In the highlands and borderlands of Myanmar, a quiet revolution in governance has been unfolding beneath the noise of war — armed ethnic organizations have not merely fought for autonomy, they have built it, institution by institution, court by court. Five years of civil conflict have inverted the old logic of the centralized state: authority is no longer something Naypyidaw grants to the periphery, but something the periphery has already claimed for itself. Any future settlement will not be drawn on a blank map but negotiated among actors who have already written their own chapters of stateho
Myanmar's Political Future Must Build From Armed Groups Already Governing on Ground
Over 450 civilians killed in military-perpetrated mass killings in first half of 2026, with nearly 40% occurring in Anyar region.
Power is emerging from the periphery, often without Naypyidaw.
Mark
So the argument here is that armed groups are already doing the work of government in parts of Myanmar. They're not just fighting—they're administering.
Mimi
Exactly. The Arakan Army in Rakhine, ethnic organizations in Shan—they've built courts, tax systems, security forces. These are functioning institutions, not just territorial claims.
Luke
But how stable are these systems? Are we talking about durable governance or armed groups imposing order through force?
Mimi
The source doesn't distinguish between the two. It says they've established systems, but it doesn't detail how they're actually functioning or how locals experience them.
Mark
And the violence is still happening. Over 450 civilians killed in the first half of 2026 alone.
Mimi
Yes, and that's concentrated in Anyar, where resistance is more fragmented. So the picture is uneven—some regions have consolidated authority, others are still in active conflict.
Luke
The source mentions younger activists questioning whether federalism is enough. But who are these younger activists? How many? What's their actual influence?
Mimi
That's attributed to a generational divide within resistance organizations, but the source doesn't give specifics about their numbers or their actual power within those movements.
Mark
What about the Rohingya question? The source flags it as a rights problem that decentralization could make worse.
Mimi
Right—if power moves to the local level without strong rights protections, minorities could face exclusion at the state level instead of the national level. It's the same problem, just relocated.
Luke
And ASEAN's role here—the source says they need to listen to more actors. But what leverage does ASEAN actually have if these armed groups control territory and the military controls other territory?
Mimi
That's the real question. The source is arguing for a shift in how ASEAN understands the problem, not claiming ASEAN can solve it.
The Pulse
- Armed ethnic organizations in Rakhine, Shan State, and border regions have built functioning courts, tax systems, and security forces — parallel governments that operate entirely outside Naypyidaw's reach.
- Military violence continues at devastating scale, with over 450 civilians killed in mass killings in just the first six months of 2026, nearly 40% of them in the Anyar region where resistance remains fragmented.
- The March 2026 formation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union signals that resistance actors are institutionalizing their political vision, but younger activists increasingly doubt whether traditional federalism can deliver after decades of broken promises.
- Decentralization carries its own dangers — resource-rich territories may resist fiscal sharing, a weakened center may be unable to arbitrate disputes, and local autonomy without rights protections risks replacing national discrimination with local exclusion.
- ASEAN's diplomat focus on Naypyidaw as the sovereign interlocutor is growing dangerously out of step with the actual distribution of power, leaving the ethnic administrations and civil society actors who will shape any real settlement largely unengaged.
In the highlands and borderlands of Myanmar, a quiet revolution in governance has been unfolding beneath the noise of war — armed ethnic organizations have not merely fought for autonomy, they have built it, institution by institution, court by court. Five years of civil conflict have inverted the old logic of the centralized state: authority is no longer something Naypyidaw grants to the periphery, but something the periphery has already claimed for itself. Any future settlement will not be drawn on a blank map but negotiated among actors who have already written their own chapters of statehood, even as more than 450 civilians paid with their lives in the first half of 2026 alone.
Myanmar's political future is no longer being written in its capital. Over five years of civil war, armed ethnic organizations have quietly constructed the architecture of statehood in the territories they control — establishing courts, collecting taxes, maintaining security forces, and administering justice independent of Naypyidaw. The Arakan Army in Rakhine State and powerful organizations across Shan State and the border regions have built functioning parallel governments. These are not aspirational demands; they are operating realities.
The violence accompanying this transformation has been immense. In the first half of 2026, more than 450 civilians were killed in military-perpetrated mass killings, with nearly 40 percent of those deaths concentrated in Anyar, where resistance remains fragmented and communities face relentless assault. Yet even as fighting continues, the war is permanently reshaping the political landscape any eventual peace must address. The old assumption — that Myanmar's future would be designed at the center and devolved outward — has inverted. Authority is now rising from the periphery.
The March 2026 creation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union reflects this shift, demonstrating the growing weight of ethnic organizations in determining the country's trajectory. But the resistance is not uniform. Veteran leaders in organizations like the Karen National Union remain committed to traditional federalism, while younger activists and diaspora communities increasingly question whether conventional federalism can deliver genuine autonomy after decades of failed agreements. Myanmar may be remaking federalism from the ground up — a more flexible arrangement combining variable degrees of autonomy, stronger state-level authority, and negotiated power sharing.
