Museveni Revives East African Federation Push as EAC Chair

Yoweri Museveni has spent two decades chasing a dream that keeps slipping away. The Ugandan president wants to bind East Africa together—not as a loose trade bloc, but as a unified political entity with shared institutions, a common military, and a regional navy. Now, having assumed the chairmanship of the East African Community in April, he is trying again, though this time with a more modest proposal: a confederation that would let countries keep their sovereignty while moving toward deeper union.

Museveni's timing is deliberate. The EAC, an eight-member bloc that includes Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, has been stumbling through integration for decades. It achieved a customs union in 2005, launched a common market in 2010, and promised a monetary union with no fixed deadline. But the bloc has never managed the leap to political federation—the fourth pillar of its founding vision. Before traveling to Dar es Salaam in early August for a two-day working visit, Museveni renewed his call for confederation, arguing that East Africans are fundamentally the same people and should act like it. A unified military command, he reasoned, would protect landlocked states and fend off external threats. A regional navy and space program would follow. "If we have the East African Federation, we shall be able to have a navy which can defend us in the oceans, and we will be able to have a space programme," he said.

This is not new rhetoric. What is new is the architecture. Rather than demand immediate political federation—a proposal that has repeatedly collided with national pride and institutional resistance—Museveni is proposing confederation as a stepping stone. Partner states would retain control over their own affairs while agreeing to a shared confederal authority with its own institutions, officials, and budget. The confederation would deal directly with governments, not citizens, and could suspend or expel members that violated the confederal constitution. It is, in essence, a way to build trust and legal alignment without asking anyone to surrender the keys to defense, foreign policy, or security.

Rebecca Kadaga, Uganda's Minister for EAC Affairs and chair of the EAC Council of Ministers, framed the shift as pragmatism. "President Museveni is the champion of the regional integration on the continent," she told reporters, "and we expect that we should do more in terms of integration." A special committee led by former Ugandan Chief Justice Benjamin Odoki is already drafting a model constitution for the confederation, collecting views from stakeholders across the region. Four countries—Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda—have completed their consultations. Tanzania, South Sudan, Somalia, and the DRC have not yet weighed in.

But skepticism runs deep. Critics argue that the EAC has failed at simpler tasks. Non-tariff barriers still choke trade. South Sudan imposes fees on travelers while insisting they are not visa charges. Tanzania has dragged its feet on roaming charges. Governments, analysts say, offer lip service to integration while protecting national interests. Dr. Kizito Sabala, a lecturer at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies at the University of Nairobi, is blunt: "Ceding sovereignty is the greatest challenge. Political federation cannot succeed with partner states ceding some level of sovereignty." The region is fractured by border disputes, proxy rivalries between Rwanda and the DRC, tensions between Burundi and Rwanda, and contested elections in Tanzania and Uganda. Chronic non-payment of dues—estimated at $98 million—suggests that even basic institutional commitments are fragile.

Perhaps most damning is the gap between policymakers and citizens. Afrobarometer surveys conducted during Museveni's tenure as chair found that a large majority of East Africans have heard little to nothing about the proposed federation. The public conversation that might build momentum for such a historic shift simply does not exist. Kadaga acknowledged the problem, calling for ordinary people to "agitate more for political federation above all else," but the machinery for that agitation is absent. Ironically, informal traders, cultural networks, and ordinary citizens have arguably outpaced their governments in practicing integration—moving goods, sharing ideas, and building ties across borders without waiting for official permission.

Museveni's confederation proposal is strategically sound: it offers a way forward without demanding the impossible surrender of sovereignty that has derailed federation talks for twenty years. Yet the obstacles remain formidable. The EAC has never managed to enforce even the protocols it has already agreed to. Governments fiercely guard their autonomy over defense and foreign policy. The region is riven by disputes and mistrust. And the people who would have to live under such a confederation know almost nothing about it. Whether Museveni's one-year term as chair will be enough to move the confederation from constitutional draft to political reality remains an open question—and history suggests the answer is no.