Morocco's 2026 election tests whether politics can deliver jobs for frustrated youth

Growth is real. Jobs are not following.
Morocco's economy expanded 4.9% in 2025, yet youth unemployment reached 37.3%, exposing a gap between macroeconomic gains and lived experience.
Mark

Why does it matter that only a third of young Moroccans trust Parliament if they're still posting about politics and showing up to protests?

Mimi

Because trust and engagement are different things. Young people clearly care about politics. The question is whether they believe voting will actually change anything. When you're 22 and unemployed in a country with 37 percent youth unemployment, you might protest or post online because you're angry, but you might not vote because you don't think it will get you a job.

Luke

But we should be careful here. The Afrobarometer survey measures trust in institutions, not belief in voting specifically. We don't know from that data alone whether young people think elections are useless or whether they just don't trust the people currently in power.

Mimi

Fair point. But the pattern is suggestive. The economy grew nearly 5 percent last year. That's strong growth. Yet youth unemployment is still at 37 percent. If growth isn't translating into jobs for young people, then what reason do they have to believe the next government will be different?

Mark

So the election is really about whether the parties can convince young voters that they'll do better than the last government at turning growth into jobs?

Mimi

Exactly. All three governing parties are making employment their central promise. The National Rally of Independents is promising one million jobs. The Authenticity and Modernity Party is promising at least one million jobs. But they've been in power since 2021. Young people can see whether those promises have been kept.

Luke

One thing to note: we don't have turnout data yet, and we don't know whether young people will actually vote at all. The registered electorate is heavily weighted toward older citizens—29 percent are 60 and above, only 4 percent are 18 to 24. Even if young people wanted to vote, they're a smaller share of the electorate.

Mark

So older voters effectively have more power in this election?

Mimi

In terms of raw numbers, yes. But that also means the parties have less incentive to address youth unemployment specifically, because older voters aren't the ones facing that problem.

Luke

Though we should note that older voters have family members who are young and unemployed. The issue isn't purely generational. And the July incident with 60,000 people crossing into Ceuta—that was a broader signal of economic frustration, not just youth frustration.

Mark

What does that crossing tell us about the election?

Mimi

It shows that when people lose faith in opportunity at home, they look elsewhere. The reports linked it to economic hardship and false information on social media. It's a sign that economic frustration is real and that it's expressing itself outside formal politics.

Luke

But we should be careful not to read too much into a single incident. The reports attributed the crossings to multiple factors—migration aspirations, false expectations about Spanish court rulings, misinformation. It wasn't a referendum on the government or a prediction of how people will vote.

Mark

So what will actually determine whether this election changes anything?

Mimi

Whether the next government can convert growth into jobs. That's the structural challenge. Morocco's economy is growing, but it's not creating enough productive employment. One researcher I read argued that Morocco's economic problems are fundamentally structural and can't be solved through short-term electoral promises alone.

  • Only one in three young Moroccans trusts Parliament, yet youth unemployment has reached 37.3 percent — a combination that makes the ballot feel, to many, like a gesture rather than a lever.
  • The Ceuta crossing of 60,000 people in late July signaled how economic desperation can bypass electoral politics entirely, spilling into migration and unrest when citizens doubt that voting changes anything.
  • Three governing parties are competing with sweeping job-creation pledges — one million new positions, minimum wage increases, billion-dollar social programmes — while the returning Justice and Development Party presses them to account for five years in power.
  • Morocco's constitutional framework means the winning party governs within limits set by the monarchy, so even a decisive electoral result does not guarantee the kind of policy authority voters may be expecting.
  • Economists warn that the structural gap between growth and productive employment cannot be closed by campaign promises alone, leaving the next government to manage expectations it almost certainly cannot fully meet.

On September 23, Morocco holds a parliamentary election that is less a contest of platforms than a referendum on whether democratic participation still holds meaning for a generation locked out of economic life. Youth unemployment stands at 37.3 percent even as the economy grows at nearly five percent — a paradox that has quietly eroded trust in institutions among the very citizens who will inherit them. Within a constitutional monarchy that reserves significant power for the crown, the election's outcome will test not only which coalition governs, but whether formal politics can reclaim legitimacy before other channels of expression fill the void.

Morocco's September 23 parliamentary election will fill 395 seats across 27 competing parties, with more than 15.8 million registered voters. But the deeper question is whether Moroccans — especially younger ones — still believe the political system can address the problems that define their daily lives.

The skepticism is measurable. An Afrobarometer survey found that only about one in three Moroccans aged 18 to 35 expressed confidence in Parliament, the head of government, or political parties. This is not apathy — young Moroccans are active on social media and attend demonstrations more than their elders. The question is whether they see voting as a tool that actually works. The registered electorate itself tells a story: voters over 60 make up 29 percent of the rolls, while those aged 18 to 24 account for just 4 percent. An older population votes on behalf of a younger one struggling to find work.

