of strategic depth that American support had long offered remained an open question—one that would likely shape Israeli politics well beyond the October 27 election.