Morocco's street protests challenge government's deepening Israel ties

On September 16, Morocco's government announced it would elevate its diplomatic presence in Israel from liaison offices to full embassies, with both countries exchanging ambassadors. The move came during a trilateral meeting in New York between Morocco's Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, and US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz. Beyond the symbolic upgrade, the two countries committed to new agreements on investment protection, tax coordination, expanded airline routes, and high-level reciprocal visits. It was a deliberate deepening of ties that went further than the diplomatic normalization Morocco had established in December 2020 under the US-brokered Abraham Accords framework.

Within days, the announcement triggered a wave of street mobilization. The Moroccan Front for Supporting Palestine and Against Normalisation called for three days of action culminating on September 27. The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation's Causes organized what it counted as 76 separate events across 45 cities under the banner "Friday for Al-Aqsa and against normalisation." Demonstrations materialized in Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tangier, Fez, Agadir, Oujda, Tetouan, Kenitra, and Sale. In the capital, protesters gathered outside Parliament. In Marrakesh, a demonstration evolved into a march through main thoroughfares. The scale of mobilization was substantial, though no independent national count of total participants exists.

The government's response was mixed but firm in several locations. In Tangier, local authorities issued a ban on a planned September 27 demonstration. Security forces then dispersed hundreds of participants, and more than 12 people were detained, according to reporting from Achkayen. In M'diq, authorities prevented demonstrations from occurring. In Agadir, security forces surrounded a gathering to stop it from becoming a march. The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation's Causes condemned what it described as bans, restrictions, and arrests. The pattern revealed a government willing to suppress street opposition even as it formalized closer institutional ties with Israel.

The tension between official policy and public sentiment runs deep. According to the Arab Opinion Index cited by Moroccan activist Mouna Rahiani, 89 percent of Moroccans surveyed opposed their country recognizing Israel, while only six percent supported it. "What we are seeing in Morocco is a growing disconnect between official diplomacy and public sentiment," Rahiani said. Yet Morocco has maintained a formal position supporting Palestinian statehood while simultaneously deepening relations with Tel Aviv. For critics of normalization, these two commitments are irreconcilable, especially given Israel's military operations in Gaza. Kathya K Berrada, senior programmes manager at the Arab Center for Research, noted that the political context has shifted: "Normalisation is being consolidated at a time when the war in Gaza has generated unprecedented public anger and intense images of Palestinian suffering."

The timing of the embassy announcement intersects with other strategic interests. The United Nations Security Council is scheduled to consider the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in October, with the current mandate expiring October 31, 2026. The September 16 trilateral statement explicitly referenced US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israeli support for Morocco's position on the territory. For Rabat, the relationship with Israel sits within a broader foreign-policy framework in which alignment with Washington and international backing for its Western Sahara claims remain central. For opponents of normalization, however, that strategic calculation does not justify closer ties with Israel while the Palestinian question remains urgent.

The protests also arrived days after Morocco held parliamentary elections on September 23. The Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which had been in power when Morocco signed the 2020 normalization agreement, saw its parliamentary representation increase from 13 seats in 2021 to 54 seats in 2026. The Authenticity and Modernity Party won 97 seats, the National Rally of Independents 66, and Istiqlal 65. Turnout dropped to 38.08 percent from 50.86 percent in 2021. The PJD, which had opposed normalization as a party position even while its then-Prime Minister Saadeddine el-Othmani signed the 2020 declaration, chose to remain in parliamentary opposition rather than join the next government. The party's larger presence gives it a stronger platform to voice opposition to Israel ties, but it will have no direct influence over foreign policy from the opposition benches.

What remains uncertain is whether the street mobilization will translate into sustained political pressure. The demonstrations show that organized opposition retains the capacity to mobilize across wide geographic areas. But Berrada cautioned that there is insufficient reliable public data to establish how many Moroccans actually support or oppose normalization, and that demonstrations, while revealing the strength of organized opposition, do not by themselves establish the views of the wider population or guarantee that government policy will shift. The government has shown it can restrict gatherings and make arrests. The PJD has a larger parliamentary voice but no seat at the governing table. And Morocco's foreign policy remains embedded in a strategic triangle involving the United States, Israel, and Western Sahara—interests that the government appears unwilling to sacrifice for domestic opposition, however widespread.