Confederation offers one possible bridge, but carries serious risks. Resource-rich territories controlling jade, hydropower, or trade routes may resist fiscal redistribution, deepening regional inequality. A weak center may struggle to arbitrate when constituent governments clash. And decentralization alone cannot resolve the rights dimension: greater autonomy does not automatically mean greater inclusion. Rakhine illustrates this clearly — any settlement must address not only the relationship between Rakhine and the union, but also the rights of minorities, including the Rohingya, within Rakhine itself. Without strong protections, decentralization risks relocating exclusion from the national level to the local one.
ASEAN's continued focus on Naypyidaw as the primary interlocutor grows increasingly disconnected from where power actually resides. Engaging ethnic administrations and resistance actors need not mean recognizing new states or endorsing territorial claims — it means acknowledging political realities. Myanmar's future union will be negotiated not on an empty map, but among actors who have already acquired territory, built institutions, and developed their own claims to authority. The challenge is not simply to redistribute power from the center. It is to find a way to share the power that has already emerged.
Myanmar's political future is no longer being written in the capital. For five years of civil war, armed ethnic groups have been quietly building the institutions of statehood in the territories they control—establishing courts, collecting taxes, administering justice, and maintaining security forces. The Arakan Army in Rakhine State has constructed parallel administrative and judicial systems across much of the region. Powerful ethnic organizations in Shan State and other border areas have done the same. These are not theoretical demands for future autonomy. They are functioning governments already operating on the ground, independent of Naypyidaw's authority.
The scale of violence has been staggering. In the first half of 2026 alone, more than 450 civilians were killed in military-perpetrated mass killings, with nearly 40 percent of those deaths concentrated in Anyar. Yet even as the fighting continues—the military still uses force intensively, and resistance actors pursue their aims through armed struggle—the war is reshaping the political landscape that any eventual settlement will have to address. The old assumption that Myanmar's future order would be designed at the center and then devolved to the states has inverted. Authority is now emerging from the periphery, often without Naypyidaw's involvement at all.
The creation of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union in March 2026 reflects this shift. Resistance actors remain committed to federalism as a principle, but the council itself demonstrates the growing power of states and ethnic organizations in determining Myanmar's trajectory. The country is not undergoing a single, uniform political transition. Different forms of authority are consolidating across different regions, shaped by distinct experiences of conflict and governance. In some ethnic borderlands, power is becoming more concentrated at the local and state level. In Bamar-majority areas like Anyar, resistance remains fragmented and civilians face relentless military violence.
There is also a generational divide within the resistance itself. Veteran leaders in organizations like the Karen National Union remain committed to traditional federalism. Younger activists and diaspora communities, however, increasingly question whether conventional federalism can deliver sufficient autonomy after decades of broken agreements, military rule, and failed peace processes. This suggests Myanmar may not be moving from federalism toward confederation so much as remaking federalism from the ground up—a more flexible arrangement combining different degrees of autonomy, stronger state-level authority, and negotiated power sharing between the union and territories that have developed substantial self-government.
Confederation offers one possible bridge, but it carries its own risks. The very autonomy that makes it attractive could fragment the country. Resource-rich areas controlling jade, hydropower, or major trade routes might resist fiscal redistribution, deepening regional inequalities. A weak central authority could struggle to make decisions when constituent governments disagree. There is also a crucial rights dimension that decentralization alone cannot solve. Greater autonomy does not automatically mean greater inclusion. Rakhine illustrates the problem: any future settlement must address not only the relationship between Rakhine and the union, but also the rights and political participation of minorities, including the Rohingya, within Rakhine itself. Decentralization without strong rights protections could simply relocate exclusion from the national level to the local one.
The implications extend beyond Myanmar's borders. ASEAN has approached the country primarily through the lens of the sovereign state and its Five-Point Consensus, but if political authority is increasingly dispersed among ethnic administrations and resistance territories, diplomacy centered only on Naypyidaw risks overlooking the actual power structures on the ground. ASEAN cannot prescribe Myanmar's system of governance, but it can broaden its understanding of who will shape any eventual settlement—listening not only to the military and the National Unity Government but also to ethnic political organizations, resistance actors, women, youth, and civil society. Engaging an ethnic administration does not mean recognizing a new state, just as engaging resistance actors does not mean endorsing their territorial claims. It means acknowledging political realities rather than treating constitutional arrangements as if they already exist.
Myanmar's future union will not be negotiated on an empty map. It will be negotiated among actors who, through five years of war, have acquired territory, built institutions, and developed their own claims to political authority. The challenge is not simply to redistribute power from the center. It is to find a way to share the power that has already emerged across the country.
Notable Quotes
Myanmar's future union will not be negotiated on an empty map, but among actors who have acquired territory, built institutions, and developed their own claims to political authority.— Lowy Institute analysis
Want the full story?
Read the original at lowyinstitute.org ↗