The economic backdrop is paradoxical. Morocco's GDP grew 4.9 percent in 2025, with further expansion projected, yet youth unemployment sits at 37.3 percent and nearly a quarter of young people are neither working, studying, nor in training. Growth is real. Opportunity is not following.

The three governing parties — the National Rally of Independents, the Authenticity and Modernity Party, and Istiqlal — have each centered their campaigns on jobs and purchasing power, with pledges ranging from one million new positions to multibillion-dollar social programmes. The returning Justice and Development Party, which collapsed from 125 seats to 13 in 2021, is pressing the coalition to defend its record with a platform of 467 specific measures.

Morocco's constitutional monarchy shapes what any election can deliver. The king appoints the head of government from the winning party and presides over the Council of Ministers, meaning electoral victory does not translate into governing power the way it would in a pure parliamentary system. The winning coalition will govern within constraints set by the crown.

The limits of formal politics were visible in late July, when roughly 60,000 people crossed into the Spanish city of Ceuta in the largest such surge in recent memory — a convergence of economic hardship, social frustration, and circulating misinformation. It illustrated how pressure can find expression outside electoral channels when citizens doubt that voting changes their circumstances.

Economists caution that Morocco's structural employment problem runs deeper than any party platform can resolve. The next government will inherit an economy that grows without generating enough productive jobs — a gap that campaign promises alone cannot close, and that will continue to test the credibility of democratic participation long after the votes are counted.

Morocco's parliamentary election on September 23 will decide which of 27 competing parties fills 395 seats in the House of Representatives, with more than 15.8 million registered voters casting ballots. But the mechanics of the vote matter less than what it reveals about whether Moroccans—especially younger ones—still believe their political system can solve the problems that shape their days.

That skepticism runs deep among the young. An Afrobarometer survey from March found that roughly one in three Moroccans between 18 and 35 expressed confidence in Parliament, the head of government, or political parties. Yet these same young people post about politics on social media and show up to demonstrations more often than their elders. The puzzle is not apathy. It is whether they see voting as a tool that actually works.

The numbers that frame this election are stark. Youth unemployment—for those aged 15 to 24—sits at 37.3 percent, according to International Monetary Fund estimates from 2025. Nearly a quarter of young people are neither working nor in school nor in training. Meanwhile, Morocco's economy grew 4.9 percent in 2025 and is projected to expand another 4.4 percent this year. Growth is real. Jobs are not following. The registered electorate itself skews old: voters 60 and above make up 29 percent of those on the rolls, while 18-to-24-year-olds account for just 4 percent. An older population votes on behalf of a younger one that struggles to find work.

The constitutional framework within which this election unfolds matters. Morocco's 2011 constitution establishes a constitutional monarchy in which the king appoints the head of government from whichever party wins the most seats. The king also presides over the Council of Ministers. Winning an election, therefore, does not automatically translate into governing power the way it does in a pure parliamentary system. The monarchy retains a central institutional role. The winning party forms a government, but within constraints set by the crown.

The three parties that have governed together since 2021—the National Rally of Independents, the Authenticity and Modernity Party, and Istiqlal—are all making employment and purchasing power their central campaign promises. The National Rally of Independents pledges one million new jobs and a gradual increase in the minimum wage to about $530 per month. The Authenticity and Modernity Party has promised at least one million jobs and says its five-year programme will cost $37.1 billion. Istiqlal has centered its campaign on purchasing power and public services, including healthcare, housing, employment, water, and food security. The specificity of these promises reflects a political reality: employment, household income, and public services have become the measures by which voters judge whether their government is legitimate.

The Justice and Development Party, led by former head of government Abdelilah Benkirane, is attempting a comeback. In 2021, it collapsed from 125 seats to 13, allowing the current coalition to form. The party is running on a platform of 467 specific measures across institutional, economic, social, and foreign policy. Its return adds pressure to the governing parties to defend what they have accomplished since taking office.

In late July, roughly 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into the Spanish city of Ceuta in the largest surge in recent history. News reports linked the crossings to economic hardship, social unrest, and false information spreading on social media. The episode illustrated how economic frustration, migration aspirations, and perceptions of opportunity can converge—and how those pressures can express themselves outside formal electoral channels when citizens doubt that voting will change their circumstances.

The election will test whether Morocco's political system can maintain credibility by connecting its development agenda to tangible improvements in how citizens live. For younger Moroccans, the gap between low trust in institutions and very high unemployment suggests that traditional electoral politics faces competition from other forms of political expression. Economic researcher Nouh El Harmouzi has argued that the challenge runs deeper than campaign promises. Morocco's economic problems are fundamentally structural and cannot be resolved through short-term electoral pledges. The next government will inherit an economy that is growing but not creating enough productive jobs—a gap that no party platform alone can close.

Morocco's economic problems are fundamentally structural and cannot be resolved through short-term electoral promises.
— Nouh El Harmouzi, economic researcher
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