Middle East turmoil tests ASEAN unity as energy security concerns mount

The leaders of Southeast Asia are gathering in Cebu this week with an agenda already shadowed by conflict thousands of miles away. Tensions between Iran and the United States over the Strait of Hormuz have begun to fracture global energy supply chains, and the ten nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are feeling the pressure. The Philippines, which holds the rotating chair, has already trimmed the summit's schedule and cut back non-essential activities—a sign of how seriously the bloc is taking the moment.

The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, moves roughly a quarter of the world's seaborne oil. Since late February, when the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran, Tehran has largely blocked the passage. For countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, which depend heavily on Middle Eastern oil imports, the disruption is immediate and costly. Metro Manila has already begun rolling out energy-saving measures—cutting fuel allocations for government vehicles, rationing power in ways that ripple through daily life. The uncertainty is compounding the problem. Graham Ong-Webb, an analyst at Singapore's S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, points out that the real complication is not the Middle East itself but the shifting signals from Washington. The Trump administration's messaging on the region keeps changing, he says, and markets are growing nervous. Governments are becoming more cautious, pulling back on long-term commitments when they cannot predict what comes next.

ASEAN has held firm to a public position: the conflict must be resolved through diplomacy and peaceful means. But behind that unified statement, the bloc is fracturing along the lines of national interest. Two weeks before the summit, Indonesia's Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa proposed something that exposed the fissures. He floated the idea of imposing a levy on ships passing through the Malacca Strait—one of the world's most critical shipping lanes, bordered by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The inspiration was transparent: Iran's plan to charge vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. If Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore split the revenue three ways, Purbaya suggested, ASEAN could turn global turmoil into regional gain. The proposal was quickly shot down by Singapore's and Indonesia's own foreign ministers, but it revealed something important. Some ASEAN members are asking whether they can benefit directly from the crisis, whether their geographic position along global trade routes is an asset to be monetized.

Other analysts worry this thinking corrodes ASEAN's credibility. The bloc has long positioned itself as a defender of the rules-based international order and international law. If it begins exploiting chokepoints the way Iran is doing, it undermines that moral authority. As one expert noted, it would be disadvantageous for ASEAN to pursue such options precisely because the bloc's strength has always rested on its principled stance. But the proposal also exposed how differently ASEAN members experience the crisis. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have greater domestic energy capacity and are leaning on subsidies and price controls to manage the shock. The Philippines and Vietnam, by contrast, are far more exposed to import disruptions and have fewer tools to cushion the blow.

Given these fractures, analysts expect the summit to produce modest outcomes. ASEAN operates by consensus, which means major coordinated action is unlikely when member states have conflicting priorities. The bloc will probably issue a statement affirming solidarity in difficult times. Leaders will discuss practical steps—how to protect maritime traffic, manage fuel supplies, stabilize food prices, and support migrant workers who send money home. But the real work will happen at the national level, each country managing its own exposure as best it can.

The longer-term picture depends on whether ASEAN can deepen its internal cooperation on energy. The bloc is pursuing ratification of the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, but it is voluntary and non-binding—which means its immediate value in a crisis is limited. What could matter over time is the vision of an ASEAN power grid, a genuine cross-border arrangement that would let countries trade energy across borders and give the bloc collective bargaining power. That kind of infrastructure takes years to build. In the meantime, ASEAN is also looking outward, toward partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council and individual Gulf nations. Oman, for instance, has already bought defence equipment from Singapore. These ties can diversify ASEAN's energy sources and strengthen its diplomatic channels. But again, this is a long game, and the crisis is unfolding now.